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Across the world, democratic deficits arise from a growing gap between citizens’ 
expectations and the way they perceive political systems to operate in practice. 
Deliberative theory offers a potential solution by advocating the direct involvement 
of ordinary citizens in structured decision-making. This approach has been 
increasingly applied to real-world decision-making through mini-public initiatives. 
This thesis investigates the largely neglected relationship between citizens’ 
assemblies, as one established form of mini-public, and their perceived legitimacy 
from the perspective of the maxi-public. Compared to other modes of decision-
making, to what extent do people regard citizens’ assemblies as legitimate? And are 
there design features of citizens’ assemblies that strengthen or weaken perceptions of 
their legitimacy?  
These questions are applied to the deeply divided case of Northern Ireland, 
where it can be particularly challenging to design democratic institutions that 
command popular legitimacy. Cross-sectional survey data reveal largely favourable 
attitudes towards citizens’ assemblies, especially compared to some more familiar 
modes of decision-making. The results of a series of complementary online 
experiments find that specific design features of citizens’ assemblies have no direct 
effect on perceived legitimacy. However, there is some variation at the individual-
level, suggesting that the design features of a citizens’ assembly should reflect its 
purpose and the broader context. Overall, the findings suggest that the establishment 
of citizens’ assemblies alongside existing institutions can make a positive 
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Apollo 13: Houston, Houston, Apollo 13. Over. 
Mission Control: Good morning, 13. […] Spacecraft is in real good shape as 
far as we’re concerned, Jim. We’re bored to tears down here. 
Radio communication between Apollo 13 Commander Jim Lovell and  
Mission Control, 12 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 120) 
 
 
When Francis Fukuyama ruminated the ‘end of history’ in 1989, he sparked an 
enduring debate in political science. Many scholars, often implicitly, came to share 
the basic contention that liberal democracy had indeed emerged “as the final form of 
human government” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). Though plenty of critics feared its 
prematurity, the proposition proved attractive not just for its comforting optimism 
against the backdrop of an uncertain post-Cold War order, but also for its apparent 
predictive validity. From the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe to the 
dictatorships of Latin America, regime transitions around the world largely affirmed 
the spread and consolidation of democracy. For much of the two decades that 
followed the end of the Cold War, the global march towards ‘more democracy’ 
appeared relatively sure-footed and unidirectional.  
 More recent observations suggest that the journey is, in fact, much more 
precarious, with mounting evidence of backsliding and exertion. It is not just that 
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newly democratised systems have struggled to consolidate; established democracies 
are also facing a crisis of legitimacy, marked by falling popular support for 
representative institutions (Foa and Mounk, 2016; Fishkin and Mansbridge, 2017). 
Diamond (2015: 144) argues that a “protracted democratic recession” has been 
underway since 2006, and most of the indicators have less to do with citizens 
abandoning an underlying commitment to basic democratic principles and, rather, 
much more to do with the failure of existing institutions and processes to meet 
citizens’ democratic expectations. This, in turn, may leave increasingly critical 
citizens willing to consider non-democratic forms of government (Norris, 1999; 
2011).   
Fukuyama’s argument may yet be proven right, but if liberal democracy is to 
survive, let alone triumph over its rivals, we need to review some of the basic 
elements of modern democracy that are often taken for granted. For instance, are 
elections the only legitimate way of selecting decision-makers? Should decision-
making rest on the agendas of political parties? And are existing institutions and 
procedures adequately designed to promote constructive problem-solving and avoid 
potentially toxic gridlock? If, after critical reflection, any of these answers turns out 
to be ‘no’, we need to consider radical reforms to the way democratic political 
systems operate if they are to earn their unassailable place in history.  
 
1.1  Contextualising the Problem 
This thesis confronts the basic problem of a perceived democratic deficit, defined as 
the failure of a political system to meet citizens’ expectations for democratic 
decision-making. Drawing on Fishkin (1991; 2009), these expectations are rooted in 
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the ability of a political system to deliver the democratic principles of political 
equality, deliberation, and non-tyranny. When the process of selecting decision-
makers undermines the promotion of political equality, when decision-making lacks 
meaningful deliberation, or when decisions are taken with tyrannical consequences 
for certain individuals, either in isolation or in combination, decision-making will 
lack the level of legitimacy required to sustain a healthy, functioning democracy. 
The present research builds on previous literature in political psychology that finds 
citizens’ evaluations of democratic legitimacy to be a function of the procedural 
performance of a political system, distinct from the substantive outcomes produced 
by the system (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; 2002). Accordingly, it assumes that 
reforms to the process of making democratic decisions can enhance (or diminish) the 
extent to which citizens perceive the system to be legitimate.  
In deeply divided places, especially those emerging from violent conflict, the 
very existence of democratic governance is often precarious. In these polities, 
Morrow (2005: 45) emphasises the fundamental “struggle to find and implement 
democratic institutions that can manage conflict in ways that can be accepted as 
legitimate.” Compared to democracies that are less divided and more established, the 
inherent difficulty in designing and maintaining a democratic political system in a 
deeply divided polity is more obvious; the survival of democratic institutions and 
processes is rarely taken for granted. Consequently, such contexts are particularly 
relevant for the study of democratic deficits – and, more urgently, for potential 
remedies. For these reasons, this thesis adopts post-conflict Northern Ireland as a 
pertinent case study. Having emerged from three decades of ethno-national conflict, 
Northern Ireland’s political experience has been decidedly mixed during the two 
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decades that followed: positive, in the sense that peace has firmly taken hold, and yet 
citizens have been left largely disappointed by their new institutions of government.  
The 1998 peace settlement, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, has been 
heralded internationally as a success story for its application of consociational theory 
to the management of ethno-national conflict (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; 
McCulloch, 2014). In practice, however, the democratic performance of the political 
system it created leaves much to be desired. By entrenching the ethno-national 
ideological dimension within the system, centrist views are under-represented among 
decision-makers. The process of making decisions tends to be intensely partisan, 
marked by opaque bargaining over fixed interests. These features, coupled with a 
low veto threshold, combine to make gridlock a regular occurrence, preventing 
important policy decisions from being taken and undermining citizens’ perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the process.  
This underlying democratic deficit leaves the system poorly equipped to 
confront the moments of acute political crisis that are typical in deeply divided 
places. If citizens’ evaluations of a political system are so poor, there is a danger that 
the system will not be able to withstand such a crisis. In any deeply divided society 
with a relatively short experience of peace, a power vacuum has the potential to be 
filled by a return to violence (Belloni, 2008). Given that Northern Ireland is often 
treated as an exemplar of consociational democratic design, exploring effective ways 
of helping to avoid such an outcome will offer important insights with a high degree 
of generalisability to other consociational polities. Beyond these, given the emerging 
divisions in many traditionally stable democracies, there is particular contemporary 
value in studying democratic performance in a place with a history of managing (and 
mismanaging) deep divisions. 
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1.2  Addressing the Problem 
A potential answer to democratic deficits could lie in empowering the dēmos 
themselves. In ancient Athens and other city-states, the earliest forms of democracy 
saw ordinary citizens directly engaged in political decision-making (Dahl, 1989). As 
the nation-state replaced the city-state as the dominant mode of political 
organisation, citizens came to play a much less direct role in public affairs, 
transforming our understanding of democratic governance. Over the last number of 
decades, however, a deliberative turn in democratic theory has been associated with 
a renewed emphasis on the formal involvement of ordinary citizens in politics: 
“Increasingly, democratic legitimacy [has come] to be seen in terms of the ability or 
opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of those subject to 
collective decisions” (Dryzek, 2000: 1).  
 Similarly, deliberative theory has increasingly been put into institutional 
practice, with the emergence of a healthy supply of democratic innovations designed 
to strengthen the legitimacy of decision-making (Smith, 2009). These include mini-
publics, of which citizens’ assemblies constitute “the most extensive modern form of 
collective decision-making by common folk” (Fournier et al. 2011: 10). Members of 
these bodies, usually around one hundred or more in number, are randomly selected 
from the wider population. They learn about a given issue, deliberate about the best 
way forward, and take a decision. The Canadian province of British Columbia 
pioneered the use of citizens’ assemblies in 2004, when its government 
commissioned one on the issue of electoral reform (Warren and Pearse, 2008). 
Citizens’ assemblies have subsequently been held in Ontario, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Poland, and the United Kingdom. A growing international precedent is 
being set whereby ordinary citizens are demonstrating both their competence and 
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appetite to be involved in political decision-making alongside existing representative 
institutions and processes. 
 Turning to the case of Northern Ireland and its rather extreme democratic 
deficit, there is a precedent for formally embedding civil society in the political 
process. Along with an elected Assembly and Executive, the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement established a Civic Forum. The advisory body comprised sixty members 
appointed by the First and deputy First Minister to represent different sectors of civil 
society, including trade unionism, business, education, the voluntary and community 
sectors, and churches. However, it quickly earned a reputation as a “talking shop” on 
a vague set of issues, lacking a clear sense of purpose and connection to the wider 
public as a whole (Donnelly, 2015: 35). Partly because of its corporatist membership 
linked to arbitrarily defined groups, partly because of its rather vague decision-
making remit, and partly because of a perception that its output was inconsequential, 
there was insufficient enthusiasm to preserve the Civic Forum alongside Northern 
Ireland’s elected institutions; it lasted only two years (McCaffrey, 2013). 
Nonetheless, its failure offers a valuable lesson: democratic institutions must be 
established with a carefully defined (and valued) role from the outset, and the key 
elements of their practical design must effectively facilitate this objective.  
 With an apparently growing need for citizen-based democratic innovations to 
help compensate for the contemporary weaknesses of elected institutions, there is a 
corresponding need to empirically interrogate the likely effectiveness of such 
institutional experiments. While the literature on deliberative democracy has 
expanded considerably in recent years to encompass questions of both normative and 
empirical inquiry, empirical research has overwhelmingly focused on the effect of 
mini-public deliberation on the relatively small number of people participating. The 
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findings largely confirm theoretical expectations that citizens value the experience of 
taking part (Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Niemeyer, 2011; Knobloch and Gastil, 2015). 
 What is less clear is the nature of the psychological relationship between 
mini-publics and the broader population – what may be termed the maxi-public. 
Beyond consistent evidence of the positive internal dynamics within citizens’ 
assemblies and other mini-publics, what is the external effect of such institutions on 
the attitudes of the citizens who are not involved? A small number of empirical 
studies have explored maxi-public attitudes towards deliberative mini-publics. Gastil 
et al. (2016) find that people largely value the contribution of citizen panels in a 
number of American states, while Jäske (2018) finds that local-level participatory 
innovations in Finland, ranging from citizen juries to participatory budgeting, have a 
positive influence on the perceived legitimacy of decision-making. More generally, 
Neblo et al. (2010) find that there is popular demand for deliberative initiatives, 
particularly from people who are less likely to participate in conventional politics. 
 This thesis builds on these studies of public opinion by focusing specifically 
on the relationship between citizens’ assemblies and perceived legitimacy, and the 
broader implications of this relationship for democratic performance. Can citizens’ 
assemblies meet people’s general expectations for the delivery of the democratic 
principles of political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny? And, importantly, how 
do people’s evaluations of these democratic innovations compare to their evaluations 
of more conventional modes of decision-making? In other words, if democratic 
deficits stem from the failure of political systems to meet citizens’ expectations, can 
the institutionalisation of citizens’ assemblies help to target some of these 
symptoms? These questions capture the overarching motivation behind the present 
research. 
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1.3  Overview of the Thesis 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the potential for deliberative mini-publics, in the 
form of citizens’ assemblies, to strengthen the democratic performance of a political 
system from the perspective of the maxi-public. It takes a positivist approach, 
seeking not to argue that citizens’ assemblies have an inherently positive effect on 
the legitimacy of a political system, but rather to first test whether or not they are 
perceived to make a positive contribution to democratic performance by citizens 
themselves. In scientific research, “the goal is inference” (King et al. 1994: 7). The 
question for this thesis, therefore, becomes one of how to construct a research design 
that can generate the strongest possible inferences. This is important because the 
audience of this research is not limited to the field of political science; it is hoped 
that its theoretical and empirical insights will help policy-makers make informed 
decisions on the most effective use of citizens’ assemblies in democratic practice. 
Drawing on both observational and experimental data, collected face-to-face and 
online between 2015 and 2018, this thesis conducts a systematic analysis of the 
likely effect of mini-public decision-making on the attitudes of the maxi-public in a 
place with a deep-rooted democratic deficit, Northern Ireland. 
Chapter Two begins by setting out a theoretical framework in which 
democratic deficits may be diagnosed in the first place, and subsequently addressed. 
It conceptualises democratic decision-making as a basic system: citizens’ political 
preferences provide inputs that pass through established decision-making processes 
before being transformed into policy outputs. Citizens’ collective feedback on the 
system’s performance offers a crucial measure of legitimacy: negative evaluations 
signal that the system is falling short of citizens’ expectations for the delivery of 
political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny. When this is the case, it is necessary 
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for the system to be supplemented with a control mechanism to close the deficit 
between expected and actual democratic performance. Turning to the literature on 
deliberative democracy, the second half of this chapter argues that mini-publics, 
institutionalised as citizens’ assemblies, can help to serve this role by strengthening 
the perceived legitimacy of decision-making. In other words, it is argued that 
citizens’ assemblies can help to control democratic deficits. 
Chapter Three applies this theoretical framework to the deeply divided case 
of post-conflict Northern Ireland. Drawing on preliminary empirical evidence, it 
establishes the nature and magnitude of the problem facing Northern Ireland’s 
consociational political system. Chapter Four proceeds to investigate the extent to 
which citizens’ assemblies can offer a viable solution. Framed against the backdrop 
of a political crisis, it analyses cross-sectional survey data to weigh up basic attitudes 
towards citizens’ assemblies compared to other, more conventional, modes of 
decision-making. Sixty-five percent of respondents think that it would be a good or 
very good idea for citizens’ assemblies to play a formal role in decision-making. The 
analysis shows that citizens’ assemblies are perceived by the maxi-public to be 
equally or more legitimate than more familiar alternatives and, crucially, that 
positive evaluations are particularly high among individuals hypothesised to be 
poorly served by the existing political system. A follow-up survey experiment 
confirms that these initial procedural evaluations are robust: a clear majority of 
respondents say they would accept a decision taken by a citizens’ assembly, even 
when the decision runs contrary to their own instrumental preferences. Levels of 
acceptance are comparable to those for most other modes of decision-making, 
suggesting that decision-making by citizens’ assemblies can attract the consent of 
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those who do not get the decisions they want. This is a fundamental indicator of 
democratic legitimacy. 
In a series of complementary online experiments, the next three empirical 
chapters examine the different ways of designing citizens’ assemblies that could 
strengthen or weaken perceptions of their legitimacy, with particular attention to the 
context of a deeply divided place. Are there different ways of designing citizens’ 
assemblies that can maximise their perceived legitimacy across different levels of 
ethno-national ideology and across different groups?  
Chapter Five addresses the selection of mini-public members at the input 
stage of decision-making. Does the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assemblies 
depend on the profile of their members and how they are chosen? Chapter Six moves 
on to the nature of decision-making at the throughput stage of the process. Does 
deliberation strengthen the perceived legitimacy of mini-public decision-making? 
Chapter Seven considers the decision power of citizens’ assemblies. Does a citizens’ 
assembly’s embedded relationship with other decision-making processes, such as 
referendums or votes in the legislative Assembly, make it regarded as a more or less 
legitimate body? In the studies presented in these three chapters, each hypothetical 
model of citizens’ assembly was consistently viewed as more legitimate than the 
real-world Northern Ireland Assembly, indicating considerable scope for such bodies 
to help reduce a perceived democratic deficit, at least in the case of Northern Ireland. 
The findings also offer a large degree of flexibility concerning the institutional 
design of citizens’ assemblies. 
Chapter Eight discusses the implications of this research for the application 
of deliberative mini-publics to deeply divided settings, both in the specific context of 
Northern Ireland and in the wider context of constitutional design in other polities 
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with consociational systems of government. More generally, this chapter considers 
the methodological contribution of this thesis to the field of political science, and the 
theoretical contribution it makes to the literature on deliberation and democratic 
innovations.  
The reader will notice that each chapter begins by paying homage to the 
failed Apollo 13 lunar mission, quoting some of the air-to-ground radio exchanges 
between the crew and Mission Control. These references may seem curious; the 
parallels between space exploration and democratic governance are perhaps not 
instantly obvious. And yet both endeavours represent daringly bold efforts of human 
ingenuity, venturing into the unknown of space and time. Neither are they accidental, 
spontaneous outcomes. On the contrary, they result from conscious efforts to achieve 
goals once thought unthinkable: to land on the moon, or to let the dēmos govern 
themselves.  
Having become normalised features of everyday life, it is easy to take the 
continued pursuit of such goals for granted. Just after Apollo 13 blasted off from 
Cape Kennedy on 11 April 1970, its crew filmed a live broadcast for viewers back 
on earth. None of the major US networks carried it, considering it to be insufficiently 
interesting or newsworthy, especially in light of the successful moon landing of the 
previous year. Their calculation changed when the mission descended into crisis: an 
exploded oxygen tank left the Apollo 13 spacecraft unable to reach the moon, with 
little certainty that it could even make it back to earth. It did, owing much to the 
unwavering determination of the crew and Mission Control to ‘work the problem’ 
and respond effectively. There was nothing routine about the mission to begin with, 
but it took a crisis to shake off any sense of complacency and, in turn, to provide an 
opportunity to learn lessons and explore new possibilities. 
		 12 
The challenges threatening the sustainability of democratic political systems 
may not carry the same weight of impending peril. Unlike missions to space, the 
journey has neither a fixed duration nor a clear destination. As such, compounded by 
the problem of citizens’ increasingly high expectations, the mission of maintaining 
democratic governance lacks a tangible measure of success. Likewise, its relative 
abstraction makes it harder to identify when things go wrong, and harder still to 
appreciate the urgent need for an intervention when they do. It is against an 
increasingly stark backdrop of democracy in crisis that this thesis joins a growing 












Apollo 13: I believe we’ve had a problem here. 
Mission Control: This is Houston. Say again, please. 
Apollo 13: Houston, we’ve had a problem. 
Radio communication between Commander Jim Lovell and Mission 
Control, 13 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 160) 
 
 
The essence of politics lies in the making of decisions. The essence of a democratic 
political system lies in the making of decisions that can be accepted as legitimate by 
its citizens. By extension, when it comes to assessing the democratic health of a 
political system, the attitudes of citizens themselves serve as a vital indicator of any 
underlying problems (Easton, 1965: 96). People formulate subjective judgements 
about the decision-making process, weighing up the extent to which arrangements 
are “appropriate, proper and just” (Tyler, 2006: 376). On the one hand, citizens may 
perceive a political system to be fundamentally legitimate because they believe in 
the values underpinning it; they identify with its normative foundation. This is an 
affective relationship, marked by diffuse support. On the other hand, citizens may 
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perceive a political system to be legitimate because they hold a broadly positive 
evaluation of the way in which its decision-making process performs on a day-to-day 
basis. This is an evaluative relationship, marked by a form of system support that is 
more specific in nature (Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965). When the process 
of political decision-making routinely fails to meet citizens’ expectations, the system 
has a problem: a democratic deficit. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of this kind of problem, 
but also to move beyond it by setting out a targeted solution: the application of 
deliberative democracy. The argument develops in two main stages. It begins by 
presenting a theoretical framework for diagnosing a democratic deficit, holding that 
citizens’ evaluative perceptions of a system’s legitimacy are a function of the way in 
which the system converts inputs into outputs. This framework follows Easton’s 
(1965) conceptualisation of political decision-making as a system, before drawing on 
Fishkin (1991) for a set of core democratic principles that citizens could reasonably 
expect to observe from it: political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny. The extent 
to which decision-making promotes these principles should explain the extent to 
which citizens perceive the system to be legitimate.  
Second, this chapter observes that when any system suffers from sub-optimal 
performance, a supplementary control mechanism is often necessary to correct it. 
Applied to political systems experiencing a democratic deficit, it is argued that mini-
publics could help to fulfil this remedial role. By promoting Fishkin’s key principles, 
these democratic innovations have the potential to strengthen people’s perceptions of 
the legitimacy of decision-making. Specifically, the chapter considers how one type 
of mini-public, citizens’ assemblies, could supplement the existing institutions of a 
political system to help to meaningfully control the system’s perceived deficiencies. 
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2.1  Perceived Legitimacy in a Political System 
As a departure point, let us consider the general process of political decision-making 
as a basic system. Reduced to its simplest form, a system is defined by a set of 
elements that, in combination, produce a result. A desired behaviour or demand, v, is 
converted into an observed behaviour or output, y (Leigh, 2012).1 Applied to the 
political domain, citizens’ demands supply the system with its core inputs; these are 
fed into an established set of procedures, and public policy decisions are the outputs 
(Easton, 1965).2 A democratic political system, however, can never be strictly linear: 
it must possess the dynamic capacity to interact with its environment (i.e. citizens) 
over time. If a necessary function of such a system is to generate decisions worthy of 
being considered legitimate, it follows that citizens’ observations of the system, and 
how it reaches those decisions, must ultimately form part of our understanding of the 








Figure 2.1: A basic democratic political system (adapted from Easton, 1965: 32)  
																																																								
1 The idea of a ‘system’ has its etymological roots in the Greek compound sýstēma, derived from syn 
(to combine) and histanai (to cause to stand). See Harper (2017) for more detail.  
2 Easton’s (1965) systems approach has been widely adopted in political science. See, for example, 
Hix and Høyland (2011), Norris (1999; 2011), and Schmidt (2013). However, it was Plato who first 
introduced cybernetics to political philosophy (Piotrowski, 2012). 
3 As Easton (1965: 23) acknowledges, “No one way of conceptualising any major area of human 
behaviour will do full justice to all its variety and complexity.” The conceptual approach adopted in 
this thesis is necessarily reductionist to meaningfully address the overall research question. 
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Easton (1965; 1975) distinguishes between two basic orientations of citizens’ 
observations of the political system.4 Its environment supplies diffuse support: a 
favourable distribution of norms and values across a given society provides some of 
the necessary conditions for the system to endure. Diffuse support is not generally 
sensitive to the quotidian performance of the system but, rather, “consists of a 
‘reservoir of favourable attitudes’” underpinning it (Easton, 1975: 444). It is 
characterised by an ideological durability and sense of collective identity that instil 
“a willingness to maintain and defend the structures or norms of a regime even if 
they produce unfavourable consequences” (Easton, 1975: 451). In other words, 
citizens may not always hold favourable attitudes towards the immediate political 
process or its decisions, but affective attitudes towards the system remain positive 
itself due to an underlying, socialised perception of its fundamental, long-term 
legitimacy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dalton, 1999: 74). 
In contrast, the level of specific support towards a system is a function of its 
perceived performance. Oriented towards a much narrower temporal focus, citizens 
observe the behaviour of the system, compare it against their expectations, and are 
thus able to make (and update) short-term evaluations. The feedback loop depicted in 
Figure 2.1 constitutes an empirical measure of legitimacy based on the “satisfaction 
that members of a system feel they obtain from (its) perceived outputs and 
performance” (Easton, 1975: 437). High levels of specific support indicate a system 
in good democratic health; low levels symptomise a short-term democratic deficit, 
where there is a “gap between aspirations and satisfaction” in the functioning of 
democracy (Norris, 2011: 5).  																																																								
4 This is a simplification of Easton’s argument. On top of the broad concepts of diffuse and specific 
system support, he posits that legitimacy can be directed at different objects – the regime or the 
authorities – and that it has different sources – ideology, structure and personal qualities (Easton, 
1965: 287). In the present chapter the focus is kept deliberately broad: on the overall political system. 
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This conceptual distinction between diffuse and specific support is important. 
If legitimacy is venting from a political system, whereby citizens’ levels of support 
are trending towards the negative, we must identify the orientation of their low or 
declining support in order to successfully diagnose the problem and prescribe an 
appropriate solution. If, for example, citizens have fundamentally low levels of 
diffuse support towards their political system, this kind of diffuse-oriented 
democratic deficit may not be easily bridged in the short-term by electing a new 
government or designing process-based reforms to the system (Norris, 2011: 238). 
Similarly, if a particular administration is unpopular and does not satisfy the 
expectations of the electorate, this kind of performance-oriented democratic deficit 
may not be of great concern for the fundamental long-term survival of the system. 
Indeed, it may be addressed by simply electing a new administration. 
 However, there is a critical qualification to this distinction. While Easton 
generally treats the concepts of diffuse and specific support as mutually independent, 
there are conditions in which levels of specific support can influence levels of 
diffuse support. He notes that in some instances, the “frustration of expectations can 
so jolt the deeper loyalties of the members of a system that their diffuse support falls 
into a precipitous decline” (Easton, 1975: 445). This possibility can be understood as 
the potential for disturbance or stress to affect the behaviour of the system and, 
consequently, its relationship with its environment.5 If the performance of a system 
is suddenly or consistently perceived to fall short of the democratic expectations of a 
sufficient number of citizens, this negative feedback could elicit a deeper erosion of 
diffuse support for the system. Without sufficient levels of diffuse support, a 
political system may be unable to survive (Easton, 1965: 96). Therefore, depending 																																																								
5 Disturbance or stress can enter the political system through sudden changes to citizens’ demands, or 
through new environmental input(s), such as a political crisis. 
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on the context, a system’s long-term durability may well depend on the extent to 
which citizens negatively evaluate its short-term performance. 
 Beyond the distinction between diffuse and specific support, we must further 
distinguish between two possible sources of the latter. In Figure 2.1, a citizen may 
observe the public policies emerging from the system and develop positive or 
negative assessments based purely on these outputs. This is an instrumental measure 
of support: an individual accepts a decision produced by a political system by virtue 
of its substance. Lipset (1959) argued, for example, that tangible economic 
development helped to establish the legitimacy of new political systems, while the 
process of European integration has historically been justified in terms of its positive 
effects on citizens’ lives (Lindgren and Persson, 2010). For Arneson (2003: 122), a 
democratic system is legitimate because “its operation over time produces better 
consequences for people than any feasible alternative model of governance.”  
This type of outcome-based support for decision-making does not require 
individuals to be motivated by calculations of self-interest. They may instead be 
motivated by a desire for outcomes to reflect collective interests, for the allocation of 
public resources and services to promote distributive justice or distributive fairness 
(Brockner and Wisenfeld, 1996; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Pratto et al. 1999; 
Appelbaum, 2001; Huddy et al. 2001). Still, taken to the extreme, a purely 
instrumentalist approach to democracy reduces a political system as a means to an 
end, leaving evaluations largely detached from questions of process design (Raz, 
1995; Wall, 2007). If other (non-democratic) means can be shown to reach the same 
ends, this approach would fail to adequately justify democratic decision-making on 
its own terms. It is, of course perfectly reasonable to measure the level of popular 
support for specific types of policy outcomes, and presumably something would be 
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faulty if a democratic system consistently delivered outcomes to which most citizens 
objected, but such a narrow, conditional measure of support cannot be taken as a 
proxy for the legitimacy of the system itself. 
On the other hand, a citizen may evaluate the system’s performance based on 
the way in which inputs (citizens’ demands) are converted into outputs (public 
policies). This is a procedural approach to system support: an individual 
unconditionally accepts the decision produced by a political system by virtue of the 
process preceding it, regardless of the substance of the decision itself. From this 
perspective, the way in which a decision-making process is designed is a necessary 
determinant of its democratic status, independent of the perceived favourability of its 
results (Gaus, 1997; Waldron, 1999; Holzhacker, 2007; Christiano, 2008). By 
emphasising the means by which a decision is produced, it is this orientation of 
system support that captures the concept of legitimacy. Building on Tyler (1990), 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995: 15) articulate this proceduralist account: 
 
In essence, an important element of process is people’s perceptions that 
decisions have been made fairly, and these perceptions of the fairness of the 
process are separate from perceptions of the actual substantive decision. Even 
if the policy outcome goes against a person’s interest, his or her assessment 
of the system will be more positive if the process is perceived as procedurally 
just. 
 
In the aggregate, instrumental and procedural factors may both shape citizens’ 
evaluations of a system’s performance, but only the latter can be described as a 
robust measure of its legitimacy. Given the choice, citizens will inevitably prefer to 
see public policies with which they agree, particularly on those issues that affect or 
interest them the most. Frustrated with certain decisions, some individuals may 
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blame the system itself and evaluate its performance accordingly, ignoring the extent 
to which the decision-making process met their democratic expectations. In 
heterogeneous places, however, it is inconceivable that all citizens can consistently 
expect to observe their preferred political outcomes. People will sometimes, perhaps 
even often, be disappointed by the results of the democratic process, especially as 
democratic governments increasingly confront external constraints that limit their 
realistic scope for action (see Strange, 1996; Genschel, 2004; Scharpf, 2011). As 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse note, an instrumentally unfavourable decision will not 
necessarily go unnoticed, but citizens’ (negative) instrumental evaluations of the 
system’s performance should be offset if they still perceive its decision-making 
procedures to be fundamentally legitimate.6  
Empirically, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) demonstrate that people do 
indeed evaluate the processes by which democratic decisions are made, and that 
these perceptions predict citizens’ support for the political system in the United 
States. With a growing popular recognition of a democratic deficit in the European 
Union (EU), scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the processes and 
procedures of decision-making rather than simply policy outcomes (Follesdal and 
Hix, 2006; Borrás et al. 2007; Risse and Kleine, 2007; Schmidt, 2013). Survey data 
from across all member states of the European Union confirm that citizens’ levels of 
satisfaction with EU democracy are influenced by both outputs and procedural 
factors (Hobolt, 2012). Moreover, successive studies in social psychology have 
found that individuals are more likely to accept the decisions of authorities when 
they believe they have been made fairly (De Cremer and van Knippenberg, 2002; 																																																								
6 This idea is related to Fiorina’s (1981) argument that voters keep a ‘running tally’ of positive and 
negative evaluations of political parties. Similarly, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995: 13) argue that 
“support for the political system should be viewed as a running tally of favourable and unfavourable 
features people associate with the system. Support for any kind is by definition more than reactions to 
any single output or action” (emphasis added). 
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Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006; Jackson et al. 2012; Mazerolle et al. 2012; 
Bradford, 2014; Urbańska, 2017). 
 Thus, if we accept the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse contention that citizens do, 
to some extent, care about the way in which decisions are made, we must now 
consider the sequential elements of the process that may shape evaluations of the 
system’s legitimacy. Drawing on Figure 2.1, there are three essential stages of a 
democratic system through which inputs are converted into outputs. First, citizens’ 
initial demands must be channelled into the system by some form of selection 
process. Who are the individuals who will decide what public policy should be? Do 
citizens perceive this selection process to be legitimate? Second, decisions on public 
policy must be made before they are taken. In other words, decision-making involves 
the consideration of different possible courses of action before one is pursued. Do 
citizens perceive this part of the process to be legitimate? Finally, a decision must be 
taken by a formal procedure for it to emerge as an output of the system. What is the 
binding mechanism through which a decision can be formally recognised as such? 
Do citizens perceive this decision-taking mechanism to be legitimate? To be able to 
apply these questions to an empirical case, we need to specify the basic standards 
citizens can reasonably expect from each of these stages of democratic decision-
making. 
 
2.2  Democratic Expectations 
In the absence of a single democratic theory, there is of course no single standard 
from which to evaluate a system’s procedural performance, the extent to which it is 
perceived to be legitimate. For Fishkin (1991), however, it is possible to identify 
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core principles that are to be expected from any democratic system. To various 
degrees of success, “a fully defensible version of democracy must simultaneously 
fulfil three conditions: it must achieve political equality, its decisions must embody 
deliberation, and it must avoid tyranny of the majority” (Fishkin, 1991: 12; emphasis 
added). Different visions of democracy place different weights on the normative 
importance of each of these principles.7 Fishkin himself accepts that, in practice, it is 
difficult to realise all three to an equal degree; trade-offs emerge in different 
models.8 Competitive democracy, associated with Schumpeter (1962) and Dahl 
(1989), places great weight on political equality by ensuring all citizens have an 
equal vote at the selection stage, with less emphasis on deliberation. Elite 
deliberation, places little weight on political equality, instead emphasising the 
Madisonian “‘indirect filtration’ of mass public opinion” (Fishkin, 2009: 70).  
Deliberative democracy, necessarily, embodies deliberation, but has an ambivalent 
commitment to non-tyranny. These principles, thus, allow scope for normative 
disagreement over the extent to which each should be prioritised in the design of a 
democratic system, while still providing a meaningful set of theoretical expectations 
against which a system’s democratic process may be evaluated. 
Fishkin’s principles correspond closely with the key stages of a democratic 
system. Political equality is the “equal consideration of political preferences” 
(Fishkin, 2009: 43). Thus, when citizens’ demands enter the political system, the 
selection process should give individuals an equal chance to voice their political 
preferences at the input stage. Deliberation is then the “process by which (selected) 
																																																								
7 Helpfully, Fishkin’s three conditions broadly correlate with the three basic functions Warren (2017: 
43-45) holds that a democratic political system must perform: empowering inclusions, enabling the 
formation of a collective will, and generating binding collective decisions.  
8 Fishkin (2009: 32) refers to this as the “trilemma” of democratic reform… Indeed, he recognises that 
a political system may satisfy one or two of the three conditions, and actively undermine the rest 
(Fishkin, 1991: 29).  
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individuals sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in discussions 
together” (Fishkin, 2009: 33). This occurs after receiving the inputs (citizens’ 
demands) but before outputs (policy decisions) are produced, constituting a 
throughput stage of a system. Finally, the decision that is taken (or not taken) must 
not “impose severe deprivations of essential interests when an alternative policy 
could be chosen” (Fishkin, 2009: 62). This principle can be applied to substantive 
outcomes, but, for our purposes, it can be used for procedural evaluation; that is, 
examining the extent to which a system is designed with the intention of avoiding 
tyrannical consequences, either by a majority or a minority.  
These principles are summarised in Table 2.1, corresponding with the stages 
of a political system through which inputs are democratically converted into outputs. 
This provides a general framework for the study of legitimacy in any political 
system. Where the system meets the expected democratic principle, we would have 
reason to expect citizens to perceive that stage of the system to be legitimate. On the 
contrary, where a system fails to meet these democratic expectations, citizens may 
develop negative evaluations of its procedural performance. Against these principles, 
therefore, this framework can be used to diagnose a democratic deficit in the way a 
political system is perceived to operate, and to help prescribe an appropriate remedy. 
 
 Stage of Political System 
 Input â Throughput â Output 
Process feature Selection of 
decision-makers 




Political equality Deliberation Non-tyranny 
Table 2.1: Democratic principles expected at different stages of a political system 
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At this stage, two qualifications should be attached to the framework presented. 
First, it does not rigidly imply that each of Fishkin’s democratic conditions can only 
be realised at a single stage of the system; they are transferable across different 
stages of decision-making. For example, both political equality and non-tyranny are 
likely to be desirable principles in the throughput stage of decision-making, in 
addition to deliberation. Similarly, deliberation may be a desirable feature in the 
selection of decision-makers at the input stage, such as during an election campaign. 
The goal of the framework summarised in Table 2.1 is simply to identify the stages 
of decision-making at which the delivery (or otherwise) of each respective principle 
is most relevant and tangible.  
Second, it is important to note that in later work Fishkin (2009: 45) adds 
participation as a fourth condition for a fully realised version of democracy, defined 
as “behaviour on the part of members of the mass public directed at influencing, 
directly or indirectly, the formulation, adoption, or implementation of governmental 
or policy choices.” However, the present framework proceeds with Fishkin’s original 
specification on the basis that its three conditions correspond most closely to the 
object of investigation: can the application of deliberative mini-publics help to 
control democratic deficits? By definition, as will be discussed later in this chapter, 
mini-publics do not directly promote mass participation. Opportunities for all 
citizens to be politically involved can be created alongside the establishment of a 
mini-public, but the focus of the present research is on the specific contribution that 
mini-publics can make to the perceived legitimacy of a political system, and how 
their institutional design may most effectively enhance it. The question of broader 
political participation by the maxi-public will be revisited in the discussion section in 
Chapter Eight. 
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2.3  Controlling a Democratic Deficit with Mini-Publics 
The next step is to consider what prescription, if any, constitutes an appropriate 
response to a democratic deficit. It is not just political systems whose observed 
performance can fall short of some set of predefined expectations. Many types of 
system are designed with this scenario in mind. When observed performance, y, is 
unequal to expected performance, v, a system contains error, e (Leigh, 2012). In 
anticipation of these conditions, “control systems are engineered to achieve their 
objective in spite of prior uncertainties about characteristics of the controlled object, 
and about the exogenous variables” (Jacobs, 1993: 1; emphasis added). Leigh (2012: 
9) notes that a system must often “neutralise adverse characteristics in the process, 
compensating for non-ideal process configurations and for short- and long-term 
perturbations and variabilities.” To this end, a feedback loop can provide critical, 
continually updated information on system performance. When it is deficient, a 
sensor detects the error and a controller is activated to correct the system’s 
performance, avoiding failure (Morris, 1991; Doyle et al. 1992; Lyshevski, 2000; 
Nise, 2011; Dorf and Bishop, 2011; Sabanovic and Ohnishi, 2011; Leigh, 2012). 
Controllers are applied to everyday systems. A thermostat in an electric 
shower provides feedback on whether or not the water is at the desired temperature, 
leaving a controller to regulate it as necessary. This prevents the water from getting 
too hot or too cold (Albertos and Mareels, 2010: 13). If turbulence alters an aircraft’s 
heading or altitude, the autopilot directs corrective signals to the aircraft’s control 
surfaces to maintain a stable configuration (Pamadi, 2004: 617). Similarly, in the 
human body, numerous vital systems, from the nervous system to the gastrointestinal 
system, rely on thyroid hormones to control homeostatic processes (Sirakov and 









Figure 2.2: A general control system (adapted from Leigh, 2012: 19) 
 
 
A political system is qualitatively different to other types of system in obvious ways: 
a thermometer cannot directly measure the effectiveness of its performance, and 
fluctuations in its expected behaviour cannot be controlled by precise autopilot 
adjustments. However, if we accept the conceptualisation of political decision-
making as a system and, more specifically, Easton’s conceptualisation of feedback as 
a short-term measure of a system’s perceived legitimacy, we can introduce the idea 
of system control. In other words, if feedback signals a gap between the expected 
democratic behaviour of the system and citizens’ observations of how the system 
performs, particularly when the system encounters an episode of stress, could an 
appropriate controller be engineered into the design of the system to address the 
error and so enhance perceptions of its procedural performance?  
Attempting to modify political systems with democratic reforms has been a 
popular endeavour among political scientists for some time, but not all potential 
reforms are equally desirable or appropriate. Saward (2003: 168) voices his caution 
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The single most important question when thinking through the new 
possibilities for democracy is this: which devices, singly and in combination, 
enact desired interpretations of democratic principles within and across the 
different stages of the decision-making process? 
 
In recent decades, democratic theorists’ prescriptions for democratic deficits have 
tended to converge on deliberative democracy (Manin, 1987; Habermas, 1994; 
Fishkin, 1995; Cohen, 1997; Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 2000; Chambers, 2003; Goodin, 
2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Nabatchi, 2010). With this “deliberative turn” 
in theory, democratic legitimacy came to be seen in corresponding terms (Dryzek, 
2000: 1). Deliberative democratic prescriptions are distinct from participatory 
models, but they typically involve the participation of ordinary citizens in decision-
making.9  
Even critics acknowledge the prominence of deliberative democratic 
advocacy in contemporary political thought, but critics’ concerns rest on a readily 
surmountable observation: that deliberative democrats are idealists who are 
“uninterested in pressing questions of institutional design and legitimacy” (Achen 
and Bartels, 2016: 301; emphasis added). Such criticisms from democratic ‘realists’ 
overlook a growing trend to connect deliberative theory to democratic practice. 
James Fishkin’s (1995; 2009; 2018) work lies at this intersection, and he enjoys 
growing company (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012; Grönlund et al. 2014; 
Reuchamps and Suiter, 2016). If deliberative democracy is to be an effective 
response to a particular democratic deficit, we must consider what value this 
																																																								
9 See Fishkin (2009) on the distinction between deliberative and participatory models of democracy. 
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approach would add to the existing democratic system – with respect to the 
fulfilment of the three democratic principles identified (Fishkin, 2009).10 
Thus, with Saward’s (2003) advice in mind, could this approach help to ‘fix’ 
democracy when it goes wrong? Specifically, could deliberative democracy help to 
control perceived deficiencies in the legitimacy of a political system? In a rare 
empirical study investigating the demand for deliberative participation, Neblo et al. 
(2010) offer encouragement. They find that it is precisely people who are disengaged 
from conventional politics – centred on electoral competition between political 
parties – who are particularly willing to participate in deliberative processes. The 
results of their study suggest that applications of deliberative democracy can indeed 
help to better meet citizens’ expectations by offering a constructive alternative to 
‘politics as usual’.  
A crucial obstacle has been that many practical applications of deliberative 
democracy have been limited in scope to one-off, small-scale experiments. 11 
Increasingly, however, mini-publics have been formally institutionalised, affirming 
their potential to complement and enhance the democratic contribution of existing 
institutions. They are broadly defined as “a class of institutions that directly engage 
citizens” and “promote democratic deliberation” in decision-making (Ryan and 
Smith, 2014: 9). Indeed, the very term ‘mini-public’ is often preceded by the 
adjective ‘deliberative’ to emphasise this quality. Such bodies are typically 
																																																								
10 Elsewhere, Fishkin (2009: 95) sets out four central questions to consider for any prescribed 
institutional response: “First, … how inclusive is it? … Second, … how thoughtful is it? … Third, … 
what effects does it have? … Fourth, under what social and political conditions can any of this be 
accomplished?” The first three essentially correspond to Fishkin’s three democratic principles and can 
be evaluated at each respective stage of the decision-making process (input, throughput and output); 
the fourth concerns the particular context. 
11 Participedia (2018) provides an extensive record of citizen-based decision-making initiatives 
around the world. At the time of writing, 689 unique cases were listed.  
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established with a problem-solving role (Fung, 2003: 340), and can take a variety of 
different formats (see Setälä and Smith, 2018: 301).  
Citizens’ juries usually involve 12-36 randomly selected participants who 
consider a particular issue over a number of days, before producing their 
recommendations in a report (Smith and Wales, 1999; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; 
Parkinson, 2006). Planning cells have been institutionalised in Germany; multiple 
cells run in parallel with one another, each comprising 25 participants who make 
recommendations on (usually) local policy issues with a technical focus (Dienel and 
Renn, 1995; Flynn, 2009). Consensus conferences share many features of citizens’ 
juries, except that they allow interested citizens to apply to participate. Those 
selected spend several weekends preparing in advance of the public conference to 
identify expert witnesses they would like to question, as well as developing the 
relevant questions they would like to ask them (Hendriks, 2005; Dryzek and Tucker, 
2008). Deliberative Polling ®, meanwhile, seeks to measure informed public 
opinion, gathering a large, representative sample of the target population (usually at 
least 200 participants), who gather to learn and deliberate about a topic before voting 
on preferred outcomes (Fishkin et al. 2000; Fishkin, 2018).12 While they vary in 
scale, institutional design, and consequence, these different models of mini-public 
provide a common demonstration that deliberative democracy is much more than an 
abstract idea. 
Beyond these four models described, there is a more durable variety of mini-
public that is arguably “more impressive” in ambition (Smith, 2009: 29), and may be 
explicitly designed to ‘co-govern’ alongside existing, traditional democratic 
institutions at the highest level of a political system: a citizens’ assembly. This more 
																																																								
12 See also Rowe and Frewer (2005). 
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formalised device is defined by three main features: its large number of (citizen) 
members are randomly selected, they deliberate over an extended period of time on a 
substantive, contested, issue (or issues), and they take a collective decision (or 
decisions) to be fed directly into the broader political process. Fournier et al. (2011: 
10) contend that a citizens’ assembly is the “only method of citizen policy-making” 
that combines each of these characteristics, constituting “the most extensive modern 
form of collective decision-making by common folk.” For Smith (2012: 91), this 
institutionalised application of deliberative democracy represents “a step-change in 
the practice of mini-publics.” Valid criticisms of deliberative democracy should 
accordingly move beyond any denial of its basic practicality; instead, the 
contemporary challenge for deliberative democrats is to establish how mini-publics 
can be effectively coupled with the broader political system (Parkinson, 2006; 
Mansbridge et al. 2012; Setälä and Smith, 2018). Before considering the potential 
for citizens’ assemblies to enhance the perceived legitimacy of a political system by 
promoting specific democratic principles, it is first appropriate to review their 
origins, applications, and institutional features. 
 
2.4  Citizens’ Assemblies as a ‘Step-Change’ in Mini-Public 
Practice 
The idea of institutionalising a citizen-based deliberative body is a radical one, but 
far from original. The earliest forms of democracy share core features of the 
‘citizens’ assemblies’ we now describe as democratic innovations (Smith, 2009). In 
ancient Athens and other city-states, citizens directly engaged in political debate and 
decision-making (Thucydides, 1972). All citizens in good standing (males with 
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military training) could vote on important decisions as members of the ekklēsia 
(general assembly). Most decisions, however, were taken by a smaller, more 
carefully defined body, the boule (council) (Fournier et al. 2011). It comprised 
approximately five hundred members who were drawn by lot to serve for one year.13 
These randomly selected citizens took decisions on a daily basis on behalf of the 
dēmos (the people at large) and prepared legislation to be considered by the ekklēsia. 
All citizens had an equal probability of being appointed to the boule (Tridimas, 
2011), and those selected for the task would engage in extensive deliberation 
(Cammack, 2013). This form of decision-making in the hands of ordinary citizens 
was, thus, a key feature of what Dahl (1989) calls the first democratic 
transformation. As the nation-state replaced the city-state as the dominant form of 
political organisation, citizens came to play a much less direct role in political 
decision-making (Dahl, 1989). 
 Millennia later, citizens’ assemblies have been established to fulfil a number 
of specific purposes, complementing conventional representative institutions. In the 
Canadian province of British Columbia, the provincial government set up a citizens’ 
assembly in 2004 to consider the controversial issue of electoral reform.14 After 
spending nearly a year learning, consulting, and deliberating about the issue, the 
body of 160 randomly selected citizens recommended changing the electoral system 
in the province (Warren and Pearse, 2008). The recommendation was put to a 
province-wide referendum the following year and was supported by 57 percent of 
voters. While this level of support fell slightly short of the 60 percent threshold 
required to change the voting system, the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly 																																																								
13 Members were selected by a kleroterion, a relatively sophisticated concrete randomisation device  
(Mirhady and Schwarz, 2011). 
14 For a detailed background on the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA), see Warren and 
Pearse (2008). 
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provided a pioneering model of how deliberative democracy can be formally 
institutionalised on a large scale. Comparable bodies were set up by governments in 
Ontario and the Netherlands in 2006, also on the issue of electoral reform (Fournier 
et al. 2011). Civil society organisations have also played a role in the development 
of large-scale mini-publics: the Belgian G1000 citizens’ summit in 2011 covered a 
variety of contested policy areas (Jacquet et al. 2016), and citizens’ assemblies in the 
United Kingdom have recently considered a number of constitutional issues 
(Flinders et al. 2016; Renwick et al. 2018). In the UK, the first state-sponsored 
citizens’ assembly was held in 2017, commissioned by parliamentary committees to 
examine future funding options for adult social care (Involve, 2018a). 
 The Republic of Ireland offers the most comprehensive case study on the 
formal embedding of deliberative mini-publics within national decision-making. The 
first step on its innovative journey of democratic experimentation took the form of 
‘We the Citizens’, a pilot citizens’ assembly sponsored by a non-governmental 
organisation and organised by an academic team (Farrell et al. 2013). The initiative 
demonstrated proof of concept, paving the way for randomly chosen citizens to 
constitute a majority of members of the Irish Constitutional Convention. It was 
commissioned up by the Irish government in 2013 to consider a number of possible 
reforms, ranging from reducing the voting age to legalising same-sex marriage. This 
body was notable for its hybrid membership profile, featuring both 66 randomly 
selected lay citizens and 33 representatives appointed by political parties (Suiter et 
al. 2016). Although not a citizens’ assembly in the purest sense of the term, it can 
still be recognised as a “mixed” version that shares many core features (Setälä and 
Smith, 2018: 303). Two of its recommendations were put to a referendum in 2015, 
one of which was endorsed and implemented. Politically, one of the most notable 
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outcomes of the Convention was the Irish government’s subsequent decision in 2016 
to establish a (pure version of a) citizens’ assembly on a further set of issues, this 
time featuring a membership of 99 randomly chosen citizens. One of its 
recommendations, to amend the Constitution to allow the Oireachtas (Irish 
Parliament) to legislate for abortion, was endorsed by 66 percent of voters in a 2018 
referendum (Field, 2018). 
A growing consensus is emerging in Ireland that citizens’ assemblies offer a 
useful vehicle for considering contested and/or sensitive issues, with positive signals 
from political elites that they could be used again to help address political problems 
(Farrell et al. 2018). Still, the uptake of this kind of mini-public tends to be in 
response to relatively narrow contested policy matters on an ad hoc basis (Setälä, 
2017). Nowhere has a citizens’ assembly been institutionalised on a permanent 
footing with a more comprehensive remit, although it has been suggested that large-
scale deliberative mini-publics could serve as a template for the reform of upper 
chambers in bicameral legislatures (Dryzek, 2017). It is not necessarily a weakness 
that citizens’ assemblies have been limited in duration and scope; their adaptability 
to particular contexts can be regarded as a significant strength. However, if such 
bodies are to target deeper problems with the democratic system, beyond narrow 
policy disputes, we need to consider how they can also enhance the quality of the 
democratic process as perceived by citizens. In other words, can the application of 
citizens’ assemblies help to address underlying democratic deficits, as well as 
serving the purpose of tackling specific issues? There are specific design elements of 
citizens’ assemblies that suggest this form of mini-public decision-making will be 
positively evaluated by the maxi-public for its promotion of core democratic 
principles. 
		 34 
2.4.1  Citizens’ Assembly Selection: Promoting Political Equality 
The selection process involves two key components: members of a citizens’ 
assembly are, by definition, citizens, and they are chosen by sortition. Put another 
way, members are not politicians and they are not elected. All citizens are 
automatically in the pool of candidates from which a “mechanical or ‘non-human’ 
process” selects members of the political body (Dowlen, 2017: 1). The idea that 
representatives can be randomly chosen from the mass public is not completely alien 
to most citizens; beyond Ancient Athens, legal juries offer a relatable contemporary 
example of lay individuals playing a consequential role in decision-making (Warren, 
2008). However, while sortition has strong claims to political equality, a general lack 
of familiarity with the procedure and its theoretical rationale may undermine support 
for this selection mechanism.  
Sortition may facilitate the selection of a highly representative sample of 
citizens, but it still involves a “blind” lottery with “no identifiable agent who can be 
held responsible for its outcome” (Dowlen, 2017: 4). Political elites themselves may 
be apprehensive of ceding control over the selection of a supplementary democratic 
body (Donnelly, 2015). It is partly for this reason that the Irish Constitutional 
Convention comprised a hybrid membership, with two-thirds of members being 
randomly-selected citizens and the remaining third being elected representatives 
appointed to the Convention by political parties (Farrell et al. 2013). The subsequent 
Irish Citizens’ Assembly, however, was selected exclusively by sortition, apparently 
with little fear from the Irish government that a move to a purely randomly selected 
body would weaken perceptions of its legitimacy. Therefore, concerns over the 
novelty of this selection mechanism may be overblown; perhaps its substantive 
benefits become swiftly appreciated. 
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Since the electoral process of selecting representatives systematically 
excludes certain types of individual, the use of random selection to establish a 
citizens’ assembly may be particularly appealing to individuals under-represented by 
an existing system. Indeed, the very logic of random selection is to draw a 
representative sample of the population in which every member has an equal chance 
of being chosen (Stone, 2016). This mechanism gives a citizens’ assembly a 
powerful, representative quality based firmly on the principle of political equality 
(Dahl, 1989 Ferejohn, 2008; Bouricius, 2013). The descriptive similarity of a 
citizens’ assembly to the wider population underpins a powerful claim to its 
democratic legitimacy (James, 2008). Fournier et al. (2011: 31) recognise this close 
relationship between the “representative character” of the selected members and 
“establishing their legitimacy” as a decision-making body.  
 
2.4.2  Citizens’ Assembly Decision-Making: Promoting Deliberation 
Citizens’ assemblies are explicitly designed to facilitate structured deliberation 
among members; that is, after participants have spent time learning about the main 
elements of a particular issue and after they have consulted with a wide range of 
relevant views, often over multiple weekends, they evaluate different arguments and 
collectively consider how the common interest can be best served. At a minimum, 
Fishkin (2009: 33) refers to deliberation as “the process by which individuals 
sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in discussions together.” Steiner 
(2012: 4) notes that the word ‘deliberate’ derives from the Latin ‘deliberare’, 
meaning “to weigh, to ponder, and to reflect.” It is not enough for participants to 
simply state their individual preferences; rather, they are challenged to justify their 
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preferences with reasons, and to be open to revising their initial preferences if they 
encounter more compelling arguments (Habermas, 1979; Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann 
and Thompson, 2004). Their views may end up remaining roughly constant 
throughout the process, but deliberation is often associated with shifts in attitudes 
towards a specific issue, about which individuals may have previously known little, 
as they have the opportunity to align their preferences with their underlying values 
(Barabas, 2004; Fishkin, 2009).  
In the deliberative phase of a citizens’ assembly, members typically engage 
in verbal dialogue with one another in small groups (Pearse, 2008). Each group’s 
table is provided with a trained, independent facilitator “to ensure that every member 
[has] an opportunity to speak; that discussions [stay] on topic; and that members 
[are] respectful of other opinions” (Suiter et al. 2016: 42). The quality of deliberation 
can depend on a variety of different conditions (Fishkin, 2009: 34), including the 
balance of information presented to participants (Barabas, 2004; Esterling et al. 
2013), the diversity of the participants themselves (Young, 2000; Bergold, 2017), the 
influence of facilitators on conversational dynamics (Steiner, 2012; Yaylaci and 
Beauvais, 2017), the nature of the topic (Farrar et al. 2010), and how the initiative is 
framed (Druckman, 2004), and the decision rule (Karpowitz et al. 2012).  
In real-world mini-publics, deliberation has been operationalised as an 
external process involving face-to-face communication. However, for Robert 
Goodin, the (internal) act of thinking is more important than the (external) act of 
speaking in a deliberative exercise. “Conversation is useful, but imagination is 
essential,” for meaningful deliberation to occur (Goodin, 2003: 228). In an empirical 
study of a mini-public process with Simon Niemeyer, the authors find that the effect 
of cognitive processing on opinion change is greater than the effect of group 
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discussion (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003). This is not to say that interpersonal 
communication should not be an element of mini-public decision-making, but it 
highlights different possible priorities for process design, especially if a certain mode 
of deliberation comes into tension with other democratic principles. For example, if 
the perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly rests heavily on the ex ante basis 
that all members of the population have an equal chance of being selected, talk-
based deliberation among participants should not be problematic. If, however, its 
perceived legitimacy also rests on the ex post basis that its process of decision-
making would yield the same distribution of post-deliberative preferences if the 
entire population could be present to deliberate, the violation of statistical 
independence among participants presents a serious problem for external validity. 
Such a problem could be overcome by facilitating deliberative decision-
making as an internal exercise rather than an external one. Beyond direct contact, 
studies in social psychology have explored the possibilities of imagined inter-group 
contact (Crisp et al. 2009; Crisp and Turner, 2009; Husnu and Crisp, 2010; Vezzali 
et al. 2015; West et al. 2015). They consistently find that it is possible to replicate 
the effects of direct contact with imagined dialogue; and similar effects have been 
observed in recent political applications of imagined deliberation (Warner and 
Villamil, 2017; Garry, 2016a). In short, while citizens’ assemblies are associated 
with a particular mode of deliberation, certain considerations may warrant a degree 
of flexibility over the way in which the decision-making process is designed. 
Indeed, by arguing that citizens’ assemblies can, in part, enhance the 
perceived legitimacy of a political system by adding deliberation, the mode of 
deliberation may be important at the individual-level. Hansen (1997) reports that the 
strength of an individual’s party identification has a positive, significant effect on his 
		 38 
or her likelihood to talk about politics with others. As Mutz (2006: 136) argues, 
“political communication of the face-to-face variety is among the most difficult 
forms of social interaction to negotiate.” Most people do not have strong partisan 
identities (Dalton, 2002); moreover, most people tend to be apolitical when they 
interact with others (Warren, 1996). Therefore, individuals who are less partisan may 
be more supportive of a decision-making process featuring imagined deliberation, 
whereas individuals with stronger partisan identities will be more likely to support 
talk-based deliberation.  
However it is operationalised in practice, the emphasis on some form of 
deliberation in citizens’ assembly decision-making is likely to be attractive to 
individuals who find themselves disillusioned with conventional political processes. 
MacKuen et al. (2010) contend that deliberation and partisanship underpin two 
distinct psychological approaches to decision-making: the former is resistant to the 
consideration of different perspectives and arguments, while the latter is open to 
reflection on new information. The individual-level distinction is supported by Neblo 
et al. (2010), whose experimental study finds higher levels of enthusiasm for 
deliberation among those without a strong level of party identification. If a 
democratic deficit arises in part due to the partisan characterisation of decision-
making, the emphasis on deliberation offered by a citizens’ assembly could help to 
meet the expectations of those least satisfied with the existing process. 
 
2.4.2  Citizens’ Assembly Decision-Taking: Promoting Non-Tyranny 
Finally, once a citizens’ assembly has taken a collective, informed decision, the 
status of its decision may influence the extent to which the body is perceived to have 
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a legitimate role that can enhance the broader political system. Should it produce a 
binding decision, or should it be limited to providing advisory recommendations? If 
the latter, what further decision-taking mechanism should be necessary for the 
recommendation(s) to be implemented? Political elites are likely to have a vested 
interest in reducing the level of power of a mini-public, suspicious of any ‘rival’ 
body that may challenge their own authority. In a series of interviews with elected 
politicians in Northern Ireland, Donnelly (2015) detected provisional support for a 
citizens’ assembly among elected representatives. However, this support is highly 
conditional on the supplementary body having only a consultative or advisory role. 
Indeed, of all the real-world citizens’ assemblies that have been established, 
none have had the capacity to take a final, legally binding decision.15 Fournier et al. 
(2011) claim that a ratification referendum adds a significant degree of legitimacy to 
the final decision of a citizens’ assembly. In the cases of British Columbia and 
Ontario, the advance commitment by each of the provincial governments to hold a 
popular vote on the respective citizens’ assembly decisions enhanced citizens’ 
evaluations of the process: “given the novelty of the institutional design, it was 
probably a reassuring safeguard” for both the maxi-public and political elites 
(Fournier et al. 2011: 154).  
 The idea of a ‘safeguard’ takes us to Fishkin’s third democratic principle. 
Non-tyranny is associated with the avoidance of a decision that could violate the 
essential interests of a particular individual or group when an alternative course of 
action was available. Unlike political equality and deliberation, this principle “is not 
internal to the design of the democratic process, but rather it provides a way of 																																																								
15 In a citizens’ assembly in Gdańsk, the city’s mayor pledged to implement any decisions of the 
mini-public that received the support of at least 80 percent of its members (Gerwin, 2018). This may 
have rendered certain decisions politically binding, but they did not carry legal weight without the 
endorsement of the municipal authorities. See Chapter Seven for a more detailed discussion. 
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evaluating its effects” (Fishkin, 2009: 60). However, different decision-making 
processes could increase or decrease the likelihood of such outcomes arising. One 
approach to help prevent tyrannical policies is to build checks into the system, 
distributing power across multiple sites. While some forms of mini-public strive for 
consensus, the support of a simple majority of members in a citizens’ assembly 
(under a secret ballot) is typically sufficient for a decision to pass (Smith, 2012: 101-
102); the likelihood of harmful decisions being taken may be reduced if there is a 
higher (internal) threshold, such as a super-majority rule, or if the decision must be 
(externally) endorsed by a majority of all voters in a referendum. 
There is, however, a potential downside of subjecting a citizens’ assembly 
decision to a referendum. Most notably, the very nature of a referendum privileges 
aggregation over deliberation. In a deliberative mini-public, members take a 
collective decision that reflects their considered preferences on a given issue, not 
their raw, unconsidered preferences. If a referendum campaign fails to promote 
genuine deliberation, it may undermine the deliberative decision-making phase of a 
citizens’ assembly. In the British Columbia case, Ratner (2008: 161) emphasised the 
contrast between the high quality of deliberation in the citizens’ assembly and the 
“transgressions of rational discourse” across the wider electorate. Yet at the same 
time, there is evidence that many voters in the referendum were guided precisely by 
the deliberative recommendation provided by the preceding citizens’ assembly. 
Survey data show that those who were aware of the work of the British Columbia 
Citizens’ Assembly were more likely to support its advisory decision. Citizens who 
knew little about it were just as likely to oppose its recommendation as support it, 
whereas those who knew something about the process were significantly more likely 
to use their vote to ratify its decision (Cutler et al. 2008: 176). Therefore, while there 
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is a paradox between the deliberative characteristics of a citizens’ assembly and the 
aggregative characteristics of a referendum, Fournier et al. (2011) suggest the two 
could complement one another.16 The latter could help act as a ‘check’ on the 
former, cumulatively enhancing perceptions of legitimacy (Bouricius, 2013).  
Alternatively, a decision-making process featuring a citizens’ assembly could 
be designed to formally give politicians the authority to accept or reject its 
recommendation(s). This approach would fulfil the logic of establishing a mini-
public to complement, rather than challenge, the existing representative institutions 
of a political system (Grönlund et al. 2014). This could add legitimacy to the process 
by promoting more politically equal inputs and delivering a more deliberative 
throughput stage of decision-making, but political representatives would retain the 
final say over any outputs. However, the relative success of this kind of co-decision-
making is likely to depend on the context. If, for example, gridlock among political 
elites is a major contributing factor behind a democratic deficit, a mini-public 
decision will only help to unlock this gridlock if political elites agree in advance to 
endorse it. It is worth highlighting that, for Fishkin, tyrannical outcomes can arise 
from policy omission as well as policy commission. In other words, the consent of 
political elites may serve to sustain tyrannical outcomes in some extreme cases, 
rather than to serve as a check on mini-public decisions. Therefore, the extent to 
which citizens’ assembly decisions should be binding or advisory depends on the 
nature of the democratic deficit this kind of body seeks to control. 
 																																																								
16 A majority of voters (57 percent) did endorse the citizens’ assembly recommendation to change 
British Columbia’s electoral system. This fell short of the super-majority (60 percent) required to 
implement the decision. In this case, the failure of the citizens’ assembly decision to produce a 
substantive outcome was not necessarily the result of its decision being put to a popular referendum, 
but more the fact that the referendum had a super-majority threshold. Thus, Fournier et al. (2011) 
argue that a super-majority threshold should not be required if the preceding deliberative process (in a 
citizens’ assembly) has been of a high standard. 
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2.5  Conclusion 
Reflecting on the pioneering case from British Columbia, Fournier et al. (2011: 155) 
suggest that the optimal conditions for establishing a citizens’ assembly “are when 
there is widespread recognition of the existence of a problem and the perception that 
the political system has failed to produce a satisfactory solution.” This chapter has 
set out a framework for identifying a basic problem – a democratic deficit – and 
argued that citizens’ assemblies could offer a meaningful, targeted solution. By 
conceptualising democratic decision-making as a dynamic system, it argues that 
citizens continually evaluate its procedural performance. When it fails to meet their 
expectations for the delivery of political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny, 
citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of decision-making will be more negative 
than positive overall, constituting a democratic deficit. 
 Under these conditions, citizens’ assemblies have specific institutional 
features that are likely to strengthen the perceived legitimacy of decision-making. 
They promote political equality through the selection of members: ordinary citizens 
are randomly chosen from the wider population to serve. This representative group 
of members engage in structured decision-making underpinned by an explicit 
commitment to deliberation. After learning about an issue and weighing up the 
possible ways forward, the citizens collectively reach a decision, helping to 
overcome any tyrannical consequences of policy inertia. In short, by supplementing 
the existing institutions of a political system, citizens’ assemblies can help to control 
a democratic deficit by promoting the democratic values that existing institutions are 
struggling to deliver. These are the theoretical expectations that now require 
empirical investigation. 
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 The issues raised in this chapter are relevant, to varying degrees, to all 
democratic political systems, any one of which could serve as a useful case study for 
such an investigation. However, they are particularly relevant to democracies with 
deep divisions. Political systems in these polities are often intentionally designed to 
reduce the potential for violent conflict by accommodating divided groups, usually 
by giving them the right to veto unfavourable decisions. While an elaborate set of 
institutional arrangements may be necessary to promote peace, they may create new 
challenges for stable and effective democratic governance, especially if gridlock is 
the norm. We therefore turn to the post-conflict case of Northern Ireland, where a 
consociational political system has helped to overcome the grave problem of ethnic 
conflict, but where the poor quality of democracy now poses a different kind of 
problem. The next chapter assesses the extent of this democratic deficit, serving as a 
necessary step before considering the extent to which a citizens’ assembly could help 
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Apollo 13: [I]t looks to me, looking out the hatch, that we are venting 
something. We are venting something into the – into space. 
Mission Control: Roger. We copy your venting. 
Radio communication between Apollo 13 and Mission Control, 
 13 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 163) 
 
 
Political systems vary according to institutional design and the surrounding 
environment in which they are embedded. Not all types of institutional design are 
equally appropriate to different polities, and not all societal environments are equally 
conducive to the smooth operation of any system of democratic decision-making, 
however designed. The deeply divided polity of Northern Ireland offers such an 
example, where ethnic conflict once appeared intractable (Whyte, 1981; Dixon, 
2001). The violence waged over the three decades of the Troubles was rooted in 
centuries-old mutually reinforcing cleavages encompassing religion, national 
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identity, and ethno-national ideology.17 The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
offered the basis of an institutional solution.18 By systematically accommodating the 
different interests of Northern Ireland’s rival groups, it prescribed a set of 
consociational institutions designed to meet the challenging governmental needs of a 
deeply divided place (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006).19  
 Some two decades after its formal establishment, this chapter appraises the 
democratic performance of Northern Ireland’s devolved political system.20 It does so 
by first setting out the consociational nature of the system before considering the 
associated challenges of delivering Fishkin’s (1991) core democratic principles at 
the input, throughput and output stages of decision-making – both in theory and in 
practice. Are decision-makers selected in a way that promotes political equality? Is 
the decision-making process deliberative? Are there mechanisms in place to try and 
prevent decisions from being taken that are tyrannical? At each of these respective 
stages of the political system, citizens have good reason to be disappointed with its 
procedural performance. An initial exploration of relevant empirical data provides 
compelling evidence that a democratic deficit exists and is in need of urgent 
attention. The nature of the diagnosis suggests that the defining features of citizens’ 
assemblies could help to strengthen the delivery of deficient democratic principles, 
and so to enhance the perceived legitimacy of Northern Ireland’s political system 
from the perspective of the maxi-public. 
																																																								
17 For analysis on the history surrounding the Northern Ireland question, which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, see, for example Dixon (2001), Bew (2007), Jackson (2010) and Walker (2011). 
18 The official name is the ‘Belfast Agreement’, denoting the location in which it was signed. It is 
commonly known as the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, in reference to the date on which it was signed. 
19 The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is not exclusively based on consociationalism (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009). It also covers broader constitutional issues, North-South relations in Ireland (Strand 
Two), British-Irish relations (Strand Three), human rights, decommissioning, security, policing and 
justice, and the release of prisoners (Northern Ireland Office, 1998). This comprehensive dispensation 
has been termed a “consociational plus” bargain (O’Leary, 1998: 11). 
20 Northern Ireland’s political system is devolved within the United Kingdom. 
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3.1  Legitimacy in a Consociational Political System 
There are four combined elements that distinguish consociations from other types of 
political system (Lijphart, 1977). First, members of the legislative branch must be 
selected on the basis of proportional representation (PR). Second, different groups 
must be represented in the executive branch to allow for inclusive decision-making. 
Third, these groups must possess mutual vetoes over political decisions deemed 
harmful to their essential group interests. Fourth, where appropriate, groups should 
be able to retain decision-making autonomy over certain domains.  
Each of these conditions is met in the Northern Ireland context. Members of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs) are elected using the Single Transferable 
Vote (PR-STV) electoral formula.21 No single party, and no single group, can govern 
alone: the governing Executive must be an inclusive power-sharing coalition led by a 
dual premiership of one unionist and one nationalist.22 Most items before the 
Assembly can be carried with the consent of a simple majority of MLAs, but, where 
deemed necessary, they must obtain the parallel consent of both a majority of 
unionist MLAs and a majority of nationalist MLAs.23 Each community, therefore, 
possesses an effective veto. Finally, there is some group autonomy, most notably 
over education, but this element is omitted from the present discussion since it plays 
a relatively minor role in Northern Ireland’s consociational design (Coakley, 2009), 
and since the present focus is on decision-making at the system-level.  																																																								
21 Farrell (2011: 157) shows that PR-STV provides a high degree of proportionality between a party’s 
vote share and seat share, a higher average level than that demonstrated by Sainte-Laguë, D’Hondt 
and Droop proportional electoral formulas. 
22 The D’Hondt formula is used to allocate all Executive positions other than First Minister, deputy 
First Minister and Justice Minister; a party’s legislative seat share is roughly proportional to the 
number of ministerial appointments. This prevents any major party “that wishes inclusion … from 
being denied access to office” (O’Leary et al. 2005: 199). 
23 Upon election, MLAs must designate as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. A petition of concern 
may be submitted to the Speaker on any matter before the Assembly, provided it has the signed 
support of 30 MLAs. When this occurs, any vote on the matter of concern will require the parallel 
consent of a majority of unionist MLAs and a majority of nationalist MLAs. 
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The Good Friday Agreement – and the institutions it spawned – has been 
heralded globally as a success story for the application of consociational theory to 
the management of ethnic conflict (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; McCulloch, 2014). 
Despite its international acclaim and the relative absence of violence since the 
signing of the Agreement, questionable levels of diffuse support towards the political 
system provide a daunting backdrop for stable democratic governance to take hold. 
Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided place (Guelke, 2012). On the religious 
dimension, Protestants and Catholics are evenly balanced according to the most 
recent census figures, constituting 42 percent and 40 percent of the population 
respectively (NISRA, 2011). Many political communities contain multiple religious 
cleavages, but in Northern Ireland they are compounded by diverging national 
identities. The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey reports that a quarter of 
respondents consider themselves to be exclusively British, a quarter consider 
themselves to be exclusively Irish, and a further quarter consider themselves to be 
more one than the other (Ark, 2015). Just 16 percent consider themselves to be 
equally Irish and British. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, Tonge 
(2013: 160) argues that there could effectively be “no such thing as disloyalty in 
Northern Ireland.” It recognises the legitimate coexistence of multiple national 
identities. This quality, however, may paradoxically make it harder for citizens to 
feel a strong, common sense of loyalty towards any single political system. 
Recent attitudinal research provides limited evidence that ‘Northern 
Irishness’ is emerging as a cross-cutting identity to unite adherents of the two 
traditional nationalities (McNicholl, 2017). Rival national identities help to fuel 
divergent preferences for Northern Ireland’s long-term constitutional status. 
Fourteen percent of citizens would like to see Northern Ireland unified with the 
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Republic of Ireland, while one in five citizens would like to see Northern Ireland 
governed directly by the British government in London (Ark, 2015).  Crucially, a 
narrow majority supports the existing arrangements as its long-term constitutional 
status: 51 percent support Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom with a 
devolved power-sharing government. It is noteworthy that the constitutional status 
quo is supported by at least a majority of citizens, albeit within the margin of error, 
but Northern Ireland’s current system of government hardly possesses what Easton 
(1965: 125) describes as a deep “reservoir of support.” Indeed, the core ideological 
dimension of electoral competition in Northern Ireland remains that of ethno-
nationalism, spanning unionists who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the 
United Kingdom and nationalists who advocate unification with the Republic of 
Ireland (Garry, 2016b). The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European 
Union, which raises fundamental questions for Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
position, has increased the salience of these ideological divisions (Murphy, 2018).24 
 The absence of traditional forms of diffuse support undoubtedly presents a 
challenge to the prospect of stable, democratic governance. As Easton (1975: 444) 
cautions, “Where (diffuse) support is negative, it represents a reserve of ill-will that 
may not be easily reduced by outputs or performance.” Similarly, Norris (2011: 20) 
contends that for citizens to “accept the legitimacy of their state … [they] do not 
challenge the basic constitutional structure and rules of the game or the authority of 
office-holders.” However, short of hugely disruptive (and, in themselves, 
destabilising) population transfers, this fundamental challenge will not disappear in 
Northern Ireland. Given the geographical distribution of Protestants and Catholics, 
British and Irish nationals, and unionist and nationalist ideologies, as well as the 																																																								
24 Not only did the decision reopen questions of identity, but it also raised questions about the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as well as Northern Ireland’s relationship with 
the rest of the UK. See Garry et al. (2018) for a study of public opinion toward these issues. 
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relative durability of these identities, there is no realistic scenario in which a new 
territorial arrangement could overcome the need for individuals of different ethnic 
groups to be governed under a shared political system. There are two lands, but only 
one soil (Wright, 1994). 
In spite of the existence of multiple (exclusive) national identities and long-
term constitutional preferences, the citizens of Northern Ireland gave a decisive 
expression of support to its short- to medium-term constitutional status. The Good 
Friday Agreement was overwhelmingly endorsed in a popular referendum in 1998. 
Of the 81 percent of voters who participated in the plebiscite, 71 percent voted in 
favour of the Agreement and just 29 percent against (Hayes and McAllister, 2001).25 
This legitimated the establishment of Northern Ireland’s consociational system of 
government. In addition, crucially, the Agreement’s ‘principle of consent’ asserts the 
right of individuals to hold divergent constitutional aspirations in the long-term 
while endorsing a devolved political system within Northern Ireland. By recognising 
“the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland with regard to its status,” in the United Kingdom or otherwise, it 
allows both supporters of the status quo and supporters of change a vehicle for 
pursuing their long-term preference (Belfast Agreement, 1998: 2).26 The principle of 
consent, thus, offers “constructive ambiguity” (Bell and Cavanaugh, 1998: 1355).  
 This provision may be imperfect, and is certainly unusual, but it reflects 
hard-nosed constitutional pragmatism. Without the principle of consent, it is 
uncertain that a peace settlement could have emerged in 1998; its acceptance 
																																																								
25 Turnout in the 1998 referendum was the second-highest recorded in a post-war vote in Northern 
Ireland (Hayes and McAllister, 2001: 79). 
26 The Northern Ireland Act (1998: s.1(2)) states that, “the Secretary of State shall exercise the power 
(to call a referendum) if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would 
express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a 
united Ireland.” 
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“effectively undercut the rationale for violence” (MacGinty and Darby, 2002: 177). 
If the Good Friday Agreement is evaluated purely as a conflict management device, 
it appears to have been successful to date. For McGarry and O’Leary (2009: 51), 
above all else, Northern Ireland’s peace settlement is “causally associated with a 
highly significant reduction in political violence.” Ceasefires of paramilitary groups 
have held up; while dissident republican groups continue to pose a security threat, 
they do not enjoy popular support.27  
However, Wilford and Wilson (2001) argue that the primacy of securing 
peace had an unintended consequence: insufficient attention to the democratic design 
of the devolved political system. If Northern Ireland’s consociational arrangements 
are evaluated for their ability to provide a successful democratic system of 
government, robust critiques emerge. The most serious contends that ‘consociational 
democracy’ is an oxymoron: a political system can be democratic or consociational, 
but not both (Barry, 1975). For Taylor (2006: 220), “consociationalism and liberal 
democracy pull in different directions.” Proponents dismiss these assertions on 
pragmatic grounds. Brendan O’Leary argues that consociationalists are realists; they 
recognise that the choice facing a deeply divided society is “between consociational 
democracy and no (worthwhile) democracy at all” (O’Leary, 2005: 9). Even the 
more generous critics of consociations acknowledge that it is difficult to imagine a 
workable alternative strategy (Guelke, 2009). 
By accepting a trade-off, O’Leary demonstrates that consociation offers a 
pathway towards a deeper form of democracy, but it does not necessarily represent a 
final destination in itself. Compared to its application in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, McCulloch (2014) notes the relative success of consociation in Northern 																																																								
27 Horgan and Morrison (2011) report a rising threat posed by dissident republicans, but do not 
suggest that they are gaining significant influence within the republican community.	
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Ireland, but acknowledges its limits in delivering stable, post-conflict democracy. 
Her caution echoes Morrow (2005: 45): “All societies contain conflict. Divided 
societies, however, often struggle to find and implement democratic institutions that 
can manage conflict in ways that can be accepted as legitimate” (emphasis added).  
Thus, despite their disagreement on its relative merits, critics and proponents 
of consociation essentially share the view that the potential quality of democratic 
performance will inevitably be constrained. They may, therefore, hold similarly low 
expectations regarding the capacity of Northern Ireland’s devolved political system 
to adequately satisfy Fishkin’s three democratic principles of political equality, 
deliberation, and non-tyranny. Accordingly, we will now explore the extent to which 
the system meets these principles, or whether there is likely to be a gap between 
citizens’ expectations and their observations of the system’s procedural performance 
in Northern Ireland. We will do so by reviewing the three key stages of this system: 
the selection of political representatives, the process of making decisions, and the 
final taking of decisions. While consociations vary by precise design, the application 
of their core features to Northern Ireland makes it a highly generalisable case. 
 
3.1.1  The Challenge of Promoting Political Equality 
In a consociational political system, who decides? As in all other contemporary 
representative democracies, principal political decision-makers are selected by 
elections. Voting has become such an intrinsic part of democratic political systems 
over the last three centuries that it has come to be regarded as the crucial mechanism 
establishing the system’s claim to represent its citizens’ demands (see Pitkin, 1967). 
Notably, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly requires 
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the holding of elections as a necessary condition of democratic government: “The 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections” (UN General Assembly, 1948). 
Universal suffrage provides a minimum basis for political equality; it facilitates 
inclusion in the sense that each citizen’s vote is counted (Dahl, 1964). In practice, 
the features and incentives of the electoral process can undermine substantive 
inclusion and, thus, substantive political equality. On the surface, a consociational 
system would seem well placed to promote political equality at the input stage of 
decision-making; after all, a key goal of consociation is to facilitate the inclusion of 
rival ethnic groups (McEvoy, 2006; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009). The term ‘power-
sharing’ is often preceded by the word ‘inclusive’ to emphasise this quality (Mitchell 
and Evans, 2009: 147). However, the prefix does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. 
In the first instance, for elections to deliver substantive political equality, all 
citizens must participate. If citizens abstain from voting, they abstain from providing 
a formal input into the democratic process that follows. No democracy records a 
turnout level of 100 percent, but some of the features of consociational democracies 
may have a particularly adverse effect on voter participation compared to other types 
of political system. This is highly problematic. As Lijphart (1997) himself argues, 
unequal participation undermines the political equality of representation. In the five 
most recent elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly (between 2003 and 2017), 
registered voter turnout averaged 61 percent; a full ten percentage points lower than 
the corresponding average across European parliamentary democracies (see Figure 
3.1).28 This is similar to the average level of turnout reported across the previous five 
																																																								
28 It is reasonable to compare turnout levels for the (devolved) Northern Ireland Assembly with those 
for national legislatures on the basis that Northern Ireland’s party system is largely detached from that 
of the rest of the United Kingdom. As such, elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly typically have 
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legislative elections in other consociational systems. For Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Lebanon, Macedonia, Northern Ireland and Switzerland, the average 
turnout is 62 percent. Belgium is, of course, an outlier. Its much higher average level 
of turnout (90 percent) is, to a significant extent, a function of compulsory voting 
(see Jackman, 1987; Miller and Dassonneville, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Mean voter turnout (percentage of registered voters) in European 
parliamentary democracies over the last five legislative elections (up to 2017) 																																																																																																																																																												
a ‘first-order’ quality, sharing more in common with European elections at the national-level than at 
the regional-level (see Reif and Schmitt, 1980). 




























In the absence of compulsory voting, consociational systems offer relatively weak 
institutional incentives for voters to participate in elections. The logic is intuitive: if 
a nominally inclusive power-sharing government is the pre-determined result of an 
election, citizens themselves may not feel empowered to determine which parties are 
included and excluded from government (see Downs, 1957: 156; Geys, 2006: 651). 
Instead, politics may be regarded as a largely elite affair.29  
A low level of voter turnout is not in itself a cause for concern; indeed, 
abstention from voting may be a tacit expression of broad satisfaction with decision-
makers. However, there is little accompanying evidence to suggest that citizens in 
Northern Ireland are satisfied with the performance of political elites. In 2007, the 
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey reported higher levels of satisfaction than 
dissatisfaction.30 Yet in every subsequent year that it has been measured, net 
satisfaction has been negative. In 2014, the most recent year in which they were 
asked, 11 percent of respondents said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the 
performance of MLAs, compared to 66 percent who reported being either 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Figure 3.2 illustrates the relative volatility and 
intensity of (dis)satisfaction levels in Northern Ireland against a European context.31 
																																																								
29 Asked whether they think the Assembly gives ordinary people more say in how Northern Ireland is 
governed, two-thirds say it makes no difference, compared to 17 percent who say it gives them more 
say (Ark, 2014). 
30 The precise question wording was, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Northern Ireland 
MLAs are doing their job?” Responses were measured on a five-point scale. Figure 3.2 presents the 
difference between the percentage of respondents expressing one of two measures of satisfaction and 
the percentage expressing one of two measures of dissatisfaction. 
31 Data are taken from the European Social Survey item, “Now thinking about the [country] 
government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” (ESS, 2017). As with the scale 
for the Northern Ireland item, net satisfaction at each time point is the percentage of satisfied minus 
dissatisfied responses. The average at each time point is taken across the 16 countries for which data 
is available (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). It is 
unfortunate that the performance satisfaction items from the European Social Survey and Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey target different objects: the government versus politicians generally. 
However, more than 90 percent of MLAs in Northern Ireland were in a party of government 
throughout the period, blurring much distinction between government and politicians in general. In 
the absence of a more direct comparison, Figure 3.2 depicts the most relevant trends of available data. 
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Figure 3.2: Net levels of satisfaction with the performance of MLAs in Northern 
Ireland compared to average net levels of satisfaction with the performance of 
European governments (Sources: ESS 2006-2014; NILTS 2007-2014) 
 
 
In a deeply divided place, high levels of abstention could also signify a shallowing of 
traditional cleavages. If voting tends to be driven by ethnic factors, the act of non-
voting may imply a reduction in the salience of these factors. In Northern Ireland 
there does indeed appear to be a sizeable ethno-nationally ‘moderate’ cleavage 
emerging. However, if inclusive power-sharing is about “the accommodation of 
ethnic diversity” (Wolff, 2009: 120), Northern Ireland’s institutions and party system 
systematically fail to represent diversity outside the main ethno-national groups.	
Wilson (2009: 228) criticises an institutional “blindness to social trends below elite 
politics.” The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey of 2017 found that while 53 
percent of respondents identified as either nationalist or unionist, 45 percent 
identified as neither (Ark, 2017). Figure 3.3 places these figures in context: the 
prevalence of individuals identifying as neither in this cross-sectional survey was not 
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Figure 3.3: Ethno-national ideology over time (percentage self-identifying as 
unionist, nationalist or neither; Source: NILTS 1998-2017) 
 
 
In contrast, the number of MLAs designating as either nationalist or unionist has 
never fallen below 90 percent in the Assembly, privileging representation on the 
ethno-national ideological dimension over other potentially salient dimensions.  
Thus, we observe two obstacles to political equality. First, the emphasis on 
elite power-sharing appears to foster a sense of detachment between representatives 
and the represented. This perceived gap between elites and citizens may be narrower 
in consociational systems containing mass parties with extensive capabilities and 
acquiescent followers (Nordlinger, 1972). These conditions are not met in Northern 
Ireland, where political elites have “failed to integrate civic society … into the 
existing governance arrangements” (Birrell and Gormley-Heenan, 2015: 125). 
Therefore, many citizens in Northern Ireland may feel little sense of inclusion in the 
selection of decision-makers at the input stage of the system, especially those with 
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 Second, and related, the electoral mechanism appears inadequate to facilitate 
the representation of Northern Ireland’s emerging ethno-nationally moderate 
cleavage. A proportional electoral system would seem conducive to inclusion, but 
the electoral incentives are for existing (ethno-national) parties to polarise (Wolff, 
2005). Political parties tend to be rewarded for divisiveness, not moderation, leaving 
elections characterised by centrifugal intra-communal competition, as opposed to 
possible centripetal inter-communal competition (Cox, 1990; Horowitz, 2014).  
Ethnic ‘out-bidding’ by rival parties is not inevitable in a consociational 
system. Political parties within each bloc are capable of adopting pragmatic positions 
on a range of policy areas without sacrificing electoral success (Mitchell et al. 2009), 
but the space for ethnic ‘under-bidding’ is typically limited (Coakley, 2009). Indeed, 
even ethno-nationally moderate voters engage in “compensational voting” in 
anticipation of post-election bargaining: “voters will want to be represented by their 
‘strongest voice’” (Mitchell and Evans, 2009: 152). While McEvoy and O’Leary 
(2013) note that voters are perfectly free to support ethnically moderate, centrist 
political parties if they wish to do so, this statement of fact neglects the reality that it 
is often difficult for new parties to emerge. Party systems are not necessarily 
‘frozen’, but existing parties play a large agenda-setting role and help to constrain 
any prospective new entries (Sartori, 1969; Mair, 1997). In other words, a lack of 
supply may not necessarily reflect a lack of demand. In the meantime, those who feel 
distant from existing (ethno-national) political parties are significantly less likely to 
vote (Garry, 2016b). 
 Therefore, the process of selecting decision-makers in Northern Ireland’s 
consociational system may be perceived as politically unequal: it appears elite-
centric rather than citizen-centric, and systematically under-represents citizens who 
		 58 
lack a strong ethno-national identity. These challenges of inclusion suggest that the 
electoral process is unable, at least on its own, to promote a broad perception of 
legitimacy at the input stage of the political system. 
 
3.1.2  The Challenge of Promoting Deliberation 
How are decisions made in a consociational political system? For Fishkin (1991), a 
democratic decision-making process should be, to a large degree, deliberative. In 
most representative democracies, however, there is a critical obstacle that often 
undermines the quality of deliberation preceding legislative and executive decisions: 
partisanship. Ferejohn contends that meaningful deliberation in an elected legislature 
is only optional in the sense that, “if you have the votes you do not need reasons too” 
(Ferejohn, 2008: 206). The partisan nature of most legislatures means that many 
members, particularly backbenchers, become lobby fodder. The logic of legislative 
party discipline results in members lacking the incentives to persuade each other or 
be persuaded, at least in a plenary session; instead, they have far greater incentives to 
serve their party’s interests, rather than to promote common interests (Mayhew, 
1974; Kam, 2009).  
 Political parties can, of course, accommodate deliberation within their 
internal structures to varying degrees. But the reality is that what the public observes 
in the legislative arena is not amenable to a high quality of meaningful deliberation. 
Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006: 203-204) detect little evidence that members of the 
United States Congress engage in genuine attempts at persuasion, with much to 
suggest that congressional discourse is shaped by ideology and partisanship. 
Similarly, applying their Discourse Quality Index (DQI) to a cross-national study of 
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parliamentary debates, Bächtiger et al. (2005) found almost no effect of deliberation 
on substantive outcomes.32 
 On the surface, the cross-party, cross-community basis of government in 
Northern Ireland would seem more conducive to deliberation. If rival political elites 
must share power, would they not be forced to set aside partisan – and ethno-national 
ideological affiliations – in order to serve the common interest? Political leaders 
might be incentivised to find common ground in order to preserve the system 
(Lijphart, 1977). In practice, however, consociational institutions offer a very 
different incentive: strategic bargaining (Steiner, 2012), with potentially 
destabilising consequences for the political system. Deliberation necessarily requires 
actors to reflect on a wide range of arguments and information, and to be open to 
changing their preferences accordingly; this lies in tension with bargaining on behalf 
of particularistic interests (Dryzek, 2000). In contrast to deliberation, bargaining is 
about the resolution of disputes through “negotiation (rather) than through 
persuasion” (Goodin, 2003: 76). In Northern Ireland, elite bargaining is a familiar 
process to citizens. The Good Friday Agreement is itself the product of intense 
negotiation (Mitchell, 2001; Hennessey, 2009). During subsequent episodes of crisis 
or instability, cross-party talks have become the default recourse.33  
The primacy of bargaining over deliberation has two main effects on the 
decision-making process. First, the goals of decision-making are defined with an 
emphasis on group interests and values (Finlay, 2011; Rosler, 2016). Having already 
discussed the ethno-national nature of elections, Cash (2009) argues that adversarial 
politics (within and between ethno-national blocs) is a rational prerequisite for group 																																																								
32 See Quirk et al. (2018) for an overview of the literature on legislative deliberation, including a 
discussion on measurement challenges. 
33 The St Andrews Agreement (NIO, 2006), the Hillsborough Castle Agreement (NIO, 2010), 
Stormont House Agreement (NIO, 2014) and the Stormont (Fresh Start) Agreement (NIO, 2015) are 
all examples of elites negotiating cross-party deals in order to stabilise Northern Ireland’s institutions. 
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representatives to exercise legitimate power in a power-sharing administration. 
Steiner (2009: 196) acknowledges the tension between elite bargaining and 
substantive deliberation around broader interests; he argues that a “spirit of 
accommodation” is missing from power-sharing in Northern Ireland, whereby 
political arguments are often expressed without reference to the common good. 
Hayward (2014) contends that there is popular demand for deliberative processes to 
help address Northern Ireland’s deep divisions and complex, common problems, but 
that the explicit dualism between nationalism and unionism institutionalises group 
interests to be in perpetual competition with one another. Wilford (2015: 774) echoes 
her observation of consociational decision-making: “the [Northern Ireland] 
Assembly … is for the most part a congress of ethnic ambassadors in which 
communal purposes and prejudices, rather than the general good and general reason, 
prevail” (original emphasis). Even in committees, where the tone is sometimes less 
partisan and more deliberative, members essentially behave as “party animals” 
within each ethno-national bloc (Wilford and Wilson, 2006: 30). 
A decision-making process centred on bargaining rather than deliberation 
makes for an unruly spectacle. Parties may be incentivised to take contradictory 
positions before elections (Deschouwer, 2005). After them, they lack a sense of 
common purpose or collective responsibility in government (Taylor, 2009). Indeed, 
rather than persuade one another in pursuit of a common goal, ministers have taken 
each other to court (Gormley-Heenan, 2015: 59). Citizens observe this absence of 
deliberation from political decision-making. The 2015 Life and Times Survey asked 
respondents, “How much would you say that members of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly from different parties work together to help solve Northern Ireland's 
problems?” Twenty-nine percent of respondents said ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a great 
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deal’, while 65 percent who said ‘not very much’ or ‘not at all’ (Ark, 2015). This 
represents an increase in the number of negative responses compared to the 2001 
survey (the only other year in which this item was measured).34	Meanwhile, more 
people distrust than trust the Assembly to work in Northern Ireland’s long-term 
interests.35 The defence of narrow party goals over the pursuit of common interests 
has the potential to result in an incoherent and/or dysfunctional government; survey 
evidence suggests that citizens notice, largely to their frustration. 
Second, the emphasis on bargaining over deliberation limits the role of 
evidence in policy-making. Knox (2008: 355) examines the recent reform of public 
administration in Northern Ireland, providing an illustration that “political 
commitments often lead you in directions that the evidence does not necessarily 
strongly support.” Again, this is not necessarily unique to consociations, but a 
compounding feature of power-sharing is the considerable scope of individual 
ministers to make their own decisions. Bell and Stockdale (2016) note the tension 
between highly localised pressures and broader interests over the decision not to 
pursue a national park in the Mourne Mountains. Since it was not necessary to bring 
the decision before the full Executive, the Environment Minister was arguably under 
greater pressure to prioritise localised interests over considerations of the wider 
interests of Northern Ireland’s citizens. Furthermore, critics argue that the devolved 
nature of consociational government gives ministers the opportunity to simply 
maintain policy parity with legislation passed centrally at Westminster, particularly 
over social security (Birrell and Heenan, 2010). The lack of imagination, or will, to 
develop bespoke policies tailored to Northern Ireland’s interests harks back to 																																																								
34 Forty-three percent say ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a great deal’; 50 percent say ‘not very much’ or ‘not at 
all’ (Ark, 2001). 
35 Thirty-two percent say they trust the Assembly to work in Northern Ireland’s long-term interests 
‘all of the time’ or ‘most of the time’, while 60 percent say they trust it to do so ‘only some of the 
time’ or ‘almost never’ (Ark, 2015). 
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practice of ‘Shamrock photocopying’, whereby (before devolution) Whitehall 
departments in London would simply duplicate policies in Great Britain and apply 
them to Northern Ireland (Cairney et al. 2009). 
Against a backdrop of inter-group bargaining and a limited role for evidence-
based policy-making, the decision-making process lacks a meaningful degree of 
reflective deliberation. In particular, the tension between bargaining and deliberation 
raises the question of what consociation is intended to deliver. If Northern Ireland’s 
political system is to facilitate a meaningful form of post-conflict democracy and 
reconciliation, the procedural design of the political process should encourage 
decision-making around the common good rather than the defence of the rival 
interests of ‘constituent peoples’ (Wilson, 2009: 236). For Taylor, consociationalists 
do not grasp the post-conflict ‘sociological terrain’. He argues that only “a turn to 
deliberative democratic politics” is required to promote a truly “public-spirited 
attitude” in policy-making (Taylor, 2009: 327). However, it is unnecessary to choose 
between the two approaches: O’Flynn (2006; 2010) does not call for consociational 
arrangements to be abandoned, but rather advocates the explicit promotion of 
deliberative principles within consociations. In any case, if citizens themselves want 
to see a more post-conflict style of policy-making, their expectations are unlikely to 
be met by a political system without such principles in evidence. Less partisanship 
and greater deliberative capacity will be required to strengthen the perceived 






3.1.3  The Challenge of Promoting Non-Tyranny 
After decision-makers have had the opportunity to consider different policy options, 
how are decisions formally taken in a consociational political system? As Fishkin 
(2009) notes, decisions taken by otherwise democratic means can still result in 
discriminatory outcomes. This is where the principle of non-tyranny is important: 
avoiding “the choice of a policy that imposes severe deprivations of essential 
interests when an alternative policy could have been chosen that would not have 
imposed comparable severe deprivations on anyone” (Fishkin, 2009: 62; emphasis 
added). Consociation, by conscious design, requires a set of procedures to avoid any 
‘tyranny of the majority’. Representatives of Northern Ireland’s two main ethno-
national blocs, nationalists and unionists, possess an effective veto on any bill or 
motion perceived to discriminate against their group’s essential interests.36 Warren 
(1999) argues that the general problem underlying any political relationships is a 
lack of trust; in the post-conflict context of Northern Ireland, mutual vetoes are 
designed to offer groups protection in the absence of sufficient levels of inter-group 
trust. However, McCulloch (2014) notes that permissive veto rights for minorities 
can lead to systemic abuse and, in turn, precipitate routine decision-taking deadlock. 
 From the democratic principle of non-tyranny, this raises a crucial, counter-
intuitive point. Fishkin (2009: 62) argues that tyranny may arise from the “conscious 
choice of policy omission as well as commission.” In other words, it is not just a 
majority that can impose tyranny, but a minority can also inflict tyranny. Procedural 
mechanisms with a relatively low veto threshold “invite gridlock” (Oberschall and 
Palmer, 2005: 82). Schwartz (2014) notes the highly challenging operationalisation 																																																								
36 The old Parliament of Northern Ireland (1921-1972) was strongly associated with unionist majority 
rule. For its entire history of half-a-century, the Ulster Unionist Party held a majority of seats. The 
post-1998 consociational arrangements represent a conspicuous institutional effort to avoid any future 
possibility of one group, represented by one or more parties, dominating another. 
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of mutual vetoes for Northern Ireland’s two communities. While a ‘petition of 
concern’ may be legitimately tabled for issues relating to culture, conflict legacy, 
and institutional reform, the precise conditions under which this mechanism may be 
applied are not specified. With an open-ended scope, a petition of concern may be 
“used to block decisions which have nothing to do with community specific 
interests” (Schwartz, 2014: 4). It is not just a feature of politics in Northern Ireland; 
gridlock is also common in consociational Belgium (Deschouwer, 2005). Where 
there is stalemate at the elite level, McGarry and O’Leary (2009: 35) acknowledge 
that it leads to “instability” in the political system. This threatens public support. 
It would be a mischaracterisation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the 
Executive to suggest that they operated in a state of permanent gridlock, yielding no 
substantive output responsive to citizens’ demands. In terms of the volume of 
legislation passed between 2007 and 2014, Schwartz (2014) calculates that the 
Assembly output was not significantly lower to that of the Scottish Parliament 
(where no comparable veto procedure exists).37 However, the quality of output has 
not necessarily been meaningful. Birrell and Gormley-Heenan (2015: 74) 
acknowledge a “steady flow of primary legislation” from the Assembly (see Figure 
3.4), but classify most of it as relatively unimportant or parity legislation (rubber-
stamping UK-wide policies). 
Business does not necessarily grind to a halt; high decision thresholds result 
in patchy output and can vastly narrow the scope of the policy agenda. Decisions 
often reflect a lowest-common denominator approach. In an empirical audit of 
democratic performance in Northern Ireland, Nolan and Wilson (2017) argue that the 
devolved institutions have failed to deliver a single piece of consequential legislative  																																																								
37 Between 2007 and 2014, the Northern Ireland Assembly passed 86 acts, only 15 fewer than the 
Scottish Parliament (Schwartz, 2014: 3). 
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Figure 3.4: Number of bills passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly, 2000-2015 
(adapted from Birrell and Gormley-Heenan, 2015: 76) 
 
 
output. With little procedural incentives to do otherwise, the foci of many political 
representatives remains on constitutional debates and short-term issues (Wilson, 
2005). This comes at the expense of longer-term public service issues and social 
policy (Knox, 2015: 30). Knox (2016: 501) succinctly captures the policy effects of 
‘tyranny of the minority’: 
 
Somewhat ironically, the political structures put in place in Northern Ireland 
to ensure a consensus … actually make it more difficult to respond 
effectively to public expectations for better services and an improved quality 
of life.  
 
In a study of empirical indicators on educational attainment, crime, welfare claims, 
unemployment, mental health, physical health, and crime, Knox (2016) finds 
evidence of a decreasing quality of life in Northern Ireland’s most deprived 
communities, typically those suffering the worst effects of conflict. For Wilford 
(2009: 181), the failure to tackle these issues stems from the rigid framework of 






According to survey data, citizens appear underwhelmed by the work of the 
institutions. Only 11 percent of citizens say that the Assembly has achieved ‘a lot’, 
48 percent say that it has achieved ‘a little’, while 31 percent say that it has achieved 
‘nothing at all’ (Ark, 2015).38 The weak perceptions of achievement may lead people 
to question the instrumental value of democratic institutions. Only a minority of 
citizens (20 percent) perceive the Assembly to be value for money.  Of the two-
thirds of respondents who do not perceive it to be value for money, more than half 
say it ‘definitely is not’ (Ark, 2015).39 If citizens do not perceive a decision-making 
process to meet their substantive policy expectations, they may question the value of 
the process itself.  
 Therefore, while Northern Ireland’s consociational procedures for taking 
decisions were designed in response to low levels of inter-group trust – in particular, 
the traditional minority (Catholic-nationalist) group’s concern at the prospect of 
tyranny by the traditional majority (Protestant-unionist) group – in practice they may 
facilitate systematic discrimination through policy omission: non-decisions. The 
salience of the ethno-national dimension and the ability of unionist and nationalist 
party representatives to exercise a veto make for a potentially gridlocked decision-
taking process. Not only are difficult decisions avoided altogether, but the rules are 
“specifically unfair” to representatives designating as neither nationalist nor unionist 
– and the voters they represent – since they do not have the same capacity to impose 
or override a veto (Schwartz, 2010: 357). We have already seen from attitudinal data 
that a plurality of citizens identify as neither nationalist nor unionist; these citizens 
do not enjoy the same procedural protections or rights as those with a stronger ethno-																																																								
38 Respondents were asked, “Overall, do you think that the Northern Ireland Assembly has achieved 
… [a lot/a little/nothing at all]?” 
39 Perceptions of instrumental value were measured on a four-point scale by this item: “On balance, 
do you think that the Northern Ireland Assembly is good value for money for people in Northern 
Ireland?” 
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national ideological position. The laudable intention of institutionalising procedures 
to help protect minorities from discrimination cannot be dismissed, but there is a 
difference between tyrannical decisions and decisions that, while instrumentally 
undesirable for some, are far from tyrannical. As Wilson (2005) notes, 
consociationalism and non-majoritarianism are not the same thing; similarly, group 
vetoes may not be the only mechanism through which non-tyranny can be promoted 
in the context of weak inter-group trust. Indeed, if a population in a post-conflict 
context cannot be easily reduced to two groups, new ways of taking decisions should 
be considered if the process is to receive a broad perception of legitimacy. 
 
3.1.4  Preliminary Hypotheses 
Having examined the performance of Northern Ireland’s consociational political 
system, there are compelling grounds to suspect that it falls short of many citizens’ 
expectations. Table 3.1 summarises the argument. 
 
 Stage of Political System 
 Input â Throughput â Output 
General process feature Selection of 
decision-makers 






Elite bargaining Mutual vetoes 
Expected democratic 
principle 
Political equality Deliberation Non-tyranny 
Main problem for 
perceived legitimacy 






Table 3.1: Democratic principles and the challenges of meeting them, at different 
stages of a consociational political system 
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Applying the framework developed in Chapter Two, Table 3.1 outlines main ways in 
which the system struggles to promote the principles of political equality, 
deliberation and non-tyranny. Accordingly, we formulate three initial hypotheses on 
the likely factors driving a cumulative democratic deficit. 
At the input stage of the political system, we have seen that the selection of 
decision-makers leaves many citizens’ preferences excluded from the process. Such 
exclusion may be voluntary, such as by abstaining from voting in elections, or it may 
arise from the systematic under-representation of ideological preferences that lack 
salience in a party system dominated by the ethno-national dimension. The challenge 
of delivering substantive political equality leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Individuals who are under-represented by the political system will be 
particularly dissatisfied with how democracy works in Northern Ireland. 
 
Second, at the throughput stage of the system, the decision-making process is 
characterised by a high degree of partisanship, serving sectional interests. This 
stands in tension with promoting the democratic principle of deliberation. While its 
relative absence may not be particularly problematic for people who have a strong 
connection to a political party, decision-making without sufficient deliberation is 
likely to be perceived as less legitimate by those without such a connection: 
 
H2: Individuals with low levels of partisanship will be particularly dissatisfied 
with how democracy works in Northern Ireland. 
 
Third, at the output stage of the political system, procedural gridlock may result in 
many decisions not being taken at all. Drawing on Fishkin’s contention that policy 
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omission can result in tyrannical outcomes, mechanisms designed to protect groups’ 
essential interests in the absence of mutual trust may have perverse consequences, 
undermining the ability of the political system to function effectively. Frustration 
with group vetoes is likely to be particularly acute among citizens from the majority 
group, as well as those who trust the out-group. These individuals have the least to 
gain from minority veto mechanisms, and so are likely to perceive less need for 
them: 
 
H3: Members of the majority group and people who trust the out-group will be 
particularly dissatisfied with how democracy works in Northern Ireland. 
 
Before examining reforms that could enhance the perceived legitimacy of decision-
making, it is sensible to first confirm whether or not citizens perceive a problem to 
exist. If the goal is to increase levels of satisfaction with the system’s democratic 
performance, we must understand the magnitude and nature of dissatisfaction. 
 
3.2  Preliminary Study 
3.2.1  Data & Method 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted on a representative sample of the Northern 
Ireland population in October 2015. The 1,015 respondents were recruited by quota 
sampling; the composition of the final sample closely mirrors the demographic 
distributions reported in the 2011 Census.40 Post-stratification weights are applied in 
the analysis that follows to account for the under-representation of single household 																																																								40	Forty-eight percent of respondents were male, 52 percent female. In terms of community 
background, 42 percent of respondents were Catholic and 46 percent Protestant (compared to 40 
percent and 42 percent respectively in the 2011 Census for Northern Ireland). 
		 70 
occupants. The survey asked respondents about their attitudes towards democracy 
and different ways of making decisions in Northern Ireland.41 While the latter aspect 
of the survey is treated fully in the next chapter, the goal of this brief analysis is to 
provide a preliminary overview of the former. 
 Here, the dependent variable is dissatisfaction with democracy, measured 
with a simple item: “On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy 
works in Northern Ireland?” Responses were collected on a four-point unipolar 
scale, which were subsequently recoded into binary categories: satisfied and 
dissatisfied.42 The explanatory variables are grouped within our threefold framework 
of core democratic principles. To test the first hypothesis on the relationship between 
democratic dissatisfaction and the delivery of political equality at the selection stage 
of the system, we capture representational inclusion and exclusion through binary 
measures of electoral participation (reported voting versus non-voting) and ethno-
national ideology (unionist or nationalist versus neither unionist nor nationalist).43 
For the second hypothesis on decision-making, we gauge partisanship through 
individuals’ stated level of party attachment (feeling close to at least one political 
party versus feeling distant from all) and their level of trust in political parties (on a 
five-point unipolar scale).44  Finally, for the promotion or otherwise of non-tyranny 
in the taking of decisions, we are interested in group-based attitudes. This entails 																																																								
41 See Appendix A for the full survey questionnaire. 
42 Response categories were “very satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” “not very satisfied” and “not at all 
satisfied.” For analytic efficiency the first two categories are collapsed into ‘satisfied’; the latter two 
are collapsed into ‘dissatisfied’.  
43 Electoral participation is measured by respondents’ stated intention in a future general election. A 
relatively low proportion (23 percent) say they “would not vote,” implying that the remainder would 
participate in the next election. This is likely to be an under-estimation of non-voting, since 
respondents tend to over-report voting in questionnaires that rely on self-reporting (Silver et al. 1986). 
44 On a bipolar five-point scale, respondents were asked to indicate how close or distant they felt to 
each of Northern Ireland’s five main political parties: the DUP, Sinn Féin, the UUP, the SDLP and 
Alliance. Most (82 percent) felt close or neutral to at least one party, while the remaining 18 percent 
of respondents felt distant from all five parties. Trust in political parties is measured on a unipolar 
five-point scale, ranging from “do not trust at all” (1) to “trust a lot” (5). Responses are recoded into 
three categories: low trust (1 or 2), medium trust (3), and high trust (4 or 5). 
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identifying a respondent’s community background (Catholic or Protestant) and their 
level of trust in the out-group.45 A series of standard demographic control questions 
are included: age, gender and social class. The full questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix A, with descriptive statistics presented in Appendix B. 
For context, data were collected when Northern Ireland’s devolved 
institutions were still functioning, with an election to the Assembly scheduled for the 
following year. The two largest parties, namely the DUP (the largest unionist party) 
and Sinn Féin (the largest nationalist party), had been publicly divided on a number 
of issues, ranging from addressing the legacy of Northern Ireland’s conflict to the 
implementation of welfare reform (Matthews and Pow, 2017). While they remained 
in a power-sharing administration together, their governing relationship had become 
increasingly marked by turbulence and animosity, necessitating routine cross-party 
negotiations to avoid the outright collapse of the political system. This backdrop will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
3.2.2  Results 
A cross-sectional snapshot reveals an overwhelmingly negative picture on the 
perceived performance of democracy in Northern Ireland (see Figure 3.5). Just one 
percent of respondents said they were very satisfied with the way democracy works 
– statistically negligible. A larger proportion, one quarter of respondents, said they 
were fairly satisfied. However, a clear majority evaluated democratic performance in 
negative terms: 62 percent of respondents said they were not satisfied, including 31 
percent who were not at all satisfied. Excluding the 14 percent of respondents  																																																								
45 All respondents were asked, in general, the extent to which they trust members of the 
Catholic/nationalist community and members of the Protestant/unionist community on separate five-
point scales. High scores (4 or 5) on both scales indicate a high level of trust in both groups. 
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Figure 3.5: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Northern Ireland (% 
selecting each option) 
 
 
expressing a ‘don’t know’ response, dissatisfaction levels rise to 71 percent 
expressing some degree of dissatisfaction compared to just 29 percent expressing 
satisfaction. The distribution of responses not only indicates net dissatisfaction with 
democratic performance (of 43 percent), but also that the intensity of dissatisfaction 
is significantly higher than the intensity of satisfaction. As a basic starting point, this 
evidence confirms that a democratic deficit exists from the perspective of citizens. 
The first hypothesis expects that individuals who are under-represented by 
the political system are especially likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy 
works in Northern Ireland. Bivariate analysis in Figure 3.6 suggests that this is not 
the case. A higher percentage of voters (72 percent) said they were dissatisfied with 
democratic performance than non-voters (65 percent), but the difference is not 
statistically significant (χ2 (1, N = 773) = .84, p = .36). In other words, the chi-square 
test fails to support the alternative hypothesis that non-voting is a symptom of tacit 
endorsement of the performance of the political system. Both voters and non-voters 
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Similarly, despite the observation that many individuals’ political preferences 
are systematically under-represented by the political system in Northern Ireland, 
negative evaluations of the quality of democracy are not significantly higher among 
ethno-national centrists. Survey respondents who identify as neither nationalist nor 
unionist were just as likely to be dissatisfied as those who describe themselves as 
nationalist or unionist (χ2 (1, N = 843) = .20, p = .66). Across the ideological 
spectrum, seven out of ten evaluated the performance of the system in negative 
terms.46  In other words, the individuals we would expect to feel under-represented 
by decision-makers in Northern Ireland’s consociational system, at least on the 
salient ethno-national dimension, are just as likely to be dissatisfied with the way 
democracy works as the individuals we would expect to feel well represented.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Northern Ireland, by 
groups over- and under-represented in the political system 
 																																																								
46 Within the broad ‘nationalist/unionist’ category, 74 percent of unionists and 73 percent of 
nationalists said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy works, indicating no significant 










































Figure 3.7: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Northern Ireland, by 
measures of partisanship 
 
 
The second of our preliminary hypotheses expects that individuals with low levels of 
partisanship will be particularly dissatisfied with the way democracy works in 
Northern Ireland. The bivariate relationships presented in Figure 3.7 suggest that this 
is indeed the case. The first measure of partisanship is derived from an individual’s 
perceived closeness to political parties. Over 70 percent of those who are close to at 
least one political party evaluated democracy in negative terms, compared to 80 
percent of those who do not feel close to any political party. This difference is 
moderately significant (χ2 (1, N = 710) = 3.60, p = .06). We see an even stronger 
relationship with the second measure of partisanship, the extent to which individuals 
trust political parties in general. Among those reporting a high level of trust in 
political parties, a majority said they were satisfied with the way democracy works; 
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those who report a low level of trust in political parties (χ2 (2, N = 819) = 51.37,  
p < .01). 
The third expectation is that individuals with little to gain from minority veto 
mechanisms are especially likely to be dissatisfied with the performance of 
democracy in Northern Ireland. The findings presented in Figure 3.8 challenge this 
hypothesis. Levels of dissatisfaction are high among members of both the Protestant 
and Catholic communities; the differences in the way members of the traditional 
majority and minority groups evaluated democratic performance are not statistically 
significant at the p < .05 level (χ2 (1, N = 776) = 3.09, p = .08). Moreover, people 
who trust members of the out-group are actually less dissatisfied with democracy 
than people who are less trusting of the other by ten percentage points. This 
difference is statistically significant (χ2 (1, N = 714) = 9.02, p < .01). 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Northern Ireland, by 
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N 741 660 715 499 
-2 Log likelihood 886.358 714.295 835.537 534.979 
Nagelkerke R2 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.12 
χ2 (d.f.)  11.96 (5)** 40.01 (5)*** 22.08 (5)*** 43.24 (9)*** 
Entries are odds ratios from logistic regressions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is dissatisfaction with democracy (coded ‘1’ if true, ‘0’ otherwise). Odds ratios greater 
than 1 indicate a positive association; odds ratios less than 1 indicate a negative association. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 










Table 3.2 combines each of the variables explored so far in a series of multivariate 
logistic models estimating democratic dissatisfaction. Controlling for age, gender 
and social class, the nature and direction of the prior bivariate relationships are 
unchanged. The only exception is the effect of party attachment: all else equal, being 
distant from all political parties is no longer a significant predictor of being 
dissatisfied with democracy. Instead, individuals’ lack of trust in political parties 
appears to provide a much stronger explanation. Holding all other variables constant 
at the mean, Figure 3.9 depicts the marginal effect of different levels of trust on the 
probability of being dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Northern Ireland 
(estimated from Model 4 in Table 3.2). The trend is unequivocal. The lowest level of 
trust in political parties (1) is associated with an 81 percent probability of being  
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dissatisfied with the way democracy works. At the other end of the scale, the 
probability of an individual being dissatisfied with the way democracy works is 
more than halved if he or she holds the highest level of trust in political parties (5). It 
is worth revisiting the distribution of attitudes towards political parties to begin with: 
only 2 percent of respondents said they trust them “a lot” (scoring 5); 46 percent said 
they do not trust them “at all” (scoring 1). In other words, levels of trust in political 
parties are heavily skewed to the negative, and these views are highly associated 
with being dissatisfied with the political system’s democratic performance.  
In comparison, the marginal effect of trusting the out-group is not as large: 
both those who are trusting and less trusting of members of the out-group are more 
likely than not to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works (see Figure 3.10). 
The probability of being dissatisfied decreases from 76 percent to just under 65 
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percent across the two levels of out-group trust. Therefore, compared to differential 
levels of trust in members of the out-group, differential levels of trust in political 
parties provide a much sharper contrast in accounting for the probability of certain 
individuals being satisfied rather than dissatisfied with the way democracy works in 
Northern Ireland. 
 
3.3  Discussion & Conclusion 
This preliminary study shows that people in Northern Ireland are highly dissatisfied 
with the democratic performance of its consociational political system. From the 
perspective of citizens themselves, it is difficult to dispute that a democratic deficit 
exists. A more challenging task lies in disentangling the precise factors driving it. 
 At the input stage of the political system, Northern Ireland’s consociational 
arrangements are designed to promote the inclusion of both unionists and nationalists 
in decision-making. In reality, however, we see that the preferences of ethno-
national centrists are disproportionately excluded from political representation. High 
levels of voter abstention further undermine the ability of the system to promote 
political equality. Non-voters and individuals who are neither nationalist nor unionist 
are indeed more likely to be dissatisfied than satisfied with the way democracy 
works. However, they are no more likely to hold negative evaluations of the system 
compared to voters and individuals who hold demarcated ethno-national positions.  
If people who are systematically over-represented are just as likely to be 
dissatisfied with democratic performance as people who are systematically under-
represented, does this mean that substantive political equality is irrelevant when it 
comes to citizens’ perceptions of the political system? The attitudinal evidence does 
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not necessarily support this interpretation. It is, in fact, possible for over- and under-
represented groups to perceive political inequalities in representation, but to object to 
it for different reasons. For example, it is possible that unionists and nationalists are 
frustrated with democratic performance precisely because rival ideological views are 
included so prominently in political representation, even if their own views are also 
over-represented as a result of the selection process. In contrast, individuals who 
hold a centrist position on the ethno-national dimension are likely to be frustrated 
because their own views are under-represented; they stand to gain the most from 
selection mechanisms that promote more politically equal outcomes. 
Similarly, even though people who abstain from voting are no more likely to 
be dissatisfied with democratic performance than people who participate in elections, 
it would be mistaken to conclude that perceptions of substantive political equality 
play no role in shaping people’s evaluations of the system. In the first instance, it is 
important to note that despite the rejection of the first hypothesis, the results did not 
offer support for the alternative hypothesis. To put it another way, non-voting is not 
significantly associated with being more satisfied with democratic performance, 
making it difficult to see how electoral abstention signifies tacit contentment with 
the system. Non-voters and voters are equally dissatisfied with the system’s 
democratic performance. From this perspective, the real puzzle is not that non-voters 
are not more dissatisfied, but rather that voters are not more satisfied. It is possible 
that high levels of dissatisfaction among non-voters are indeed largely explained by 
their sense of exclusion from the system – a perception of political inequality. For 
voters, meanwhile, their substantive inclusion may be insufficient to offset other 
perceived deficiencies of the way the system works. For them, it is not a sense of 
political inequality in the selection of decision-makers that is driving dissatisfaction; 
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it is more likely that voters’ negative evaluations arise from their observations of the 
subsequent stages of decision-making. 
 At the throughput stage of the system, political parties are traditionally the 
primary vehicles through which voters’ preferences are translated into policy 
outcomes. In Northern Ireland, the nature of decision-making is particularly partisan, 
characterised by negotiation over fixed, narrow interests rather than deliberation in 
pursuit of a common interest. It appears that people notice, and they evaluate the 
system accordingly. Such a decision-making process is marginally less problematic 
for people who feel close to at least one political party, and much less problematic 
for those who generally trust political parties. It appears that for the latter group 
especially, political parties remain effective agents in democratic decision-making. 
However, levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works are 
significantly higher among people who do not feel close to any political party and 
those who distrust parties in general. When the two variables are included in a model 
together, it is clear that distrust in political parties is a particularly powerful predictor 
of democratic dissatisfaction. Given that less than 10 percent of people trust political 
parties in Northern Ireland, compared to two-thirds who distrust them, it would be 
decidedly unrealistic to expect political parties to be the sole vehicles capable of 
meeting citizens’ democratic expectations for the system. As long as distrust in 
political parties is so widespread and so heavily associated with the underlying 
problem, they are much more likely to be contributing to a democratic deficit than 
fixing it. There are, therefore, compelling grounds to suggest that a very different 
model of decision-making is required in response. A much greater emphasis on 
deliberation over partisanship in decision-making could, at the very least, help to 
close the gap.  
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 Finally, at the output stage of the political system, a low veto threshold helps 
to make gridlock a frequent phenomenon in Northern Ireland. While minority veto 
mechanisms were designed to avoid tyranny of the majority, non-decision-making 
can result in perverse outcomes. Intriguingly, Catholics and Protestants are equally 
likely to be dissatisfied with Northern Ireland’s democratic performance. While the 
traditional majority group may be expected to be particularly frustrated with a 
system characterised by gridlock, it seems that the minority group shares this level of 
frustration. Moreover, while we may reasonably have expected that people who trust 
members of the out-group to have been especially dissatisfied with the political 
system, since they derive no benefit from group-based protections, it turns out that 
individuals who are less trusting of the out-group are significantly more likely to be 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works. In other words, the very people who the 
system is explicitly designed to protect are the ones who are the least likely to be 
satisfied with its performance.  
And yet perhaps this should be unsurprising. If, as it is argued, the legitimacy 
of the political system is undermined by continual abuse of veto powers by political 
representatives of both communities, their mutual manipulation of consociational 
procedures may paradoxically serve to undermine, not generate, inter-group trust. 
Still, if the political system were to abandon these mechanisms entirely, people who 
distrust members of the out-group may not respond positively once they reflect on 
the potential loss of power for their own group. Without experiencing any direct gain 
from group veto rights, individuals who are trusting of the out-group are more likely 
to welcome a process of taking decisions that promotes non-tyranny in a broader 
sense, beyond minorities alone. 
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 In sum, this chapter has offered a preliminary, yet striking, diagnosis: 
Northern Ireland’s political system suffers from a pervasive democratic deficit. From 
the perspective of the maxi-public, it appears that considerable legitimacy has 
already vented from the system. Though being a deeply divided place, many citizens 
are united in their view that their political system is not functioning as it should be. 
Controlling the problem will be a daunting task, and it is unlikely that any remedy 
will be able to close the democratic deficit quickly or in isolation. On the contrary, 
enhancing citizens’ evaluations of the decision-making process is likely to take time 
and concerted reforms to the way the system operates.  
The diagnosis provides a starting point for developing at least one targeted 
solution. Recognising the challenges of delivering the democratic principles of 
political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny in a consociational political system, 
the preliminary empirical evidence suggests that, to varying degrees of magnitude 
and certitude, these challenges cumulatively contribute to a democratic deficit in 
Northern Ireland. Crucially, if these principles can be more effectively promoted by 
adding new elements to the decision-making process, some of the causes of the 
democratic deficit can be brought under control. While no single solution is likely to 
be capable of addressing all sources of grievance, the immediate priority should be 
to weigh up the possible solutions that stand a realistic chance of addressing the 
shortcomings identified. In the previous chapter, it was argued that citizens’ 
assemblies could be established alongside existing institutions to help perform this 
corrective role. In the next chapter, we proceed to empirically investigate this claim 







INITIAL PERCEPTIONS OF 
MINI-PUBLICS 
THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLIES 




Apollo 13: Okay Houston, are you still reading 13? 
Mission Control: That’s affirmative. We’re still reading you. We’re still 
trying to come up with some good ideas here for you. 
Radio communication between Apollo 13 Lunar Command Pilot  
Fred Haise and Mission Control, 13 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 161-2) 
 
 
Equipped with an initial diagnosis of the problem, the next step is to establish if the 
proposed treatment, a citizens’ assembly, is likely to be effective. The effectiveness 
of any prescribed solution rests on two assessments. First, does the treatment directly 
target the symptoms giving rise to the diagnosis? This might seem like an obvious 
question, but its purpose is to differentiate between certain courses of action that 
might be worthy in their own right, regardless of their relationship to the underlying 
problem, and those courses of action that are demonstrably associated with an 
improvement in specific symptoms. From a purely normative perspective, the 
application of deliberative democracy is a worthy pursuit for a variety of compelling 
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reasons. But having diagnosed a democratic deficit on the basis of empirically 
observed symptoms, an effective intervention must be evaluated on its capacity to 
treat them. Participants and organisers of a citizens’ assembly might find the process 
to be resoundingly positive on a personal level, but what contribution, if any, can 
these democratic innovations make more broadly at the level of the political system? 
This brings us to a second question. How does one particular treatment 
compare to the available alternatives? To try and fix a democratic malaise, the 
temptation may be to either fall back on dusty off-the-shelf remedies that no longer 
work, or else to blindly embrace a fashionable new institutional innovation without 
any prior intention of testing its likely effectiveness. Either approach may yield 
disappointing results if the potential contribution of a prescribed treatment is not 
evaluated against other plausible options, including the status quo. If deliberative 
mini-publics are to help control a democratic deficit in a political system, we first 
need to determine their potential relative to other possible ways of making decisions. 
 Thus, the goal of this chapter is to establish citizens’ baseline perceptions of  
mini-public legitimacy compared to other – more conventional – modes of decision-
making. First, it considers the range of options that may be considered as a realistic 
response to political crisis in the context of Northern Ireland. Second, it uses cross-
sectional survey data to assess the basic potential for citizens’ assemblies to promote 
the principles of political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny, before directly 
comparing the perceived merits of citizens’ assemblies to alternative processes. This 
is a baseline test of their perceived legitimacy. Third, it subjects each mode of 
decision-making to a more robust test of legitimacy through a randomised survey 
experiment, moving beyond citizens’ evaluations to assessing the extent to which 
they would accept a decision with which they disagree, reached by different means. 
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4.1  Never Waste a Good Crisis 
4.1.1  Contextualising Crises & Strategies for Intervention 
Having been introduced to Northern Ireland’s consociational political system in 
Chapter Three, it will come as little surprise that it routinely finds itself in crisis. The 
disproportionate representation of ethno-national ideologies, the heavily partisan 
nature of decision-making, and a low veto threshold combine to undermine the 
stability of the political system. It has been argued that these chronic symptoms 
amount to an underlying democratic deficit. Sometimes they go largely ignored in 
the background, apparently benign, but at certain junctures their malignancy is 
brought to the fore. An acute crisis delivers an existential shock to an already fragile 
system, further undermining public support and threatening its very survival.  
 The resilience of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions has been 
repeatedly tested since their establishment in 1998. Early controversies included the 
initial failure of the IRA to decommission its weapons, resulting in the boycott of 
Executive meetings by one of the parties of government (the Democratic Unionist 
Party) and a series of short suspensions of the institutions by the UK government 
during 2000 and 2001 (Tonge, 2000; Hazleton, 2004). Allegations of an intelligence-
gathering operation by the IRA at Stormont, the seat of government, brought about a 
more durable suspension of the institutions in 2002. The fact that it took five years 
for them to be restored underscores the inherent difficulty associated with the task of 
political reconstruction, along with the risk that any temporary collapse of the system 
becomes permanent. 
 After the reinstatement of the devolved institutions in 2007, the Assembly 
and Executive managed to complete a full term for the first time. This period was 
characterised by a relative sense of calm. The devolution of policing and justice 
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powers to Stormont in 2010 was a defining moment, having been reserved by the 
UK government at Westminster until Northern Ireland’s political parties could agree 
to the handover of such a sensitive portfolio.47 Despite evidence of dysfunction, such 
as a number of Executive ministers voting against their government’s own budget in 
early 2011, and despite ongoing security threats, not least a number of deadly attacks 
carried out by dissident republicans, these challenges did not appear to pose a more 
fundamental danger to the consolidation of Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions 
and peace process. As Matthews (2012: 349) notes, the 2011 Assembly election 
campaign largely focused on ‘bread and butter’ issues rather than the “constitutional 
pyrotechnics” that dominated most previous contests. However, it would be 
“premature” to take this relative shift in tone as a deeper sign of ‘normalisation’ 
(ibid: 344). 
 Thereafter, things went downhill. The 2012 decision by Belfast City Council 
to fly the Union Flag from City Hall only on designated days, rather than all-year-
round, sparked widespread street protests (Nolan, 2013; Jarman, 2019). Relations 
between the main parties of the Executive came under greater strain as the relative 
salience of the ethno-national dimension increased at the expense of ‘bread and 
butter’ issues. Intense disagreement over the flying of flags was accompanied by 
renewed disputes over the regulation of parades and dealing with the bitter legacy of 
Northern Ireland’s recent conflict (Lawther, 2014; Bryan, 2015; Evans and Tonge, 
2017). The “heavy political turbulence” generated by these three issues was 
compounded by contestation over the implementation of welfare reform, whether or 
not same-sex couples should have the right to marry, and whether or not Northern 
Ireland’s abortion laws should be liberalised (Matthews and Pow, 2017: 311). New 																																																								
47 In the Hillsborough Castle Agreement (NIO, 2010), Northern Ireland’s five main political parties 
agreed that the cross-community Alliance Party would nominate the new Justice Minister. See Brewer 
(1991) on the contested nature of policing in divided societies. 
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disputes along socio-economic ideological dimensions tend to reinforce, rather than 
undercut, ethno-nationalism (Garry et al. 2017).  
 Matters reached a tipping point in January 2017 when the deputy First 
Minister, Martin McGuinness, resigned from the Executive over the alleged 
mishandling of a renewable energy scheme by the First Minister, Arlene Foster.48 
His party, Sinn Féin, did not nominate a successor, thus collapsing the power-sharing 
government. A resulting Assembly election failed to fundamentally alter the 
arithmetic of government formation – the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Mrs 
Foster, was returned as the largest party in the Assembly – but the campaign served 
to expose bitter animosity between the two main parties. In the wake of the election, 
there have been five separate rounds of inter-party negotiations to try and re-
establish the Executive. Despite the crisis ostensibly stemming from the failure of 
the First Minister to take accountability for a policy failure, another issue swiftly 
replaced it as the main point of contention between the main parties: Irish language 
rights. At the time of writing, they have been unable to resolve their differences.49 
Table 4.1 summarises Northern Ireland’s post-Agreement experience of 
devolved government. The purpose of this chronological synopsis is to emphasise 
the inherent instability of Northern Ireland’s devolved political system, even when 
functioning. While the early crises stemmed directly from the tangible legacy of 
ethno-national conflict, the system’s underlying democratic deficit arguably weakens 
its capacity to withstand them. This magnifies the need for a democratic intervention 
that resolves a crisis in a sustainable way, and that helps prevent any recurrence. 																																																								
48 In her prior capacity as Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Mrs Foster had implemented 
a scheme intended to encourage non-residential premises to generate heat from renewable energy. In 
late 2016 it became apparent that this Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) was running severely over-
budget, having been implemented without appropriate cost controls. A public inquiry into the matter 
is underway, chaired by Sir Patrick Coghlin. 
49 Despite the dormancy of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, the UK government has not 
formally suspended the devolved institutions. 
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Status Year Events 
 1998 Good Friday Agreement signed (April); first Assembly election held (June). 
  Assembly meets for the first time (July); operates in ‘shadow’ capacity. 
 1999  
  Full powers devolved to the Assembly from Westminster (December). 
 2000 Assembly suspended (11 February-30 May); powers returned to Westminster. 
   
 2001  
  24-hour suspensions of the Assembly (on 10 August, 22 September). 
 2002  
  Assembly suspended (from October); direct rule from Westminster ensues. 
 2003  
  Assembly election held (November), but institutions remained suspended. 
 2004 Inter-party talks to restore devolved Assembly break down at Leeds Castle 
(September).   
 2005  
   
 2006  
  St Andrews Agreement reached after inter-party talks (November) 
 2007 Devolved powers restored to Stormont (May) after Assembly election (March) 
   
 2008  
   
 2009  
   
 2010 Inter-party talks to devolve policing & justice powers results in the 
Hillsborough Castle Agreement (February)   
 2011 Assembly election held (May) 
   
 2012  
  Loyalist street protests over flag display (December). 
 2013 Inter-party talks, chaired by Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, begin in 
September, but conclude without agreement (December).   
 2014 Stormont House Agreement reached after 11 weeks of inter-party talks 
chaired by the UK government (December)   
 2015 Fresh Start Agreement reached after 10 weeks of inter-party talks chaired by 
the UK government (November)   
 2016 Assembly election held (May); UK referendum on EU membership (June). 
   
 2017 Assembly collapses, but is not formally suspended. Election held (March). 
Four rounds of inter-party talks fail to produce a new government.   
 2018 Fifth round of post-election inter-party talks collapse (February). 
   
Table 4.1: A timeline of key moments in the functioning of Northern Ireland’s 
devolved political system, 1998-2018 
Key:  Functioning  Partly functioning  Not functioning 
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To date, there have been two broad approaches to crisis intervention. In the first 
instance, there may be an attempt to persevere with the system in its basic form. 
Indeed, this is the default course of action, as the pattern in Table 4.1 denotes. 
Emergency cross-party negotiations are convened to try and resolve the parties’ 
differences. These elite-level talks are usually chaired by the UK government or an 
international diplomat; they take place behind closed doors and usually take months 
to produce a result, if at all.50 A fresh election could be called in an attempt to 
persevere with the system by establishing fresh mandates. However, if political 
parties are divided before an election, they are unlikely to face pressure to 
compromise during a campaign or in its immediate aftermath – as illustrated by the 
March 2017 Assembly election.51 
A very different approach would be to abandon the system altogether, either 
for a fixed period or indefinitely.52 This would involve direct rule from Westminster, 
likely with official input from the Irish government. Such an arrangement may 
provide a period of breathing space, but it is not a realistic option for the long-term. 
All major political parties in Great Britain – and in the Republic of Ireland – insist 
that Northern Ireland should have a devolved government, consistent with the Good 
Friday Agreement, and thus view direct rule in any form as an option of last resort.53 																																																								
50 Multi-party talks convened by American diplomat Richard Haass, for example, lasted from 
September to December 2013 but failed to result in a multi-party agreement on the issues of flags, 
parading and dealing with the legacy of the past. Other talks between political elites have been more 
successful, resulting in the Hillsborough Agreement (NIO, 2010), the Stormont House Agreement 
(NIO, 2014) and the Fresh Start Agreement (NIO, 2015). 
51 As Table 4.1 notes, to date there have been five separate rounds of cross-party talks to try and form 
a government in the wake of the March 2017 election. None have been successful. 
52 Abandoning the system could, of course, be a pretext for some sort of reformed devolved system of 
government for Northern Ireland. The possibility of institutional reform is one that may emerge from 
any of these approaches, but it is a deeper question: it is not a short-term response to political crisis. 
53 The UK government has been notably reluctant to impose direct rule following the most recent 
collapse of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions in 2017. In the absence of ministerial 
direction and oversight, civil servants have been running government departments on a provisional 
basis. While Westminster approved legislation to ensure the continued funding of public services, any 
major public policy decisions have either been avoided or reversed following judicial review (Erwin, 
2018). 
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A third (and untested) approach would be to supplement the existing system 
with another kind of democratic decision-making, complementing an elite-centric 
process with a formal role for citizens. If elected politicians are locked in a vicious 
circle of deepening tumult, why not empower citizens themselves to adjudicate on 
the specific issue(s) causing the crisis? Holding a referendum would be the most 
familiar way of enhancing representative institutions with direct democracy (Budge, 
1996). Such an option could be decisive, but it could also be divisive, particularly in 
an already deeply divided place where a referendum may be seen as an overly crude 
majoritarian instrument (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009). As we have seen in Chapter 
Two, deliberative democracy offers an alternative mode of citizen-based decision-
making. It offers the same benefit of direct democracy – involving citizens directly 
in the political process – but with an emphasis on supplying citizens with an 
environment conducive to considered decision-making. After reviewing the 
applications of deliberative democracy to deeply divided places, O’Flynn and 

























We have also seen from Chapter Two that deliberative democracy can be formally 
institutionalised in the form of a citizens’ assembly. Figure 4.1 illustrates the basic 
logic of a citizens’ assembly as a supplement to Northern Ireland’s political system. 
It has two related advantages. First, it may help to make a constructive contribution 
to any pressing crisis among political elites (O’Flynn and Caluwaerts, 2018). That is, 
it may serve as an intervention aimed at resolving the immediate source of an acute, 
short-term crisis. Second, and more fundamentally, it may help to make a positive 
contribution by controlling the chronic democratic deficit underlying Northern 
Ireland’s political system. By promoting the principles of political equality, 
deliberation and non-tyranny, a citizens’ assembly could help improve evaluations of 
the broader system from the perspective of the maxi-public, repositioning the system 
onto a more sustainable footing. Thus, the advantage of a crisis is that by shining a 
light directly on the nature of existing arrangements, it provides an opportunity to 
experiment with innovative democratic reforms that may otherwise be seen as 
unnecessary. From the perspective of the maxi-public, a political crisis may also 
stimulate a greater willingness among citizens to take such proposals seriously.  
 
4.1.2 Hypotheses 
What do people think about citizens’ assemblies? Do they hold broadly favourable 
or broadly unfavourable attitudes to their key institutional features? At the 
individual-level, we expect that certain types of citizen will respond more 
enthusiastically to this innovative mode of decision-making than others. Drawing on 
both the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two and the empirical analysis 
of  Chapter Three,  the  specific  attributes  of  citizens’  assemblies  are  likely to  be  
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 Stage of Political System 
 Input â Throughput â Output 
General process feature Selection of 
decision-makers 






Elite bargaining Mutual vetoes 
Expected democratic 
principle 
Political equality Deliberation Non-tyranny 















Table 4.2: Democratic principles, and the challenges of meeting them, at different 
stages of a consociational political system 
 
 
particularly attractive to citizens who are less well served by the features of a 
consociational political system. Table 4.2 summarises the value added by citizens’ 
assemblies across the three stages of decision-making, prompting the following 
initial hypotheses on the factors shaping positive perceptions toward some of their 
basic procedural features: 
 
H1a: Support for the selection features of a citizens’ assembly will be particularly 
high among individuals under-represented by the existing system (non-voters 
and people who are more ethno-nationally moderate). 
 
H1b: Perceptions of the deliberative decision-making capacity of a citizens’ 
assembly will be especially high among those with low levels of partisanship. 
 
H1c: Support for a citizens’ assembly playing a role in the taking of decisions will 
be particularly high among members of the majority group and individuals 
with high levels of out-group trust. 
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At the aggregate-level, we need to scrutinise the baseline legitimacy of citizens’ 
assemblies against alternative modes of decision-making. Despite the theoretical 
promise of citizens’ assemblies to enhance the quality of democracy, their relative 
novelty may limit popular appreciation of their potential to make a net positive 
contribution to the political system. Compared to representative and direct forms of 
democracy, deliberative mini-publics of any kind remain unfamiliar to the broader 
maxi-public. A lack of prior awareness of the concept may offset the perceived 
benefits of citizens’ assemblies relative to more conventional forms of decision-
making. As such, a further hypothesis errs on the side of caution: 
 
H2: The perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly will be at least as high as 
that for the alternative approaches to resolving a political crisis.  
 
However, compared to representative modes of democratic decision-making, it is 
expected that citizens’ assemblies will receive a higher level of support from 
individuals who stand to be better served by an alternative arrangement: people who 
are less well represented by the consociational system, those who may prefer 
deliberative over partisan decision-making, and those who would prefer to see 
decisions taken without the threat of minority veto. At this stage, compared to 
approaches that involve persevering with the system in its current form, it is 
expected that these individuals will be equally attracted to supplementing it with 
either direct or deliberative democracy: 
 
H3a: Compared to modes of decision-making that involve persevering with the 
system as it is, the perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly will be higher 
among individuals under-represented by the existing system, individuals with 
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low levels of partisanship, and individuals from the majority group or those 
possessing high levels of out-group trust. 
 
H3b: Compared to a referendum, the perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly 
will be equally high among individuals under-represented by the existing 
system, individuals with low levels of partisanship, and individuals from the 
majority group or those possessing high levels of out-group trust. 
 
 
4.2  Study One 
4.2.1  Data & Method 
A representative sample of the Northern Ireland population was interviewed on their 
attitudes towards a hypothetical citizens’ assembly as well as other (more familiar) 
forms of decision-making in October 2015.54 Respondents were presented with the 
following stimulus: 
 
On some important issues – such as flag display and the issue of welfare 
reform – the political parties in Northern Ireland find it very hard to agree 
with each other, and this leads to political crises. When such a crisis happens, 
there may be a number of ways to try and resolve it. Please tell me to what 
extent you think each of the following approaches is a good idea or a bad 
idea. 
  
Here, respondents are initially being asked to imagine a set of circumstances – a 
political crisis at the elite-level – and to evaluate potential, yet realistic, responses. 																																																								
54 This was part of the same cross-sectional survey analysed in Chapter Three. Face-to-face 
Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI) were conducted by Ipsos-MORI. 1,015 respondents 
were recruited by quota sampling. Post-survey checks suggest that the sample is representative. 48 
percent of respondents were male and 52 percent female. In terms of community background, 42 
percent of respondents were Catholic and 46 percent Protestant (compared to 40 percent and 42 
percent respectively in the 2011 Census for Northern Ireland). In the statistical analyses that follow, 
the data are weighted to realign any deviation from the quotas. 
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For context, political parties were at the time engaged in talks chaired by the UK 
government, culminating in the Fresh Start Agreement (NIO, 2015) the following 
month. Thus, the scenario benefits from a high degree of realism. The possible 
responses presented to respondents correspond to the three broad approaches of 
persevering with the system in its existing form (through inter-party talks chaired 
either by the British government or an international diplomat, or holding a fresh 
election), abandoning the system (by introducing direct rule from Westminster), or 
supplementing the system (with a referendum or a citizens’ assembly).  
 Our specific focus is, of course, on people’s perceptions of citizens’ 
assemblies. Compared to the five other options, this form of decision-making is 
relatively novel and the concept is unlikely to have been familiar to the vast majority 
of people in the sample. Therefore, before being asked for their reaction, respondents 
were first provided with a brief vignette to describe the three key features of a 
citizens’ assembly. These included the random selection of ordinary citizens from 
the general population to serve as its members; their deliberation on the background 
information, evidence and arguments on both sides of a contentious issue; and the 
reaching of a collective decision to be implemented: 
 
Another possible way of resolving a difficult issue – such as flag display or 
the issue of welfare reform – would be to get a group of ordinary people to 
make a decision on it after they have had a chance to consider the evidence 
and arguments. Here's how it would work… A representative sample of 500 
ordinary citizens in Northern Ireland is selected to consider the issue. These 
people would be selected in the same way that people are selected to serve on 
a jury: they are randomly selected.  And they would be a cross-section of all 
of the people in Northern Ireland in terms of age, gender, social class and 
religious and community background. The people on this ‘Citizens’ 
Assembly’ would be provided with background information about the issue 
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and would be given a presentation of all the main arguments on both sides of 
the issue. They would be asked to think carefully about the evidence and the 
different views and would then be asked to vote on the issue. What a majority 
of these people decided in the vote would be seen as the decision on the issue 
and would be implemented.   
 
The first two features are generally common to all citizens’ assemblies, at least as 
they have been constituted in practice; the latter is more unusual in that a citizens’ 
assembly is usually tasked with reaching an advisory decision, not a binding one. 
However, in order to meaningfully compare respondents’ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly against alternative modes of decision-making, it 
provides a more robust test when the hypothetical body possesses equivalent (i.e. 
final, rather than advisory), decision powers. 
There are two sets of dependent variables. The first set of single-item 
measures capture basic attitudes toward selection, decision-making, and decision-
taking features with respect to the hypothetical citizens’ assembly itself: the extent to 
which ordinary people would be good decision-makers,55 their likely motives in 
decision-making,56 and the extent of the role that it should play in taking decisions.57 
Further items capture the extent to which respondents think that each mode of 
decision-making, citizens’ assemblies and the alternatives, is a good or bad idea.58  																																																								
55 “In general, how good or bad do you think ordinary people would be at making decisions if they 
were selected to serve on a citizens’ assembly?” There were five response categories: ‘very bad’, 
‘fairly bad’, ‘neither good nor bad’, ‘fairly good’ and ‘very good’, with ‘don’t know’ a further 
permissible option. 
56 “In a citizens’ assembly, do you think ordinary people would try to come to a decision that is good 
for everyone in Northern Ireland, or would they just try to look after the interests of their own 
community, or just try to look after their own personal interests?” The response categories were: 
‘…good for everyone in Northern Ireland’, ‘…just try to look after the interests of their own 
community’, ‘…just look after their own personal interests’, and ‘don’t know’.	
57 “If a citizens’ assembly of this kind was introduced do you think it should… [‘…make the final 
decision’, ‘…make a recommendation to be considered by politicians’ or ‘…not be given any role at 
all in policy-making’]?” 
58 The response categories were ‘very good idea’, ‘good idea’, ‘neither good nor bad idea’, ‘bad idea’ 
and ‘very bad idea’. Respondents had the option of responding with ‘don’t know’. 
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These are relatively crude measures of perceived legitimacy. In isolation, none can 
capture the full breadth and depth of the concept. Instead, they reflect a more modest 
goal of establishing respondents’ basic attitudes toward key institutional features of 
citizens’ assemblies, as well as comparing people’s general evaluations of citizens’ 
assemblies against other modes of decision-making. Taken together, these measures 
offer an initial, not a complete, investigation of citizens’ assembly legitimacy. 
 In order to test the individual-level hypotheses, we need variables that are 
relevant to the different stages of the citizens’ assembly process: selection, decision-
making, and taking decisions. Electoral participation relies on a self-reported item on 
future voting intention. Ethno-national moderation is initially measured on a five-
point bipolar scale and recoded to form a three-point unipolar scale, ranging from 
strong to moderate levels of ethno-nationalism. 59  Trust in political parties is 
measured on a five-point Likert scale. Partisan detachment is operationalised as a 
dummy variable: those who feel distant from all political parties are coded ‘1’ while 
those who feel close to at least one party are coded ‘0’.60 Similarly, out-group trust is 
operationalised as a dummy variable: those who trust members of both traditional 
communities are coded ‘1’; those who only trust members of their own community 
are coded ‘0’.61 Community background is itself measured according to nominal 
categories. Standard controls are included for age, gender and social class. All 
variables were also used in the survey analysis in Chapter Three. The full 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix A, with descriptive statistics in Appendix B. 																																																								
59 On the three-point scale, those identifying as very strongly unionist or nationalist are coded ‘0’, 
those identifying as fairly strongly unionist or nationalist are coded ‘1’, and those identifying as 
neither unionist nor nationalist are coded ‘2’. 
60 On a five-point scale respondents were asked the extent to which they felt close to or distant from 
each of the five main political parties (the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP), the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Sinn Féin and the Alliance Party. 
61 Respondents were asked (on a five-point scale) the extent to which they trusted “people from a 
Catholic/nationalist community background” and “people from a Protestant/unionist community 
background.” When respondents indicated one of the two positive response categories for both items, 
they are coded as being trusting of both communities (‘1’). 
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4.2.2  Results 
Some simple descriptive statistics convey broadly favourable attitudes toward the 
key features of citizens’ assemblies. At the input stage of a citizens’ assembly, most 
survey respondents appear receptive to the idea of ordinary people being selected to 
play a role in decision-making. Fifty-six percent say they think that ordinary people 
would be good or very good at making decisions, while only one in six say they 
would be bad or very bad. As Table 4.3 illustrates, there are no significant 
differences in attitudes between voters and non-voters (χ2 (2, N = 819) = 1.49, p = 
.48) or across different levels of ethno-national ideology (χ2 (2, N = 884) = .74, p = 
.69). Just as individuals who are over-represented in Northern Ireland’s political 
system are just as likely as those who are over-represented to be dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works, they are equally optimistic about the decision-making 
capability of their fellow citizens. Contrary to H1a, this suggests that one way in 
which citizens’ assemblies promote political equality – providing an equal 
opportunity for all citizens to be included in their selection – is widely seen to be 










Voter 16.7 26.3 57.0 100.0 
Non-voter 20.2 23.6 56.2 100.0 
Nationalist/unionist 16.1 27.7 56.3 100.0 
Neither 18.2 26.5 55.3 100.0 
All 17.4 26.7 55.9 100.0 
Table 4.3: Perceptions of whether ordinary people would make good or bad 
decision-makers (%), by groups over- and under-represented in the political system  
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Close to at least one party 18.9 41.3 39.9 100.0 
Distant from all 15.7 40.5 43.8 100.0 
High trust in parties 20.3 41.9 37.8 100.0 
Medium trust in parties 14.7 50.3 35.1 100.0 
Low trust in parties 18.9 38.9 42.2 100.0 
All 18.3 41.1 40.5 100.0 
Table 4.4: Perceptions of the likely motivation of citizens’ assembly decision-makers 
(%), by measures of partisanship  
 
 
Heading further into the process of decision-making, people hold mixed views about 
the likely motives of citizens’ assembly members. Just under one in five think that 
they would be mainly driven by self interest, while the remainder of respondents are 
evenly split in their anticipation of sectional and common interest motivations: 41 
percent think members would make decisions to serve their own community; 41 
percent think they would make decisions to serve everyone. There are no significant 
differences between individuals who feel close to at least one party and those who 
are distant from all parties (χ2 (2, N = 853) = 1.19, p = .55). Similarly, there is no 
significant variation in anticipated decision-making motivation across different 
levels of trust in parties (χ2 (4, N = 779) = 7.76, p = .10). While not a majority, it is 
arguably impressive that, across these variables oriented towards the nature of 
decision-making, four in ten people broadly anticipate citizens’ assembly members 
to be driven by the common interest. Respondents were not asked whether or not 
they thought this would be a good thing, perhaps explaining the lack of individual-
level variation predicted by H1b, but this distribution of expectations implies a 
healthy perceived capacity for citizens’ assemblies to engage in deliberation. 
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 No role Recommendation Final decision Totals 
Catholic 13.3 62.2 24.4 100.0 
Protestant 17.6 58.3 24.1 100.0 
Trust out-group 15.5 55.9 28.7 100.0 
Do not trust out-group 15.1 65.0 19.9 100.0 
All 15.8 61.2 23.0 100.0 
Table 4.5: Perceptions of the likely motivation of citizens’ assembly decision-makers 
(%), by measures of group identity and inter-group trust 
 
 
On the potential for a citizens’ assembly to influence policy output, Table 4.5 shows 
that an overwhelming majority of respondents say that such a body should play some 
sort of role in the process of taking decisions. Most (61 percent) think it should have 
the power to make a recommendation, while nearly a quarter think a citizens’ 
assembly should be able to take a binding decision. Only 16 percent say that it 
should be given no role at all. Interestingly, there are no significant differences in the 
attitudes of Catholic and Protestant respondents (χ2 (2, N = 819) = 2.73, p = .26). In 
other words, members of the traditional minority group are just as likely as members 
of the traditional majority group to support a citizens’ assembly having a formal role, 
with a further alignment of preferences on the precise nature of that role. We do 
observe significant variation in the preferences of individuals across different levels 
of out-group trust. Offering partial support for H1c, respondents who report a high 
level of out-group trust are significantly more likely to support a citizens’ assembly 
being able to take a final decision; those who are less trusting of out-group members 
are more likely to supporting it having an advisory role (χ2 (2, N = 700) = 7.87, p < 
.05). They are, however, equally likely to support it having some role compared to 
no role (χ2 (1, N = 701) = 0.02, p = .90). On the whole, most people see a place for 
citizens’ assemblies in the political system. 
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Taking a broader view, to what extent do people see citizens’ assemblies as a 
legitimate problem-solving device compared to other possibilities? Figure 4.2 shows 
that respondents are either more or just as likely to support a citizens’ assembly 
compared to available alternatives, confirming H2. This novel form of decision-
making received a mean level of support of 2.63 (SD = 1.28) on our five-point scale, 
recalibrated to run from 0 (‘very bad idea’) to 4 (‘very good idea’). This is 
statistically indistinguishable from the level of support for the default response of 
holding inter-party talks chaired by the UK government (M = 2.59; SD = 1.11).62 It is 
slightly higher than that for a more familiar form of citizen-based decision-making, a 
referendum (M = 2.51; SD = 1.20). While this difference is statistically significant, 
the magnitude is not overly large. 
In contrast, other modes of decision-making were much less well received. 
Persevering with the system through cross-party talks chaired by an international 
diplomat was seen as a particularly bad idea (M = 1.39; SD = 1.36).63 Giving voters 
the chance to reset the configuration of the system in an election was not seen much 
differently (M = 1.57; SD = 1.23). While abandoning the system with direct rule 
from Westminster was far from a widely favoured option, it is perhaps notable in 
itself that enjoyed a higher level of support than the two former ways of persevering 
with the system (M = 1.95; SD = 1.34). Put another way, a majority of people 
thought that each of these three responses to crisis would be a mostly bad idea. For 
context, 66 percent said that a citizens’ assembly would be a good or very good idea, 
excluding the 5 percent of survey participants who expressed a ‘don’t know’  
																																																								
62 Differences in means were tested using paired samples t-tests (two-tailed), with an alpha level of 
.05. 
63 The difference in the level of support for inter-party talks chaired by the British government and by 
an international diplomat is striking. The particularly weak level of support for the latter may reflect 
the public’s frustration at the breakdown of talks chaired by the American diplomats Richard Haass 
and Meghan O’Sullivan in late 2013. 
		 103 
 
Figure 4.2: Levels of support for different modes of decision-making (0 = very bad 
idea, 4 = very good idea; N = 1,015) 
 
 
response. Similarly, a large majority expressed a positive view towards inter-party 
talks chaired by the UK government (67 percent), and a referendum (61 percent). 
Underneath these aggregate findings, there is some important variation at the 
individual-level. Even though a citizens’ assembly received a similarly high level of 
support to two other more conventional modes of decision-making, different factors 
are associated with each set of positive evaluations. In the first of three direct 
comparisons, the logistic models presented in Table 4.6 estimate the probability of 
supporting a citizens’ assembly compared to cross-party talks chaired by the UK 
government, the default crisis response. The dependent variable is a binary outcome, 
coded ‘1’ where the respondent gives a higher level of support for a citizens’ 
assembly compared to cross-party talks, and ‘0’ otherwise. Excluding invalid 
responses, 35 percent of cases fall into the former category and 66 percent fall into 
the latter, which includes 31 percent of cases giving a higher score to cross-party 
talks and 34 percent evaluating the two options with the same level of support. 
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  1 2 3 4 
  Support for Citizens’ Assembly over Party Talks 
Selection     




- - 1.058 
(.286) 
 Ethno-national moderation 
(high = more moderate) 
1.222 
(.119)* 
- - 1.031 
(.155) 
Decision-Making     
 Distant from all parties 





 Trust in parties  





Decision-Taking     
 Protestant  
(ref: Catholic) 




 Trust out-group 
(ref: do not trust out-group) 




Controls     


































N 777 664 742 509 
-2 Log likelihood 997.75 835.30 937.33 612.65 
Nagelkerke R2 .02 .04 .04 .09 






Entries are odds ratios from logistic regressions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is support for a citizens’ assembly over party talks chaired by the British 
government (coded ‘1’ if support for a citizens’ assembly is higher, ‘0’ if it is equal or lower). Odds 
ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive association; odds ratios less than 1 indicate a negative 
association. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table 4.6: Predicting support for a citizens’ assembly over cross-party talks chaired 
by the British government 
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In line with H3a, the first regression model in Table 4.6 shows that people who hold 
more ethno-nationally moderate ideological views are significantly more likely to 
support a citizens’ assembly over UK government-chaired talks between the political 
parties, controlling for age, gender and social class. However, the effect disappears 
after the full range of variables enters the equation in the final model. Here, we see a 
highly significant negative relationship between levels of trust in political parties and 
citizens’ assembly support. The more individuals trust political parties, the less they 
support a citizens’ assembly as a response to crisis over the default alternative. This 
makes logical sense: those who trust political parties should be more likely, or just as 
likely, to support political parties in finding a solution to a crisis. Conversely, it is 
understandable for those who distrust political parties to be considerably more 
enthusiastic about an alternative centred on citizens, consistent with H3a. In Chapter 
Three we saw that people with a low level of trust in political parties are particularly 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works, indicating that citizens’ assemblies have 
the potential to add real value to decision-making from their perspective.  
 In Table 4.6 we also observe striking variation along the lines of community 
background. Contrary to H3a, Protestants are significantly less likely than Catholics 
to support a citizens’ assembly over traditional cross-party talks chaired by the UK 
government. It is likely that members of the Protestant community, who typically 
hold a British national identity, are somewhat more attracted to a process in which 
the UK government plays a formal role, even if only in a facilitation capacity. On the 
other hand, members of the Catholic community, who generally see themselves as 
Irish, are unlikely to have a similar kind of attachment, leading them to evaluate a 
citizen-centred alternative mode of decision-making more favourably. 
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  1 2 3 4 
  Support for Referendum over Party Talks 
Selection     




- - .931 
(.291) 
 Ethno-national moderation 
(high = more moderate) 
1.048 
(.123) 
- - 1.143 
(.157) 
Decision-Making     
 Distant from all parties 





 Trust in parties  





Decision-Taking     
 Protestant  
(ref: Catholic) 




 Trust out-group 
(ref: do not trust out-group) 




Controls     



































N 762 655 732 507 
-2 Log Likelihood 912.78 786.07 866.84 599.83 
Nagelkerke R2 .01 .04 .01 .05 
χ2 (d.f.)  4.65 (5) 17.60 
(5)*** 
5.65 (5) 17.01 (9)** 
Entries are odds ratios from logistic regressions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is support for a referendum over party talks chaired by the British government 
(coded ‘1’ if support for a referendum is higher, ‘0’ if it is equal or lower). Odds ratios greater than 1 
indicate a positive association; odds ratios less than 1 indicate a negative association. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table 4.7: Predicting support for a citizens’ assembly over cross-party talks chaired 
by the British government 
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Of course, a citizens’ assembly is not the only mode of decision-making that 
involves ordinary citizens directly. Table 4.7 offers a direct replication of the logistic 
models of Table 4.6, except the outcome variable is now support for referendums 
over cross-party talks chaired by the UK government. Excluding invalid responses, 
28 percent of respondents evaluated referendums more positively than the default 
option of cross-party talks (coded as ‘1’ in the binary outcome measure). A further 
34 percent gave referendums a lower score, while 39 percent gave both modes of 
decision-making an equivalent score (coded as ‘0’ in the outcome measure). On the 
whole, Table 4.7 tells a broadly similar story to Table 4.6. For example, lower levels 
of trust in political parties significantly predict support for referendums relative to an 
elite-led alternative. However, there are some important distinctions.  
Notably, there are no longer significant differences in evaluations between 
Catholics and Protestants. Perhaps the latter are more willing to look beyond a 
facilitation role for the UK government when the citizen-based alternative mode of 
decision-making is one with which they are already familiar. Turning to the control 
variables, it is also notable that while both citizens’ assemblies and referendums are 
both particularly supported by individuals from a working-class background, women 
are only significantly more likely to support the former, not the latter. These 
variables are not the direct focus of the present research, but both women and people 
from a working-class background are typically under-represented by conventional 
forms of representative democracy. When women weigh up citizens’ assemblies and 
referendums against the default option of inter-party talks, they do not evaluate the 
citizen-based alternatives in the same way. Thus, despite the two modes sharing a 
broadly similar profile of individual-level support, citizens’ assemblies have the 
potential to add democratic value for women in a way that referendums do not. 
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  1 2 3 4 
  Support for Citizens’ Assembly over Referendum 
Selection     




- - 2.135 
(.285)*** 
 Ethno-national moderation 
(high = more moderate) 
1.006 
(.119) 
- - .813 
(.154) 
Decision-Making     
 Distant from all parties 





 Trust in parties  





Decision-Taking     
 Protestant  
(ref: Catholic) 




 Trust out-group 
(ref: do not trust out-group) 




Controls     



































N 759 654 734 503 
-2 Log Likelihood 972.56 834.33 932.00 611.51 
Nagelkerke R2 .01 .00 .01 .03 
χ2 (d.f.)  7.32 (5) 1.03 (5) 3.79 (5) 10.89 (9) 
Entries are odds ratios from logistic regressions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is support for a citizens’ assembly over a referendum (coded ‘1’ if support for a 
referendum is higher, ‘0’ if it is equal or lower). Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive 
association; odds ratios less than 1 indicate a negative association. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table 4.8: Predicting support for a citizens’ assembly over a referendum 
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This leaves us to directly compare respondents’ relative evaluations of the two 
citizen-based supplementary modes of decision-making. The outcome variable in 
Table 4.8 is support for citizens’ assemblies over referendums. Excluding invalid 
responses, 35 percent of cases are coded ‘1’, indicating a higher level of support for 
the former over the latter. Of the cases coded ‘0’ on the outcome measure, 26 percent 
evaluate referendums more positively than citizens’ assemblies, while 40 percent 
evaluate the two modes with an equivalent score. Across each of the variables 
considered in the final equation, there is almost no evidence of individual-level 
variation explaining support for one outcome over another. The only exception 
relates to voting behaviour: individuals who say they would not vote in a future 
election are significantly more likely to support citizens’ assemblies rather than 
referendums, compared to individuals who say they would vote for a political party. 
 To summarise at this point, a range of cross-sectional evidence cumulatively 
suggests that citizens’ assemblies can play a role in democratic decision-making that 
is broadly perceived to be legitimate. Key features of their selection, decision-
making, and decision-taking are well-received: most people say that members would 
be capable of making good decisions, many say that citizens’ assembly decisions 
would be motivated by serving the common good, and an overwhelming majority 
say that citizens’ assemblies should have some role in decision-making, either in an 
advisory or binding capacity. In the context of a political crisis in Northern Ireland, 
most people think that a citizens’ assembly would be a good idea as a response. 
Notably, compared to the default response of holding inter-party talks, citizens’ 
assemblies are particularly favoured by individuals with low levels of trust in 
political parties – the same individuals who are particularly likely to be dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works, suggesting the constructive potential for citizens’ 
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assemblies to help target and control some of the factors driving Northern Ireland’s 
democratic deficit. 
 
4.3  Study Two 
The results of Study One provide an initial overview of maxi-public attitudes toward 
an institutionalised mini-public, but they are vulnerable to two criticisms. To begin 
with, the test of H2 may have overestimated the level of support for a citizens’ 
assembly compared to other modes of decision-making. Here, the dependent variable 
only measured relative perceptions of its legitimacy in general terms: the extent to 
which a citizens’ assembly would be a good or bad idea as a decision-making device. 
Perhaps this is too general a measure, even when considered against other favourable 
attitudes towards key features of the way citizens’ assemblies are selected, the way 
they make decisions, and their formal role in the taking of decisions. A second issue 
is the observational nature of the study, making it difficult to directly compare 
people’s perceptions of one form of decision-making against another. Therefore, a 
follow-up study is conducted to address these potential limitations. 
 What might constitute a tougher test examining the perceived legitimacy of a 
citizens’ assembly? Gibson et al. (2014: 840) note that the “decisions of legitimate 
institutions, even when handing down unpopular decisions, seem to carry with them 
an obligation to accept and obey.” Since legitimacy is fundamentally about the way 
in which a decision is taken, rather than the substance of the decision itself (Tyler, 
2006), we must establish that procedural evaluations of citizens’ assemblies are able 
to withstand people’s instrumental considerations. To what extent do these 
favourable perceptions translate into acquiescence, irrespective of instrumentality? 
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People who get the results they want, the ‘winners’, are less likely to question the 
procedures through which the favourable results were generated (Nadeau and Blais, 
1993). In contrast, ‘losers’ will have greater incentive to critically reflect on the 
decision-making arrangements. Their consent is necessary for the long-term stability 
of these arrangements (Anderson et al. 2005). For present purposes, one strategy for 
scrutinising the robustness of the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly 
decision-making is to introduce an objection precondition to the research design: 
 
[L]egitimacy takes on importance primarily in the presence of an objection 
precondition. When people approve of a decision, the legitimacy of the 
decision maker is of little consequence since people are already getting what 
they want. When the decision is unpopular, its efficacy hinges upon the 
perceived legitimacy of the decision-making process and institution (Gibson 
and Caldeira, 2003: 4; original emphasis). 
 
It is when people are presented with an outcome with which they personally disagree 
that we can obtain a much clearer indication about their fundamental attitudes to the 
legitimacy of the process. If an individual genuinely perceives a particular mode of 
decision-making to be legitimate, he or she will accept the decision irrespective of 
whether or not he or she likes it. Thus, the outcome variable in the present follow-up 
study will be operationalised as decision acceptance. An experimental research 
design is adopted to provide a more rigorous test of its relationship to the mode of 
decision-making, the independent variable. The main hypothesis here is derived 
directly from H2, with a further individual-level expectation that stronger levels of 
ethno-national ideology will reduce levels of decision acceptance, regardless of how 
the decision was taken, since a contested issue in a deeply divided place is likely to 
be much more salient for those with the strongest levels of ethno-nationalism: 
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H4: An unfavourable decision taken by a citizens’ assembly will be accepted to 
the same extent as the same unfavourable decision taken by alternative 
modes of decision-making. 
 
H5: In general, levels of acceptance will be lower among individuals with 
stronger levels of ethno-nationalism. 
 
4.3.1  Data & Method 
Participants were recruited by Ipsos-MORI across two waves in 2017 (in February 
and April). Sampling points were randomly selected from Northern Ireland’s 285 
electoral wards, with quotas applied for age, gender, social class and location. The 
2,015 participants were representative of the population: 52 percent of participants 
were female and 48 percent male. In terms of community background, 46 percent of 
respondents came from a Protestant background and 42 percent were Catholic, while 
10 percent identified with another or no religious group.64  In face-to-face Computer-
Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI), all participants were presented with a short 
briefing on the salient and contentious issue of Irish language policy:65 
 
There has been discussion in recent years about whether or not to introduce 
special rights for people in Northern Ireland who speak Irish. Some people 
have called for an Irish Language Act, which would be a new law to protect 
the rights of Irish language speakers and to promote the use of the Irish 
language in Northern Ireland. Others disagree and are opposed to any special 
rights for Irish language speakers. 																																																								
64 In the 2011 Census, 42 percent identified as Protestant and 40 percent as Catholic.	
65 The issue strongly divides political elites and the public along ethno-national lines. Unionist parties 
have repeatedly signalled their opposition to an Irish Language Act, viewing it as a threat to Northern 
Ireland’s ‘Britishness’; nationalist parties are staunchly in favour of such legislation, arguing that it 
would be a vital demonstration of cross-community respect. The experiment was conducted when the 
issue was salient, but before it escalated to become a contributing factor to deeper political crisis. At 
the time of writing, it is a core issue behind an impasse involving Northern Ireland’s largest parties. 
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At this point, respondents were asked about their personal preference on the issue: 
whether they support or oppose the introduction of an Irish Language Act, and the 
extent to which they do so (strongly or somewhat). Among the 90 percent indicating 
a preference either way (validating the salience of the issue), 65 percent said they 
supported the introduction of such legislation, leaving 35 percent opposed. 
Responses closely reflected ethno-national positions: 96 percent of nationalists were 
in favour of an Irish Language Act, compared to 70 percent of unionists who were 
against it. People identifying as neither nationalist nor unionist were largely 
supportive, by a margin of 69 percent in favour to 31 percent against new legislation. 
All respondents were then presented with a scenario in which the issue of 
Irish language legislation directly sparks a political crisis, adding specificity to the 
more general crisis scenario presented to respondents in Study One: 
 
Suppose that at some point in the near future the issue of Irish language 
rights was brought before the Northern Ireland Assembly. After debating it, a 
majority of MLAs supported a new law protecting Irish language rights, but 
it was blocked by the largest unionist party using its power of veto. This led 
to a worsening of relations among the political parties, creating gridlock in 
the Assembly and a new political crisis. 
 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of six treatments, corresponding 
directly to the six different modes of decision-making presented in Study One.66 
They were told that a decision had been taken on whether or not to introduce an Irish 
Language Act, with the mode of decision-making manipulated. Crucially, the 
decision presented was one with which each respondent personally disagreed. In 																																																								
66 Randomisation checks (performed via linear regressions) found no significant demographic 
differences across each experimental group. Differences were also tested on attitudinal and political 
variables, including the respondent’s position on an Irish Language Act and his or her ethno-national 
identity. Again, there were no significant differences across any of the groups. 
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other words, respondents who initially indicated their opposition to an Irish 
Language Act were told a decision had been taken to introduce an Irish Language 
Act; if they stated their support for an Irish Language Act, they were told a decision 
had been taken not to introduce such an Act. An objection precondition was 
unavoidably absent for the 10 percent of respondents who expressed a ‘don’t know’ 
position towards the issue.67 For the purposes of the interview, they were randomly 
assigned to one of the two possible decisions, but were ultimately excluded from the 
analysis. Finally, respondents were asked the extent to which they would accept the 
decision, and whether or not they would be willing for their assigned mode of 
decision-making to be used again in the event of another political crisis.68 Table 4.9 









Party talks (British Govt) (n = 336) 60.4 28.0 11.6 100.0 
Party talks (Intl diplomat) (n = 338) 58.3 32.0 9.8 100.0 
Election (n = 320) 57.8 35.0 7.2 100.0 
Direct rule (n = 327) 60.9 27.8 11.3 100.0 
Referendum (n = 345) 58.6 30.4 11.0 100.0 
Citizens’ assembly (n = 349) 61.3 28.1 10.6 100.0 
All (N = 2,015) 59.6 30.2 10.3 100.0 




67 The 14.9 percent of respondents who initially responded ‘don’t know’ regarding their preference on 
an Irish Language Act were probed further: “If you had to choose, would you be slightly more 
inclined to support special rights for Irish language speakers, or slightly more inclined to oppose 
special rights for Irish language speakers?” They could still respond ‘Really don’t know’. These 
respondents (10.3 percent in total) were excluded from the analysis. 
68 For the former item, response categories were: (1) ‘I would find this almost impossible to accept, 
(2) ‘I would not like it but could live with it if I had to’, and (3) ‘I would happily accept the decision’. 
The second two responses were collapsed into a single category to create a dichotomous measure of 
decision acceptance. For the latter item, the response categories were simply: (1) ‘Yes, I would be 
happy’ and (2) ‘No, I would not be happy’. Unprompted ‘don’t know’ responses were recorded. 
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Figure 4.3 summarises the operation of the experiment and its overall logic. Refer to 













































Figure 4.3: Summary of experiment 
 
Would you support or oppose 
an Irish Language Act? 
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Would you accept this  
decision? 
In the event of a future crisis, 
would you be happy for  
[assigned mode of  
decision-making] to try and  
overcome it? 
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4.3.2  Results 
Compared to the observational results of the cross-sectional survey in Study One, the 
follow-up experiment finds much variation in people’s attitudes to different modes 
of decision-making. Figure 4.4 displays the percentage of respondents in each group 
who said they would accept or not accept the decision on an Irish Language Act. 
Across all groups, an average of 78 percent of respondents said they would accept 
the personally objectionable decision, leaving 22 percent who would refuse to accept 
it. In the citizens’ assembly condition, the acceptance rate was 75 percent. This is not 
significantly higher or lower (at the p < .05 level) than the acceptance rate in almost 
all of the other groups, providing broad support for H4. The one exception is the 
referendum condition, in which 94 percent of respondents said they would accept a 
personally objectionable decision. This level of decision acceptance is significantly 
higher than all other decision-making conditions of the experiment.69  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Decision acceptance levels (%) by mode of decision-making  
(N = 1,728) 																																																								



























In the previous cross-sectional study, a referendum was not supported above any 
other mode of decision-making as a procedural response to political crisis. In the 
experiment, however, it appears that there is something about a referendum that 
causes an unfavourable decision on a specific, contentious issue, to be so widely 
accepted. Part of the explanation lies at the individual-level. On the whole, people 
with relatively strong ethno-national positions were less likely to accept an 
unfavourable decision compared to those who hold more moderate positions. 
However, this relationship varied across different modes of decision-making. Of 
those who felt most strongly about the specific issue of Irish language legislation 
(either positively or negatively), just under 60 percent of respondents said they 
would accept the decision of a citizens’ assembly, compared to just under 90 percent 
of respondents who held a less intense preference on the issue (see Figure 4.5). 
When the decision was taken by referendum, the decision acceptance levels 
converged. However, this moderating effect is statistically insignificant (p = .84).70  
Using a more general measure of ethno-nationalism, self-reported ideology, 
the relationship is much more pronounced. Of the respondents identifying as 
strongly unionist or nationalist, just over 40 percent said they would accept an 
unfavourable decision on Irish language policy taken by a citizens’ assembly – half 
the acceptance rate for respondents identifying as moderately nationalist or unionist, 
or neither. When the decision was taken by a referendum, however, individuals with 
strong and moderate ethno-national ideologies were just as likely to accept the 
decision: acceptance levels exceeded 90 percent in each case. This moderating effect 
is statistically significant (p = .02). 
																																																								
70 The results from binary logistic regression models are reported in Appendix D. 
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Figure 4.5: Moderating effects of ethno-nationalism (strength of issue position; 




Compared to alternative modes of decision-making, a decision taken by a citizens’ 
assembly was not regarded as less legitimate among those with the strongest ethno-
national preferences; these individuals were less inclined to accept any unfavourable 
decision, wherever it originated, largely confirming H5. However, an unfavourable 
decision taken by a referendum was perceived to be significantly more legitimate 
among individuals identifying as strongly nationalist or unionist. This distinction is 
important, as it implies that procedural evaluations of the legitimacy of citizens’ 
assemblies are robust enough to withstand instrumental considerations to the same 
extent as most conventional modes of decision-making, but that referendums have a 
unique capacity to do so in a deeply divided context. It should be noted that only a 
minority of respondents (19 percent) identify with the strongest level of ethno-
national ideology, but these individuals appear particularly sensitive to the 
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p = .02** p = .84; n.s. 
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Figure 4.6: Levels of tolerance (%) for each mode of decision-making being used in 
response to a future crisis (N = 1,728) 
 
 
Finally, as well as being asked the extent to which they accepted the specific 
decision on an Irish Language Act, respondents were also asked whether or not they 
would be happy for their assigned mode of decision-making to be used to try and 
overcome a future political crisis on another issue. This tests whether or not the mere 
generation of an unfavourable decision by a particular mode of decision-making 
substantially reduces tolerance for it being used again. Does losers’ consent extend 
into the future, as well as the present? Comparing Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.5, we see 
that the levels of tolerance for future usage are broadly similar to those for levels of 
decision acceptance with respect to three modes of decision-making: both sets of 
inter-party talks and the citizens’ assembly. 71  Considerably lower levels were 
observed for the election, direct rule and referendum conditions.72  
																																																								
71 Levels of tolerance for future use are two percentage points lower for citizens’ assemblies and 
inter-party talks chaired by an international diplomat, compared to decision acceptance levels. They 
are six points higher for inter-party talks chaired by the British government. 




























The underlying unpopularity of direct rule and elections, as established in 
Study One, likely accounts for these gaps. For referendums, 21 percent fewer 
respondents expressed support for them being used to overcome future political 
crises compared to the percentage expressing a willingness to accept an unfavourable 
decision reached by one. The magnitude of this difference is likely to derive 
considerably from the high level of decision acceptance (94 percent) to begin with. It 
also implies that just because citizens are extremely likely to accept an unfavourable 
decision taken by a particular mechanism does not mean they support its frequent 
usage. In other words, while referendums have appear to have a particular quality 
that produces overwhelming acceptance of unpopular decisions, their recurrent 
application to polarising issues may test losers’ consent over time. This underscores 
the empirical distinction between individuals’ general attitudes toward a mode of 
decision-making and their propensity to accept an unfavourable decision taken by 
exactly the same mechanism.  
In short, some modes of decision-making are associated with less variation 
across the two outcome measures than others. As far as citizens’ assemblies are 
concerned, aggregate changes are minimal: among ‘losers’, levels of decision 
acceptance and levels of tolerance for the future use of citizens’ assemblies are high 
and largely static. 
 
4.3  Discussion & Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the general attitudes of the maxi-
public towards citizens’ assemblies. Are they perceived to be legitimate devices that 
can meaningfully contribute to democratic decision-making? The results of both 
		 121 
studies are encouraging. Turning first to some of the key procedural features of 
citizens’ assemblies themselves, the cross-sectional results of Study One reveal 
largely favourable attitudes on the capacity of ordinary people to be selected to serve 
as members, on the likelihood of members making decisions for the benefit of 
everyone, and on citizens’ assemblies playing some sort of formal role ahead of 
political decisions being taken. With no significant individual-level effects across the 
variables examined, these attitudes appear to be broadly held, and provide initial 
evidence that citizens’ assemblies have attributes across their input, throughput and 
output stages of decision-making that can be viewed as legitimate. Put another way, 
if attitudes displayed much greater scepticism toward the idea of ordinary people 
being selected to play a role in political decision-making, if citizens’ assembly 
members were expected to be overwhelmingly motivated by personal or group 
interests, or if a majority of people thought that citizens’ assemblies should play no 
formal role, such findings would have severely challenged the view that citizens’ 
assemblies have qualities perceived to be legitimate. That these conclusions do not 
emerge from survey responses is a non-trivial sign of the net positive role that 
citizens’ assemblies can potentially fulfil. 
 In addition, the results of Study One show that citizens’ assemblies are 
evaluated positively when compared to more conventional modes of decision-
making. As a response to an acute political crisis in Northern Ireland, the idea of 
supplementing the system with a citizens’ assembly receives a significantly higher 
level of support than the idea of persevering with the system through an election or 
cross-party talks chaired by an international diplomat, as well as compared to the 
idea of abandoning the system with direct rule from Westminster. The idea of a 
citizens’ assembly supplementing the system receives a similar level of support to 
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two alternatives: persevering the existing system with cross-party talks chaired by 
the British government, and supplementing the system by holding a referendum on 
the issue behind the crisis.  
A citizens’ assembly is appealing over both of these alternatives for two main 
reasons. First, it is the option that is arguably the most likely to provide a practical, 
measured, and constructive way out of the crisis – especially if cross-party talks 
routinely fail to reach agreement, and since a referendum (at least if used on its own) 
could serve to polarise elites and the public further, without addressing some of the 
underlying sources of polarisation. Second, and crucially, citizens’ assemblies 
receive particularly high levels of support from individuals found to be highly 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Chapter Three. Notably, for example, 
people who distrust political parties are significantly more likely to support citizens’ 
assemblies over holding cross-party talks. Non-voters, meanwhile, are significantly 
more likely to support citizens’ assemblies over referendums. These findings are 
intuitive: people who distrust political parties (who are substantial in number) are 
unlikely to see them as the answer to political crisis; people who do not vote are 
unlikely to be enthusiastic about the potential for voting to solve problems. Taken 
together, these results suggest that citizens’ assemblies have the potential to add a 
democratic quality to decision-making in a way that more conventional alternatives 
do not. 
 The results of Study Two show that people’s favourable attitudes towards the 
general idea of citizens’ assemblies are robust. The experimental study demonstrates 
that people are just as willing to accept an unfavourable decision taken by a citizens’ 
assembly on a salient ethno-national issue compared to the same decision taken by 
four of the other conventional modes of decision-making. If levels of support for a 
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citizens’ assembly had been hollow or superficial, this experiment provided an 
effective opportunity to expose people’s underlying reservations. Indeed, as 
Anderson et al. (2005: 4) contend, evaluating the way ‘losers’ respond to an outcome 
they dislike constitutes an unparalleled test of democratic legitimacy: 
 
[I]f democratic procedures are to continue in the long run, then the losers 
must, somehow, overcome any bitterness and resentment and be willing, 
first, to accept the decision … and, second, to play again next time. That they 
would do either is not altogether obvious. 
 
From this perspective, it is reassuring that each mode of decision-making considered 
in the experiment was associated with a high level of decision acceptance. We know 
from Study One that people evaluate each of these democratic instruments in 
markedly different ways, yet are broadly willing to prioritise the democratic norm of 
decision acceptance over any negative procedural or instrumental considerations.  
 The significantly higher level of decision acceptance in the referendum 
condition deserves serious reflection, not least for its paradoxical implications for a 
deeply divided place experiencing a political crisis. On the one hand, people with the 
strongest ethno-national views are significantly more likely to accept a referendum 
decision with which they disagree compared to all other modes of decision-making, 
including decisions from a citizens’ assembly. On the other hand, referendums, 
given their majoritarian nature, are generally seen as excessively crude instruments 
of decision-making that are often inappropriate for deeply divided places (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2009). One possible way of channelling the unique legitimating quality 
of referendums, while attempting to overcome their polarising bluntness, is to 
combine their usage with citizens’ assemblies. For example, a citizens’ assembly 
could initially be held over an extended period to forensically consider the issue 
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behind the crisis. It would offer an appropriate environment in which citizens could 
learn about the different aspects of the issue, carefully deliberating over the best way 
forward, before producing a collective recommendation. This recommendation could 
subsequently be put to all citizens in a popular vote, thus combining the deliberative 
benefits of a non-partisan mini-public environment with the aggregative benefits of 
giving everyone the chance to influence the final decision. This idea will be 
considered further in Chapter Seven. 
 It is also important to reflect on the limitations of the present study. Most 
obviously, it only addresses the single issue of Irish language policy. It is possible 
that other salient ethno-national issues, as well as salient non-ethno-national issues, 
could produce different patterns of decision acceptance across modes of decision-
making. However, this concern should not be overstated. At the time of writing, 
divisions over Irish language policy remain the principal obstacle to the restoration 
of a power-sharing government featuring Northern Ireland’s main political parties. 
The results of the experiment can be reasonably generalised to another issue of this 
nature and magnitude; external validity may be reduced for less salient issues, or 
those lacking an ethno-national dimension, but it was not ultimately a priority of this 
experiment to make such generalisations. A further experiment with manipulations 
for issue salience and issue domain could help disentangle these potential effects on 
decision acceptance across different modes of decision-making.  
There are two additional questions that merit further investigation. First, does 
the perceived likelihood of ‘winning’ influence the acceptance of an objectionable 
decision? In other words, if you think you will be on the winning side, does that 
make you more likely to accept an unfavourable decision, even though you have 
been told that you are on the losing side? It is true, for example, that more people 
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support the introduction of an Irish Language Act than oppose it, by a ratio of about 
two to one. Implicitly, they may find it less plausible to be told that an Irish 
Language Act will not be introduced compared to those who are told that it will be 
introduced. This potential asymmetry in people’s expectations may have an 
individual-level effect on the relationship between decision acceptance and the mode 
of decision-making. A second question deserving further research concerns the 
nature of decision acceptance. What does it mean not to accept a decision? There are 
presumably many different levels of objection, ranging from mild frustration to 
organised violence. These carry implications that go beyond the scope of the present 
research, but such questions will become more important if growing numbers of 
people consistently perceive themselves to be ‘losers’ from democratic decision-
making. 
Returning to the central focus of this thesis, this chapter has made an 
important contribution. Drawing on cross-sectional evidence, it shows that people 
have broadly favourable attitudes toward key features of citizens’ assemblies, that 
citizens’ assemblies receive a high degree of support compared to conventional 
modes of decision-making, and that citizens’ assemblies receive particularly positive 
evaluations from individuals known to be dissatisfied with the way democracy 
works. Experimental evidence shows that these findings are robust. Taken together, 
these empirical results provide a strong case that citizens’ assemblies are perceived 
to be highly democratic devices, and that they have the potential to strengthen the 
quality of democratic decision-making.  
It is now necessary to explore their relative potential further by examining 
people’s perceptions of the specific features of citizens’ assemblies. Do the core 
design features of citizens’ assemblies demonstrably promote the democratic 
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principles with which they are theoretically associated? Does the manner in which 
citizens’ assemblies are selected, make decisions, and take decisions, have an effect 
on the extent to which they are perceived to be legitimate? And are there ways of 
designing citizens’ assemblies that strengthen or weaken perceptions of their 
legitimacy in the challenging context of a deeply divided place? Through a series of 
complementary experiments, conducted online in parallel with one another, the three 








THE PROCESS OF SELECTING 
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Mission Control: I have an activation procedure. I’d like you to copy it down. 
[…] 
Apollo 13: Okay. Ready to copy, Jack. 
Radio communication between Mission Control and Apollo 13 
Commander James Lovell, 13 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 181) 
 
 
In a democratic political system the demos are, somehow, involved in decision-
making. In modern representative democracies, elections provide the mechanism by 
which citizens collectively provide an input into the political process. People elect 
professional politicians to translate their political preferences (the inputs of the 
system) into public policy (the outputs of the system), while the prospect of future 
elections incentivises political representatives to maintain a close proximity to 
voters’ demands. The decision-makers of deliberative mini-publics, on the other 
hand, tend to be selected on a very different basis. Rather than being elected as to 
hold a professional occupation as a politician, members of a citizens’ assembly are 
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randomly selected as citizens to fulfil a duty alongside their existing occupation, if 
applicable. 
 There are, thus, two important dimensions to the selection of the members of 
a citizens’ assembly that are distinct from the conventional selection of the members 
of legislatures in a representative democracy. First, there is the selection mechanism 
itself: sortition as distinct from election. Second, there is the profile of the body’s 
membership: ‘ordinary citizens’ as distinct from professional politicians. These twin 
features help to promote political equality. This chapter investigates the effect of 
both aspects of selection on the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assemblies. By 
examining the prototypical selection process of a citizens’ assembly against other 
possible alternatives, it weighs up the relative effects of sortition (over election) and 
citizen decision-makers (over professional politicians). The results of an online 
experiment show that, overall, a citizens’ assembly composed exclusively of 
randomly selected citizens is perceived as equally legitimate as one in which 
members are elected, or one in which members are a combination of ordinary 
citizens and elected politicians. However, the prototypical model is regarded as 
particularly legitimate among individuals who attach a high level of importance to 
political equality and those who identify as ethno-nationally moderate. 
 
5.1 Promoting Political Equality 
The concept of ordinary citizens being randomly selected to make decisions on 
behalf of the wider public is one that is both well established and familiar to most 
people. It is, however, generally restricted to one domain – the judicial system – in 
which juries play a fundamental role. The selection of jury members in this way 
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helps to underpin the legitimacy of the judicial process (Sealy and Cornish, 1973; 
Dwyer, 2002; Stone, 2009). In other parts of the political system, the concept of 
recruiting citizen decision-makers by lot remains largely alien, making mini-publics 
a particularly novel form of democratic innovation (Smith, 2009). And yet, as 
Fishkin (2009) argues, this mode of selection allowed early forms of democracy to 
implement a key principle: political equality.73 For Fishkin (2009: 43), “The root 
notion of political equality is the equal consideration of political preferences.” By 
selecting citizens at random, in theory everyone has an equal probability of 
becoming a member of a mini-public. With a large enough sample, the distribution 
of political preferences in a mini-public on a given dimension mirrors the 
distribution of these political preferences among citizens as a whole (Callenbach et 
al. 2008). Such a mechanism facilitates the fair inclusion of the attitudinal and 
demographic characteristics that exist among citizens within a target population.  
Crucially, it also establishes a fair basis for exclusion. If we accept the 
practical constraint that all citizens of a jurisdiction cannot physically assemble to 
collectively engage in deliberative decision-making, apart from participating in 
purely aggregative forms of decision-making that are relatively unbounded by time 
and location, then we are forced to justify why some citizens are included in formal 
decision-making and most are, necessarily, excluded. For many deliberative 
theorists, this restriction conflicts with an ambition to broaden and deepen 
deliberation among all citizens in a given polity: “democratic legitimacy depends 
upon the ability of all those subject to a decision to participate in authentic 
deliberation” (Dryzek, 2000: 85; original emphasis). This ambition, for authentic 																																																								
73 Fishkin (2009: 43) argues that political equality was achieved in ancient Athens “first via random 
sampling” at the selection stage and “second via processes exhibiting political equality” in the 
subsequent stage of decision-making. He also recognises that political equality was only achieved 
with respect to the “limited population of citizens.” 
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deliberation at the macro-level, can still be held while, at the same time, recognising 
that existing conditions render the realisation of such a goal extremely challenging. 
For example, as Fishkin (2009: 98-99) observes, allowing individuals to self-select 
as members of a mini-public typically results in participation by an unrepresentative 
sample of the population: 
 
Another alternative to random sampling and microcosmic deliberation is to 
hold public forums that are theoretically open to participation by anyone. But 
this alternative is not really inclusive and leads to domination by organised 
interests who are inevitably the ones who actually show up, and at best, issue 
publics (those especially interested in the topic). 
 
By designing and creating the conditions conducive to deliberation at the micro-
level, housed within a formal institution, participation is necessarily restricted to a 
limited number of citizens. Random sampling offers a mechanism through which a 
representative “microcosm” of the public can be selected, with the boundary of 
inclusion and exclusion resting on the principle of political equality (Fishkin, 2009: 
96). 
 
5.2  Selecting Members of Citizens’ Assemblies 
In an attempt to gather a representative cross-section of the population, citizens’ 
assemblies are almost always selected via sortition. In the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly (BCCA) on electoral reform, members were selected by a multi-stage 
stratified random sampling procedure A large sample was initially drawn from a list 
of all registered voters, and these randomly selected individuals were invited to 
participate in the Citizens’ Assembly; 7 percent responded positively (Fournier et al., 
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2011: 54). In the final sample, there was stratification for gender, geography and age, 
producing a mini-public with an equal number of men and women – one member 
from each of British Columbia’s (then) 79 electoral districts – and a broad range of 
age groups. Similar selection procedures were applied in constructing the Ontario 
Citizens’ Assembly, the Dutch Burgerforum, the Irish Citizens’ Assembly, and the 
Citizens’ Assembly on Social Care in England.74 Such procedures are imperfect. 
Most obviously, there is an inevitable element of self-selection: only by legally 
compelling people to participate could selection bias be rendered negligible, and 
even then some selected members may still refuse to participate. Providing members 
with strong incentives to participate, including paying them an honorarium, 
reimbursing travel costs, and minimising the amount of time commitment required, 
could also help to reduce any distorting effect of self-selection.75 A further problem 
with sortition is that it relies on scale to successfully obtain a robust representative 
sample. If a mini-public only includes between 50 and 200 members, there is a 
danger that certain groups of individual will be under-represented or over-
represented, thus undermining political equality.  
However, imperfect as it is, the key point is that sortition can still generate a 
mini-public that “reasonably closely” mirrors the profile of the maxi-public on 
visible and invisible dimensions (Thompson, 2008: 42). For Stone (2016: 340), the 
question for institutional design is not simply about whether or not sortition should 
be used to select members of a democratic body, but rather: “Should we use sortition 
instead of some other selection process (original emphasis), such as voting?” 
Elections remain, overwhelmingly, the dominant mechanism by which political 																																																								
74 Refer to Fournier et al. (2011: Chapter Three) for an overview of different citizens’ assembly 
selection procedures. 
75 Warren (2008: 59) notes that while randomly selected bodies of citizens display fewer biased 
demographic characteristics than electoral representation, “forms of citizen representation that rely on 
self-selection magnify the biases of education, income, time, and ethnicity.” 
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representatives are selected to conventional legislatures. To most citizens, they 
provide an equal opportunity to express their political preferences and have them 
formally represented in decision-making; elections are, thus, understood to lay the 
foundations for representative democracy (Manin, 1997). In practice, electoral 
processes often undermine the principle of political equality by distorting 
representative outcomes. The system used to count votes and the construction of 
electoral units (geographical districts) can leave some citizens with a much greater 
probability of influencing the outcome than others (Farrell, 2011). Empirical 
evidence has consistently illustrated the failure of elections to deliver descriptive 
representation (Childs, 2008). Finally, while all citizens may theoretically possess an 
equal opportunity to vote, participation in the electoral process is distorted by self-
selection: non-voting by large segments of the population – with unequal rates of 
participation across different groups – introduces systematic bias (Wichowsky, 
2012). In short, weighed against the limitations of sortition, in practice, elections 
have much greater potential to deviate from the substantive realisation of political 
equality for all citizens. 
 On the other hand, compared to sortition, the concept of voting for political 
representatives is at least familiar to virtually all citizens. This baseline familiarity 
might contribute to the perception that elections are legitimate instruments for the 
selection of decision-makers. For this reason, combined with a range of political 
factors, some real-world mini-publics have violated the prototypical method of 
selecting members via sortition and instead relied on a conventional voting 
procedure. Most notably, members of the Icelandic Constitutional Assembly (which 
later became the Icelandic Constitutional Council) were selected by a national 
election (Bergmann, 2016). It differed from a normal legislative election in that most 
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candidates were lay citizens, unaffiliated with political parties. In total, 522 
individuals put themselves forward, having obtained signatures from at least 30 
supporters, and 25 were elected. While they included people from “a broad range of 
backgrounds,” critics alleged that, “only previously well known individuals had been 
elected, mostly from the ranks of the left-leaning Reykjavik elite” (Bergmann, 2016: 
22). This, together with a low level of participation from the broader electorate 
(turnout was just 37 percent), cast serious doubt over the representativeness of those 
selected and, by extension, undermined the promotion of political equality in an 
otherwise laudable attempt to involve ordinary citizens directly in decision-making. 
 The Irish Constitutional Convention (2012-2014) took a different approach to 
moderating the potential novelty of the concept of a mini-public by blending its 
design with a more conventional concept. Rather than injecting familiarity through 
the selection mechanism (of citizen members), it adopted a hybrid profile of 
members: two-thirds (66) were lay citizens selected at random from the Irish 
population; the remaining 33 members were politicians appointed by political parties 
(in proportion to their representation in the lower chamber of the legislature).76 
Suiter et al. (2016: 50) attribute the inclusion of politicians in the membership of the 
body as a way of earning “parliamentary buy-in for the process and its 
recommendations.” However, it should be noted that in the establishment of the 
subsequent Irish Citizens’ Assembly, the hybrid model of citizens and politicians 
was abandoned: all 99 members were lay citizens. The inclusion of politicians in 
Ireland’s first deliberative mini-public may have been helpful for securing the broad 
endorsement of the process from political elites. Once it had been secured, a 																																																								
76 Having been allocated with a certain number of places, each political party was able to decide how 
its members would be appointed to the Constitutional Convention: in Fine Gael, for example, the 
party whip selected nominees; parliamentary representatives of the Irish Labour Party voted on which 
peers to select. All political appointees were serving politicians, either in the Dáil (lower house), the 
Seanad (upper house), or the Northern Ireland Assembly (see Suiter et al. 2016). 
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prototypical mini-public membership profile had the potential to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the process from the perspective of Irish citizens. 
 
5.2.1  Hypotheses 
Drawing on the preceding discussion, we can see that members of mini-publics can 
be selected via different mechanisms and under different categories of profile. 
However, mini-publics that do not consist entirely of randomly selected citizens 
deviate from the prototypical model. As a reasonable starting point for empirical 
investigation, it is hypothesised that a citizens’ assembly selected by a prototypical 
process will be perceived to be more legitimate than alternative models featuring the 
election of citizens and/or the inclusion of a politician category of members. The 
greater the deviation from the prototypical process along these dimensions, the lower 
its perceived legitimacy: 
 
H1: Perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making is highest under 
conditions of membership being exclusively citizens and citizens being 
selected by sortition, and lowest under conditions of membership being a 
mixture of citizens and politicians and citizens being selected by election. 
 
The normative justification is that prototypical citizens’ assemblies are selected in a 
manner that promotes political equality. Introducing either elections or political 
representatives, or both, to the selection process will make it harder to achieve this 
goal in practice. Therefore, individuals’ level of attachment to the principle of 
political equality should have a moderating effect on the relationship between the 
selection process and perceived mini-public legitimacy: 
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H2: Among individuals who value political equality as a democratic principle, 
the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making will be 
particularly high under a prototypical selection process. 
 
In the context of Northern Ireland, we have already seen (in Chapter Four) that 
ethno-national ideology has an effect on citizens’ assembly support: individuals who 
are ethno-nationally moderate are more likely to prefer the establishment of a 
citizens’ assembly to elite-level talks, compared to individuals who are more 
strongly unionist or nationalist.77 Since these moderate ideological preferences are 
traditionally under-represented by elected politicians, such views are likely to be 
more proportionally represented by a random sample of citizens. By extension, it is 
reasonable to expect that individuals’ ethno-national ideology will have a 
moderating effect on the relationship between the mini-public selection process and 
perceived legitimacy. Individuals who are neither nationalist nor unionist are 
particularly likely to support a citizens’ assembly selected with a prototypical 
process compared to alternatives that reinforce the status quo. Conversely, those who 
identify as unionist or nationalist are much less likely to support a selection process 
that rebalances their over-representation: 
 
H3: The perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly selected by a prototypical 
process will be particularly high among individuals with a moderate ethno-
national position, and particularly low among those with a stronger ethno-
national position. 
 
Finally, community background has been a very sensitive aspect of political 
representation in Northern Ireland. Historically, members of the traditional minority 
																																																								
77 This finding refers to Model 1 in Table 4.6. 
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community, Catholics, experienced systematic political inequalities in an electoral 
process largely controlled by a political party representing the Protestant majority.78 
Generally speaking, Catholics have been more supportive of electoral reform in the 
direction of proportional representation, perceived to be a means of redressing 
historic imbalances, whereas Protestants tend to be more supportive of majoritarian 
or plurality-based electoral systems through which the security of their status can be 
better maintained (see Garry, 2016b). This may be partly linked to knowledge: since 
the Catholic community had direct experience of substantive political inequality, it is 
likely that its members will be more sensitive to the potentially inegalitarian effects 
of different selection mechanisms. Thus, given this historical backdrop of political 
inequality and its enduring legacy, Catholic citizens are particularly likely to support 
a mini-public selection process that is explicitly connected to political equality – the 
prototypical model – whereas members of the traditional majority community are 
much less likely to positively evaluate a process from which they may lose out, in 
relative terms: 
 
H4: The perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly selected by a prototypical 
process will be particularly high among Catholics, and particularly low 




78 See Whyte (1983) for an overview of electoral inequalities. 
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5.3  Study One 
5.3.1  Data & Method 
A total of 332 adults living in Northern Ireland took part in the study. They received 
an email invitation as members of an online panel hosted by Opinium, a major UK 
survey company, and accepted the invitation to participate by clicking on a link.79 
Participants earned a small amount of credit (£0.50) for completing the survey. This 
relatively small non-random sample is not fully representative of the Northern 
Ireland population, but is diverse on relevant demographic variables.80 Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions in a 2 x 2 design. 
They were presented with a description of a citizens’ assembly, manipulated by the 
profile of decision-makers (either all citizens or an even combination of citizens and 
elected politicians) and the mechanism by which the citizen members are selected 
(via sortition or election). The four conditions are summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
  Profile of Decision-Makers 















50 citizens + 50 politicians 
Citizens elected 
Table 5.1: Summary of experimental conditions in Study One 
																																																								
79 There are 40,000 members on Opinium’s UK-wide online panel. A screening question filtered out 
any respondents who did not live in Northern Ireland. Participants were required to give their 
informed consent before proceeding to the survey. 
80 Participants were mainly male (70 percent) with a mean age of 46.9 years (SD = 14.47). The sample 
contained a roughly even distribution of Protestants (39 percent) and Catholics (38 percent), while a 
further 21 percent identified ‘no religion’ as their community background. 
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Each of the short vignettes provided respondents with some necessary contextual 
information about the concept of a citizens’ assembly and why such a body might 
realistically be considered for political decision-making in Northern Ireland, with 
every effort made to keep the text as simple and concise as possible. To avoid the 
introduction of confounding effects around the nature of the decision, all respondents 
were told that the decision of the citizens’ assembly would be final. The manipulated 
text is shown in italics (see Appendix E for each of the four individual vignettes):  
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a [version of 
a] citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
The citizens’ assembly would consist of [{100 ordinary members of the 
public.} {50 ordinary members of the public and 50 elected politicians.}] 
[{Members would be randomly chosen in the same way that legal juries are 
selected. A random sample of 100 citizens would be a cross-section of the 
Northern Ireland population in terms of age, gender, social class and 
religious and community background.} {Any member of the public would be 
able to put themselves forward to be a member. They would face an election. 
Out of all members of the public who put themselves forward, the [{50} 
{100}] people with the most votes would be selected to sit on the citizens’ 
assembly.] 
[The political parties would appoint the remaining 50 members – in 
proportion to their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly.] 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it. 
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Online surveys have a number of obvious advantages. They facilitate the efficient 
randomisation of respondents to experimental conditions, maximise the practical 
convenience of participation, and encourage respondents to provide honest answers 
to questions. These benefits are accompanied by a number of trade-offs, the most 
significant being the researcher’s relative lack of control over the experiment itself. 
Participants must be trusted to read instructions and complete the tasks independent 
of any oversight or guidance. As such, in the present study, respondents were not 
able to proceed to the questions of the online survey until 30 seconds had elapsed, 
encouraging a baseline level of engagement with the text before asking participants 
for their reaction. Key elements of the manipulated variables were emphasised in 
bold type to reduce the cognitive complexity of the task. Two short manipulation 
checks were embedded in the questionnaire after the main set of response items, 
asking participants to identify both the profile of decision-makers in the citizens’ 
assembly described and the mechanism by which citizen members were selected. 
Immediately after reading the vignette, respondents were asked to evaluate 
the process described. The full wording of the base question and response options 
was: “Imagine the way in which a citizens’ assembly would deal with a political 
issue. As a way of making a decision, to what extent do you think this process would 
be … fair or unfair; trustworthy or untrustworthy; democratic or undemocratic; 
efficient or inefficient; even-handed or discriminatory; acceptable or unacceptable; 
good or bad; competent or incompetent; supportable or unsupportable; credible or 
not credible?” Responses to these ten items were recorded on a seven-point scale and 
combined to produce a mean score of perceived legitimacy, the outcome variable.81 
																																																								
81 For each of the ten items there were seven response options on a bipolar scale, for example: 
‘extremely’ (fair), ‘mostly’ (fair), ‘slightly’ (fair), ‘neither’ (fair nor unfair), ‘slightly’ (unfair), 
‘mostly’ (unfair), and ‘extremely’ (unfair). See Appendix E for the full questionnaire. 
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Legitimacy is, of course, a “profoundly normative concept by nature” (von 
Haldenwang, 2016: 1); it is also “complex and multifaceted” (Weatherford, 1992: 
53). These features present a challenge for empirical measurement – to sufficiently 
capture the essence of the construct of legitimacy, thus ensuring content validity, 
while ignoring “other aspects that might be related but are outside the investigator’s 
intent” (DeVellis, 2016: 84). The development of the multi-item scale began with a 
conceptual mapping exercise, identifying the “relevant content domain of the 
underlying construct” (ibid). This led to the extraction of ten relevant aspects of 
legitimacy from the empirical literature: a perception of fairness in decision-making 
(Tyler, 1990; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003); trust in the process (Miller, 1974; 
Sniderman, 1981; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Gibson et al. 2003), confidence in the 
process (Smith, 1981; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003); Gibson et al. 2003), perceived 
efficiency or value for money (Miller, 1974), perceived competence of decision-
making (Miller, 1974), a belief that decision-makers are doing a good job (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, 1995; Gibson et al. 2003), a perception of non-discrimination 
(Miller, 1974; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Gibson et al. 2003), a belief that the 
process is democratic (Schmitt, 1983), a belief that decisions should be accepted 
(Gibson, 1989; Tyler & Rasinski, 1991; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), and a perception 
that the process is worthy of support (Tyler, 1990; Gibson et al. 2003). 
These aspects of legitimacy are appropriate to the object of the measure: that 
is, the decision-making process of a hypothetical citizens’ assembly. Other aspects of 
legitimacy, such as institutional loyalty (Gibson et al. 2003), institutional pride 
(Tyler, 1990; Craig et al. 1990; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Sunshine & Tyler 
2003), lack of corruption (Miller, 1974; Sniderman, 1981), legalism (Gibson et al. 
2003), affective support (Kornberg & Clarke, 1992; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; 
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Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Gibson et al. 2003), and apolitical decision-making 
(Gibson, 2007) may be relevant to the perceived legitimacy of specific types of 
institution, such as the courts, or institutions that have existed long enough for 
citizens to develop affective attachments. However, these items were deemed less 
relevant to the object of the measure and its content domain, and thus were excluded 
from consideration.82 The final ten-item scale is unidimensional and internally 
reliable (α = .97).83 
To test the hypotheses on moderating effects, the survey included questions 
on ethno-national ideology and community background. It also captured levels of 
support for the democratic value of political equality, measured on a five-point 
unipolar scale on which respondents indicated the extent to which they think it is 
important “that representation promotes political equality for everyone.” The full list 
of questions and response categories can be found in Appendix E. 
 
5.3.2  Results 
Across the four experimental conditions, there are no significant differences in the 
extent to which respondents perceive each model of citizens’ assembly to be 
legitimate (F(3, 328) = 1.92, p = .13). For the prototypical model, in which members 
are exclusively citizens who are randomly selected, the mean legitimacy is 2.91 (SD 
1.75). As Figure 5.1 illustrates, this is not significantly higher or lower than the mean 
legitimacy of each of the other models described, ranging from 2.69 (SD 1.60) for 																																																								
82 For example, while affective support may be an important aspect underlying the legitimacy of 
existing political institutions, it is almost impossible to apply to a hypothetical decision-making body 
like a citizens’ assembly (see Kornberg and Clarke, 1992; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; Sunshine 
and Tyler, 2003; Gibson et al. 2003). Similarly, the perceived legalism of the decision-making 
process may be relevant to the legitimacy of a judicial institution like the Supreme Court of the 
United States, but much less relevant to the legitimacy of an explicitly political institution (see Gibson 
et al. 2003). 
83 For factor analysis and reliability statistics, refer to Appendix F.  
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the model with exclusively elected citizens to 3.30 (SD 1.71) for the model featuring 
a mixture of politicians and elected citizens. Thus, across the four conditions, the 
mean score of the outcome variable on its seven-point scale hovers around the 
midpoint (with the scale recalibrated to run from 0 to 6). 
However, based on these results it is not possible to accept the null 
hypothesis with an adequate degree of confidence. The risk of a Type II error is high 
due to the low percentage of respondents passing the two manipulation checks 
embedded in the questionnaire; thus, it is not sufficiently clear that the manipulations 
themselves had no significant effect on the outcome measure. In fact, as Table 5.2 
shows, only a minority of respondents correctly identified an important aspect of the 
manipulation in three of the conditions. The pass rates vary significantly across the 
four groups (χ2 (3, N = 332) = 31.510, p < .01). It was only in the prototypical 
condition that a majority of respondents, 65 percent, passed the manipulation checks. 
 
 






















Pass 64.6 46.3 28.0 27.9 41.6 
Fail 35.4 53.7 72.0 72.1 58.4 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 5.2: Percentage distribution of respondents passing or failing manipulation 
checks in Study One 
 
 
It is worth recalling that the manipulation checks for this experiment consisted of 
two separate questions with binary response options. First, respondents were asked 
about the profile of the citizens’ assembly described: were the members “100 
ordinary members of the public,” or were they “50 members of the public plus 50 
politicians”? Figure 5.2 shows that a majority of respondents in each condition 
correctly reported the profile of citizens’ assembly members. However, the variation 
in the distribution of correct responses across the four conditions suggests variation 
in the complexity associated with different models of citizens’ assembly. In the two 
conditions describing a citizens’ assembly comprising exclusively citizens, a large 
majority were able to recognise that the members were “100 ordinary members of 
the public.” In the other conditions describing “a version of a citizens’ assembly” 
(emphasis added) comprising a mixture of politicians and ordinary citizens, a 
significant minority of respondents failed to recognise that members would be “50 
members of the public plus 50 politicians.” This is not to suggest that respondents in 
Groups [1] and [3] were more diligent in their engagement with the stimulus material 
than respondents in Groups [2] and [4]; rather, it suggests that the concept of a 
citizens’ assembly in which members are exclusively citizens is easier to process 
than the concept of a citizens’ assembly that includes politicians.  
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Figure 5.2: Responses to the first manipulation check: “Who would be the members 




Figure 5.3: Responses to the second manipulation check: “How would the ordinary 
citizens be selected?” 
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Second, respondents were asked about the selection mechanism: how would the 
ordinary citizens be selected? Figure 5.3 shows that, across all conditions, most 
respondents identified that these members would be “Randomly chosen (in the same 
way that juries are selected).” While this was the correct response for Groups [1] and 
[2], this was incorrect for Groups [3] and [4]. In the latter two conditions, only a 
minority of respondents correctly recognised that citizens would be selected “By an 
election.” Respondents appear to be more cognitively receptive to the concept of a 
citizens’ assembly featuring randomly selected citizens as opposed to elected 
citizens. Thus, taken together, the pass rates for the two sets of manipulation checks 
suggest that people are more likely to recognise a citizens’ assembly with a 
prototypical mode of selection, whereby its members are exclusively citizens who 
are randomly selected. Selection processes involving the election of citizen members 
and the appointment of politicians in a hybrid model of membership appear to be 
more challenging for respondents to apprehend in an online survey environment. 
 At this point, there are three possible responses to the results of the 
experiment. In the first instance, it is possible to simply accept the null hypothesis in 
spite of the low, and uneven, proportion of respondents failing basic manipulation 
checks across the experimental conditions. The risk of a Type II error is, however, 
excessively high. A more conservative strategy suggested by Wilson et al. (2010: 
64) would be to “analyse the data on the basis of the responses of the participants to 
the manipulation check.” The authors note that it is “common practice across the 
social sciences” to drop subjects after a post-treatment manipulation check (ibid). By 
excluding participants failing the manipulation checks, internal analysis of the data 
could test the original hypotheses with respect only to those successfully responding 
to the treatment. In this experiment, dropping responses of the participants who 
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failed the manipulation checks yields a significant direct effect of the treatment (see 
Appendix F for supplementary analysis). We must keep in mind the significant 
variation in pass rates across the conditions; in other words, the retention or dropping 
of cases was non-random. With two conflicting sets of conclusions, we appear to be 
confronted with a choice between accepting the null hypothesis (risking a Type II 
error) and rejecting the null hypothesis (risking a Type I error). However, a final, and 
more radical, strategy would be to repeat the experiment with some critical 
amendments to its design. Aronow et al. (2016: 8) “stress the importance of 
manipulations that are sufficiently clear so as to minimise the necessity to remove 
subjects based on a lack of comprehension.” It is this strategy that will be pursued. 
 
5.4  Study Two 
5.4.1  Data & Method 
A total of 329 adults living in Northern Ireland took part in this follow-up study. 
They received an email invitation to participate in a project conducted by researchers 
at Queen’s University Belfast, as members of an online panel hosted by LucidTalk. 
Its panel of over 10,000 members are incentivised to take part in online surveys on a 
range of subjects by earning reward points that can be used to enter bi-annual prize 
draws. Similar to the profile of the sample in Study One, respondents were largely 
male (75 percent), with a healthy degree of variation on community background (42 
percent Protestant, 35 percent Catholic, and 22 percent with no religion). 
The experimental design replicates that of Study One, bar three significant 
refinements. First, in addition to reading a text-based vignette describing a model of 
a citizens’ assembly, on the same screen (underneath the text) respondents were 
		 147 
presented with an infographic summarising the manipulated selection process from 
each condition. The purpose of the infographics was simply to summarise and 
reinforce the vignettes, facilitating their comprehension. Apart from the necessary 
variation needed to operationalise the independent variable, the four visualisations 
(presented in Figure 5.4) were designed to be as simple and consistent as possible, 
minimising the risk of confounding effects. For example, the citizens and politicians 
depicted lack any specific attributes, and the colours used to distinguish the two 
types of citizens’ assembly member lacked any obvious connotations.84 
Second, the placement of the manipulation checks was modified. Instead of 
completing the manipulation checks after answering a series of survey items 
measuring the outcome variable, the manipulation checks were placed before all 
other questionnaire items – immediately after the manipulations themselves. There is 
a trade-off from this reordering. By requiring participants to complete manipulation 
checks before asking them for their subjective evaluations, there is a risk that their 
responses will be mediated by act of completing the task (Kidd, 1976). However, if 
the process of completing the checks serves to reinforce the manipulations, this 
should not be a disadvantage. 
Finally, if a respondent failed to answer either of the checks correctly, he or 
she was prompted to review their original response(s) and invited to return to the 
previous page containing the stimulus. The ability to provide respondents with real-
time feedback is a benefit of conducting the experiment online. After receiving the 
prompt, respondents could still proceed to the questionnaire, but their failure to pass 
the manipulation check(s) would be recorded, facilitating post hoc exclusion. 																																																								
84 In the on-screen colour version of the infographics, the animated citizens are depicted in shades of 
teal, while the animated politicians are depicted in shades of purple. These colours were sufficiently 
distinct from one another to reinforce the hybrid nature of the citizens’ assembly membership in 
Groups [2] and [4]. These colours can also be considered politically ‘neutral’ in the sense that they are 







































5.4.2  Results 
In contrast to the experiment reported in Study One, the vast majority of respondents 
in this experiment passed both manipulation checks. An average of 93 percent of 
participants correctly identified the profile of the citizens’ assembly described in 
each condition (see Figure 5.5). The pass rate for this check was slightly lower for 
group [2], in which 88 percent of respondents correctly identified a mixed profile of 
ordinary members of the public and politicians. An identical proportion, 93 percent 
of respondents, correctly identified the selection mechanism described in each 
condition (see Figure 5.6). In Groups [1], [2] and [4] the pass rate for this check 
exceeded 95 percent, but it was lower for Group [3], in which 77 percent of 
respondents (correctly) indicated that citizen members would be chosen by an 
election and 23 percent (incorrectly) stated that they would be selected by sortition. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Responses to the first manipulation check: “Who would be the members 
of the citizens’ assembly?” 
ü	 ü		 ü		 ü		û		 û		 û		 û		
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Figure 5.6: Responses to the second manipulation check: “How would the ordinary 
citizens be selected?” 
 
 
The higher number of respondents in Group [3] failing to correctly identify the 
selection mechanism appears to reflect the nature of the citizens’ assembly described 
in this condition. Open-ended comments left by participants suggest that, despite 
being prompted about their incorrect answer, many persisted with their response that 
members would be randomly chosen – not elected – because this is how they thought 
citizens should be selected. These participants ignored the wording of the question, 
which asked how members of the citizens’ assembly “would” be selected, not how 
they ought to be chosen. Their responses appear to have been based on their 
subjective preferences for the design of a citizens’ assembly, not the selection 
mechanism specified in the treatment. Therefore, only the 283 respondents who 
passed both manipulation checks are included in the analysis that follows.85 
																																																								
85 See Appendix G for an alternative analysis that includes all respondents. The substantive results 
remain broadly constant. 
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Figure 5.7: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly 
 
 
Figure 5.7 shows little difference in the mean legitimacy scores across the four 
conditions. The two sortition-based models, both with citizens only (M = 3.66, SD = 
1.95) and mixed members (M = 3.67, SD = 1.59), were perceived as marginally more 
legitimate than the two election-based counterparts consisting of citizens only (M = 
3.26, SD = 1.38) and mixed members (M = 3.21, SD = 1.62). However, overall, there 
is no significant direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
(F(3, 278) = 1.05, p = .37). A citizens’ assembly with a prototypical selection 
mechanism, sortition, and a prototypical profile of its membership, exclusively 
members of the public, is regarded as equally legitimate as the alternative models 
described. Thus, H1 is rejected. In the absence of a direct effect, however, we do 
observe striking moderating effects in the relationship between the design of the 
selection process of a citizens’ assembly and perceptions of its legitimacy. Each 
moderating effect is formally tested by regression analysis, reported in Appendix F.  
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Figure 5.8: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly, by 
perceived importance of political equality (with p-values for moderating effects) 
 
 
Respondents were asked to consider the extent to which democratic representation 
should be connected to the principle of political equality.86 Among those who think 
it is ‘mostly’ or ‘very’ important for representation to promote political equality, 
which amounts to a significant majority of respondents, a citizens’ assembly with a 
prototypical selection process was perceived to be the most legitimate model (M = 
3.82, SD = 1.77). This is consistent with our expectation that the normative 
justification for the random selection of citizens as decision-makers – the promotion 
of political equality – would translate into empirical support among individuals 
already committed to this normative principle. Figure 5.8 shows how perceived 
legitimacy steadily declines when elections and politicians enter the selection 
process and, arguably, political equality becomes harder to deliver. Among those 																																																								
86 The distribution of responses is, unexpectedly, skewed. 15 percent of respondents reported that it 
was ‘not at all’, ‘not very’ or only ‘somewhat’ important that representation should promote political 
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who value political equality, the citizens’ assembly with the lowest legitimacy score 
is the model deviating the furthest from the prototypical selection process (M = 3.29, 
SD = 1.62). In contrast, among those who regard political equality as being less 
important, the prototypical model is seen as the least legitimate (M = 2.12, SD = 
2.07). The moderating effect of political equality is significant across these two 
contrasting models, providing support for H2.87 For individuals who do not attach 
much importance to political equality, the particularly low level of legitimacy 
ascribed to a citizens’ assembly consisting purely of randomly selected citizens may 
well stem from their relative disregard for the very principle on which this 
prototypical selection process rests.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly, by ethno-
national ideology (with p-values for moderating effects) 
 
																																																								
87 Taking the prototypical model (Group [1]) as the reference category, respondents’ perceived 
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Ethno-nationalism also has a moderating effect on the perceived legitimacy of 
citizens’ assemblies with different selection processes (see Figure 5.9). Among those 
identifying as neither nationalist nor unionist, a body consisting exclusively of 
randomly-selected citizens was perceived as the most legitimate model (M = 4.09, 
SD = 1.53), while the model featuring a mixed membership of politicians and elected 
citizens received the lowest score (M = 3.53, SD = 1.31). By contrast, respondents 
identifying as unionist or nationalist perceived the model with the prototypical 
selection process to be less legitimate, on average, by nearly one unit (M = 3.23, SD 
= 2.04). For them, the most legitimate model featured sortition and a mixed profile 
(M = 3.68, SD = 1.60). Compared to the prototypical condition, the magnitude of the 
difference in effect size across different levels of ethno-national ideology was only 
statistically significant with respect to this condition, thus only partly confirming H3. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly, by 
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Figure 5.10 presents the mean legitimacy scores for each experimental condition by 
community background. Protestant respondents perceived each version of citizens’ 
assembly to be equally legitimate, with each mean score positioned more or less on 
the midpoint of the scale. Catholic respondents perceive the prototypical model to be 
the most legitimate (M = 4.43, SD = 1.18) and the model deviating most from the 
prototypical selection process to be the least legitimate (M = 3.49, SD = 1.59). 
However, the differences in the magnitude of the effect sizes for Catholic and 




Figure 5.11: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly compared 




88 The statistically insignificant differences may stem from the reduced sample size: the 22 percent of 
respondents identifying with neither community were excluded from this analysis, with a negative 
effect on statistical power. 
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Finally, as a check on the robustness of respondents’ perceptions of (hypothetical) 
citizens’ assembly decision-making, all were asked to imagine the way in which the 
(real-world) Northern Ireland Assembly makes decisions – that is, when it is 
functioning normally.89 They evaluated the Northern Ireland Assembly’s decision-
making according to the same ten items on which they had evaluated legitimacy of 
each respective version of citizens’ assembly. In all four conditions, the mean 
legitimacy score for decision-making by the Northern Ireland Assembly is lower 
than the mean score for each model of citizens’ assembly. Therefore, while neither 
the profile of citizens’ assembly members nor the selection method of citizen 
members had a direct effect on the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly 
decision-making, Figure 5.11 demonstrates that respondents are far from indifferent 
to different types of decision-making process. Compared to their evaluation of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, respondents are, on average, favourably disposed to 
decision-making by citizens’ assemblies selected in different ways. 
 
5.5  Discussion & Conclusion 
The process by which mini-publics are selected is a defining feature of these 
democratic innovations. Under a prototypical model of citizens’ assembly, all 
members are ‘ordinary’ citizens who are selected at random from the maxi-public. 
The profile of decision-makers – lay citizens, as opposed to professional politicians – 
and the mechanism used to select them – sortition, as opposed to election – both help 
to promote the democratic principle of political equality. In theory, everyone is 																																																								
89 At the time of the experiment in March 2018, the Northern Ireland Assembly had not been 
functioning for over a year. It collapsed along with the Northern Ireland Executive in January 2017. 
Even by explicitly asking respondents to ground their evaluations of the Assembly while it was 
operating normally, rather than on the basis of its post-collapse state of dormancy, evaluations may be 
negatively affected.  
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capable of participating in decision-making, and everyone stands an equal chance of 
being selected to do so in a formalised citizens’ assembly. And yet these two 
dimensions of mini-public selection remain conceptually novel to most people. For 
this reason, designers of mini-publics may wish to retain more conventional features 
of existing democratic institutions, such as selecting lay citizen members via an 
electoral process, or by engineering a membership profile that includes both lay 
citizens and professional politicians. The results of this chapter suggest that, overall, 
these deviations from a prototypical selection process make no difference to the 
perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly. A citizens’ assembly in which 
members are all randomly selected citizens is regarded as equally legitimate as one 
in which citizens are elected, and one in which members are evenly split between 
professional politicians and lay citizens – either elected or randomly selected. 
 This finding endows practitioners with a certain degree of flexibility in the 
design of mini-public selection procedures, commensurate to contextual demands. If, 
for example, a government commissions a citizens’ assembly in the face of wider 
scepticism among political elites, the inclusion of politicians as members of the body 
themselves – with all political parties proportionally represented – may help to 
secure the endorsement of the process and its outcomes from the political 
establishment. Such a scenario is imaginable in Northern Ireland, where there is an 
uneven degree of enthusiasm for the concept of a citizens’ assembly among political 
parties; unionist politicians have been somewhat wary of the idea (Donnelly, 2015). 
However, while this hybrid membership configuration certainly helped to generate 
‘buy-in’ from political parties in the Irish context (Suiter et al. 2016), it does risk 
changing the dynamic within the citizens’ assembly itself, particularly if partisan 
divisions contributed to the perceived need for a citizens’ assembly in the first place. 
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Meanwhile, if sortition were deemed by the commissioning body to be too 
radical a departure from conventional selection mechanisms, then members could be 
selected by an election without undermining public perceptions of the mini-public’s 
legitimacy, all else equal. However, this dimension of selection is perhaps more 
sensitive to external variables. Sortition, by definition, produces a predictable 
outcome: a sample of the population that is representative on certain parameters to 
within a recognised (but low) margin of error. In other words, if a random sampling 
procedure is implemented rigorously and transparently, the outcome is purely a 
function of this mathematical procedure. Elections also have many predictable 
qualities, but such predictability relies on political parties providing structure to 
competition between candidates. Without parties to provide a sense of order, the 
process of selecting fellow citizens may become too complicated for voters to feel 
like they can meaningfully engage. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in the manipulation 
checks for Study One, a majority of respondents reported that citizens’ assembly 
members in all experimental conditions were randomly selected – including a 
majority of respondents in the two conditions featuring elected citizen members. 
This in itself suggests that the idea of electing ordinary people to a mini-public may 
produce greater confusion rather than a sense of procedural familiarity. Or, to put it 
another way, the idea of randomly selecting citizens’ assembly members actually 
appears to be more intuitive to many people than might have been expected. 
The experience of Iceland illustrates how such a selection mechanism may 
indeed make life difficult for the maxi-public in practice. The election of lay citizens 
to the Icelandic Constitutional Convention suffered from a lack of popular 
engagement with the campaign; weak turnout was likely the result of voters being 
overwhelmed by the task of choosing between 522 candidates and the media simply 
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being unable to cover each of them adequately. The Supreme Court ended up 
invalidating the election, delivering “an almost fatal blow to the whole process” 
(Bergmann, 2016: 23). On the face of it, while deviations from the prototypical 
model of citizens’ assembly selection may not come at a cost to the body’s perceived 
legitimacy as far as the citizens not selected are concerned, the potentially unruly 
process of electing lay citizens may unwittingly damage the integrity of the process. 
To put it bluntly, the nature of an election envisaged by respondents in an 
experiment (even when they correctly recognise the electoral selection mechanism) 
may be vastly different to reality, which, in turn, may undermine retrospective 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the process.  
 Besides questions of practicality and political expediency, the design of a 
process for selecting members of a citizens’ assembly should also be informed by an 
underlying democratic rationale. The individual-level results of the experiment in 
Study Two provide clear evidence that a prototypical selection process is positively 
associated with the promotion of political equality. It is possible that respondents 
were positively primed by the vignette wording. For example, for the prototypical 
condition respondents were told that, “A random sample of 100 citizens would be a 
cross-section of the Northern Ireland population in terms of age, gender, social class 
and religious and community background.” They were also told that this selection 
mechanism was similar to the way legal juries are chosen. These pieces of 
information, addressing another application of the mechanism and its effects, may 
have played a role in convincing respondents that it would indeed be a legitimate 
way of selecting members of a mini-public. However, they are both objective 
statements of empirical reality. In the absence of such (minimal) contextual detail, it 
is unlikely that respondents would be familiar with the operation of sortition and its 
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basic effect of generating a representative sample of the wider population. A further 
study would be useful to investigate people’s baseline awareness of the principles 
underlying random selection, disaggregating the specific elements that are related to 
its perceived promotion of political equality, and how these differ from key elements 
of an electoral method of selection. 
 In many respects, the key point of mini-publics is precisely to be different to 
other elements of the political system – not to present a challenge to other processes 
and institutions, but to help the overall system to function better. From this 
perspective, the moderating effect of ethno-national ideology offers encouraging 
potential for the application of citizens’ assemblies to deeply divided places. 
Individuals who are ethno-nationally moderate, and whose political priorities may 
not be adequately captured by Northern Ireland’s party system that remains 
dominated by the ethno-national dimension, perceive a citizens’ assembly with a 
prototypical selection process to be particularly legitimate. Presumably, these 
individuals see greater opportunity for their political preferences to be expressed 
through a representative sample of ordinary citizens compared to alternative 
processes featuring elections and political representatives.  
It is particularly important to note that among individuals with stronger 
ethno-national views, it is not the case that they perceived a prototypical model to be 
considerably less legitimate; rather, the moderating effect of ethno-national ideology 
appears principally to be driven by the particularly positive evaluations of this model 
among those with moderate ethno-national views. For most of the other experimental 
conditions, differences in the intensity of ethno-national ideology had no significant 
moderating effect on perceived legitimacy. This suggests that establishing a citizens’ 
assembly through the random selection of ordinary citizens has the potential to 
		 161 
enhance the democratic quality of decision-making from the perspective of 
individuals who are neither nationalist nor unionist, without risking the widespread 
alienation individuals who identify as either unionist or nationalist. Moreover, 
despite historical sensitivities over political representation in Northern Ireland, 
community background has no significant moderating effect at all on the relationship 
between a mini-public’s selection process and its perceived legitimacy. This may be 
explained by demographic change over recent decades that has seen the Protestant 
and Catholic communities becoming more equal in size. As far as the prototypical 
model of citizens’ assembly is concerned, as well as the alternative possibilities 
considered in this chapter, this null effect suggests that neither community will 
consider itself advantaged – or disadvantaged – by the selection process. 
If the motivation behind establishing a citizens’ assembly is to try and control 
a democratic deficit, by virtue of its selection procedure promoting the democratic 
principle of political equality in a way that other institutions do not, there are 
compelling reasons to adopt a prototypical model, even in a deeply divided place. 
And yet, decision-making by each of the four models of citizens’ assembly 
considered in this analysis was consistently perceived to be more legitimate than 
decision-making by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Regardless of variation in the 
design of their selection processes, this finding in itself highlights the positive 
potential for democratic deficits to be reduced by involving ordinary citizens in 
decision-making. However, the selection of citizens’ assembly members is of course 
just one aspect of their design. The next chapter examines the potential effect of how 
the subsequent stage of the process is designed. Once members of a citizens’ 
assembly have been selected, does the way in which they go on to make decisions 





THE PROCESS OF MAKING DECISIONS 
LEGITIMACY AT THE THROUGHPUT STAGE  




Mission Control: And, 13, this is Houston. I’ve got another procedure for the 
LM . A short one. 
Apollo 13: Okay. Ready to copy, Jack. 
Radio communication between Mission Control and Apollo 13 Lunar 
Module Pilot Fred Haise, 13 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 181) 
 
 
For most deliberative democrats, the mere gathering of citizens in a mini-public is a 
necessary but far from sufficient condition for the body’s claim to democratic 
legitimacy. It is what the sample of citizens do when gathered that elevates a mini-
public to a deliberative mini-public. As Fishkin (1991: 36) puts it, political equality 
without deliberation is of little benefit, “for it amounts to nothing more than power 
without the opportunity to think about how that power ought to be exercised.” 
Members of a mini-public must be presented with sufficient information on the issue 
in question, they must encounter a full range of relevant arguments and perspectives, 
and they must have the opportunity to weigh up the evidence before reaching any 
collective decision.  
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The normative justifications for promoting deliberation in decision-making 
are extensive and, by their nature, they cannot be falsified: deliberation is either a 
principle of democratic decision-making or it is not. It is the role of empirical 
research to investigate whether the central claims of deliberative theory are delivered 
in practice. In the first instance, from the perspective of the maxi-public, does the 
presence of deliberation in mini-public decision-making enhance the perceived 
legitimacy of the process? And, if so, are there ways of designing a deliberative 
process that enhances or diminishes the extent to which it is perceived as legitimate? 
This chapter probes these two questions. The results of a randomised experiment 
suggest that as long as the members of a citizens’ assembly are provided with 
comprehensive and balanced information on an issue, a formal deliberation phase, 
operationalised either as (external) face-to-face discussion or as (internal) imagined 
conversation, makes no significant difference to the perceived legitimacy of 
decision-making. Variation in attitudes at the individual-level, across different levels 
of ethno-national ideological intensity and the perceived importance of deliberation, 
indicates that the design of a deliberative decision-making process should reflect the 
context and purpose of the mini-public. 
 
6.1  Promoting Deliberation 
By deliberation, Fishkin (2009: 33) refers to “the process by which individuals 
sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in discussions together.” The 
goal of such a process is to arrive at “views that represent collective, informed 
consent” (ibid: 34). For some theorists, it should be acknowledged, deliberation is 
not simply a process but a worthy goal in its own right; it does not need to be 
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instrumental to the fulfilment of a broader purpose. However, when deliberation is 
oriented towards a collective good – the making of public policy decisions – it is 
typically understood to offer “a means to a more considered, reasoned decision,” 
rather than being treated as an end in itself (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003: 629). For 
decision-makers to be sincerely guided by deliberation, participants must be open to 
persuasion based on the strength of competing arguments, prepared to consider 
broader interests beyond their own, and willing to potentially revise their initial 
preferences on the basis of new evidence. At their core, deliberative decisions are 
those reached through ‘the unforced force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1996). 
Such a decision-making process stands in contrast to those guided by 
partisanship, self-interest and fixed preferences. Real-world processes involving 
elected representatives often fall short of deliberative ideals. When legislative voting 
is driven by partisan calculations, politicians are placing party loyalty over a genuine 
attempt to engage in objective reasoning. Parliamentary and congressional debates 
offer the opportunity for representatives to argue in favour of a particular position, 
but empirical evidence suggests they primarily do so in order to assert their position, 
without the intention of persuading others or being open to persuasion themselves 
(Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2006). Similarly, at the executive level of decision-making, 
coalition governments (and, perhaps less obviously, single-party administrations) are 
characterised by negotiations, both in the formation and in the day-to-day execution 
of a programme for government. Political parties enter government, quite 
reasonably, seeking to implement a particular agenda that serves the interests of the 
people who voted for them. Their electoral strength determines their relative 
bargaining power in any political horse-trading. Just as partisanship may obstruct 
meaningful deliberation in the legislative process, the logic of negotiation can also 
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blind decision-makers to the force of the better argument. Negotiators enter the 
process with fixed preferences and defend them to the extent that their bargaining 
power allows, often without the incentive to reflect on the relative merit of holding 
these preferences to begin with. Efforts to negotiate compromise outcomes serve as a 
tool for maximising sectional interests, as distinct from an effort to consider 
outcomes that best serve a common interest.90 In short, while decision-making on the 
basis of partisanship and/or negotiation may serve a range of political purposes, such 
decision-making stands in tension with the basic principles of deliberation. 
What, exactly, are these principles? There is certainly a degree of variation 
within deliberative theory itself, but Fishkin’s (2009) criteria broadly encapsulate the 
key features of deliberation identified in the literature.91 He argues that the quality of 
a deliberative process can be evaluated according to five conditions: participants’ 
access to relevant information, the substantive balance of arguments, the diversity of 
positions held by participants in group interactions, the conscientiousness of 
participants in decision-making, and the extent to which arguments are given equal 
consideration on their merits. Taken together, these five conditions signify that 
deliberation is essentially about the quality of information provided to participants 
and the manner in which participants assess it and respond to it. The relative latitude 
of the criteria leaves open a range of possible configurations for the practical design 
of a deliberative process in a mini-public. 
 
																																																								
90 Participants may ultimately make a decision on the basis of their own personal values or interests, 
or those of a particular group (see Fishkin, 1991: 37). Some deliberative theorists explicitly emphasise 
the promotion of the common good in decision-making (see Bächtiger et al. 2018). Others see this as 
possible, even desirable, but not strictly necessary: what is important is that participants are presented 
with the full range of information and arguments, allowing them to at least consider information and 
perspectives beyond their own initial horizon. 
91 See Bächtiger et al. (2018) for a more comprehensive overview of the principles underpinning 
deliberation. 
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6.2  Making Decisions in a Mini-Public 
Mini-public decision-making is typically structured around a number of distinct 
phases (see Fournier et al. 2011). Participants first have the opportunity to learn 
about the issue at stake, receiving background information and viewpoints from a 
combination of impartial experts, advocates of a certain position, and members of 
the broader public in plenary sessions and consultations. It is only after becoming 
familiar with the different aspects of an issue that members of the mini-public are in 
a position to begin deliberating what to do about it. In every citizens’ assembly that 
has been held, the deliberation phase has been operationalised through roundtable 
discussions in which members sit in small groups (of usually no more than ten 
participants) and engage in structured dialogue, facilitated by trained professionals.92 
For many deliberative democrats, this mutual exchange of participants’ perspectives 
through active listening and talking is a venerable part of the process (Polletta and 
Gharrity Gardner, 2018; Morrell, 2018). 
 However, deliberation and verbal discussion are not synonymous. While 
Fishkin’s (2009: 33) definition refers to “the process by which individuals sincerely 
weigh the merits of competing arguments in discussions together” (emphasis added), 
such discussions may not necessarily demand face-to-face interaction. Indeed, if we 
take Fishkin’s (2009: 34) goal of deliberation as reaching “views that represent 
collective, informed consent,” and if we evaluate this process according to the five 
conditions he specifies, there is no explicit requirement that deliberation centres on 
interactive acts of talking and listening to one another. Indeed, the modern term 
derives from the Latin ‘deliberatus’, translated as ‘considered carefully’. Its roots are 																																																								
92 Intermediaries may fulfill different roles, depending on the purpose and structure of the deliberative 
forum. See Landwehr (2014) for a discussion of these roles, and see Gerber (2015) for a discussion of 
the impact of different kinds of facilitation on participants. 
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‘librare’ (to weigh) and ‘de-’ (down), reflecting an early understanding of 
deliberation as a process of contemplating different options, as if comparatively 
weighing them on a set of scales (see Steiner, 2012: 4). In this narrow sense, 
deliberation at the very least demands an individual to think for himself or herself. 
Talking and listening to other individuals directly may enhance and refine his or her 
independent thinking, but such interaction would be in addition to the fundamental 
requirement of deliberation. Put another way, deliberation without conversation is 
possible, but deliberation without thinking is impossible.  
Accordingly, Dryzek (2000) prefers the term ‘discursive democracy’ over 
‘deliberative democracy’ precisely because he recognises that deliberation can be a 
personal rather than a social decision-making process. Even in explicitly collective 
modes of decision-making, where individuals weigh up different courses of action in 
conversation with one another, Goodin (2000: 81) argues that deliberation “must 
inevitably be done within each individual's head” both before and during an 
interpersonal exchange of ideas and reasons. He refers to this “internal-reflective” 
aspect of decision-making as “deliberation within” (ibid: 92). In an empirical study 
of a citizens’ jury, Goodin and Niemeyer (2003: 635) found that while many 
deliberative democrats “would have us privilege conversation over cognition as 
politically the most important mode of deliberation,” the effect of individuals 
internally reflecting on information – before discussing it with others – had a much 
greater effect on opinion formation than external discussion. It is one thing to shift 
the relative emphasis of deliberation from external to internal processes, but it is 
another to suggest that deliberation, at least in a mini-public environment, should be 
conducted purely internally among participants. 
		 168 
The rationale for the exclusive promotion of internal deliberation in citizens’ 
assemblies falls into four broad categories. First, there is the issue of statistical 
inference. If the purpose of a deliberative mini-public is to find out what the maxi-
public would decide under ideal conditions (i.e. the careful consideration of all 
relevant information and arguments), then the decision-making process should 
generate outcomes that are replicable and generalisable. Such a claim about the 
decision(s) of a mini-public rests on a core statistical assumption: that the sample is 
representative of the broader population. However, the representativeness of the 
sample is compromised as soon as the (initially independent) participants interact 
with one another and have the opportunity to influence each other in unique ways. 
As Goodin (2000: 88-89) puts it, the challenge for mini-public design “lies in 
ensuring the continuing representativeness of the subset, once the deliberation gets 
underway … (since) it beggars belief that any one group would come to exactly the 
same conclusions by exactly the same route as any other” (original emphasis). Thus, 
if participants each responded to a comprehensive and identical set of evidence by a 
process of internal deliberation – without interacting with one another – they would 
at least maintain their statistical independence and the generalisability of the 
sample’s aggregate decision(s).93 
A second reason is that there are some sensitive contexts in which face-to-
face discussion could prove problematic. Allport (1954) argued that inter-group 
contact has the potential to reduce prejudice between different groups, but, crucially, 
this effect is dependent on a set of favourable conditions, including equal status 
among groups, the possession of common goals, the absence of inter-group 																																																								
93 Even though the initially representative sample would still become unrepresentative once 
participants were provided with information to stimulate internal deliberation, the idea is that by 
maintaining consistency in the information provided and the instructions given to each participant, the 
process can be replicated in a way not possible with face-to-face deliberation. 
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competition, support for political authorities, and personal interaction. 94  This 
hypothesis has been consistently validated (see, for example, Pettigrew, 1998). 
Without the attainment of necessary conditions, however, contact between 
individuals of rival groups can stimulate higher levels of mutual prejudice and 
undermine relations between them (Paolini et al. 2010). Experiments have 
demonstrated both the limits of positive contact, such as when groups possess 
unequal status (Henry and Hardin, 2006; Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2013), as well as 
the prejudice-inducing effect of negative contact (Barlow et al. 2012; Graf et al. 
2014). For meaningful deliberation to occur among a diverse group of individuals in 
a deeply divided polity, the avoidance of interpersonal contact may be desirable – at 
least when the conditions conducive to positive contact are tenuous or unattainable. 
Third, beyond the political sensitivities of a deeply divided place, it may not 
always be practical or efficient for members of a mini-public to physically assemble 
in a single location (Gastil, 2000). For geographically large polities, as well as for 
mini-publics set up to address issues that transcend national borders, a face-to-face 
meeting of participants may be prohibitively expensive if members of the sample are 
each required to travel great distances to the venue. The use of mini-publics at the 
global level of decision-making has been suggested, particularly to consider 
transnational environmental issues (Baber and Bartlett, 2009), and yet the physical 
assembly of participants may in itself be environmentally harmful and unnecessary. 
Even if the target population resides in a relatively small geographical unit, and even 
if the issue(s) to be examined by the mini-public pertains only to that jurisdiction, the 
complexity of the issue(s) could render it necessary to spread the work of the mini-
public over a long period of time, or perhaps participants do not even share the same 																																																								
94 See Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) for an overview of the history and influence of Allport’s inter-
group contact hypothesis. 
		 170 
language. 95  Under such circumstances, internal deliberation by individual 
participants could overcome the potential practical difficulties of physical assembly 
and interaction. 
 Finally, real-world deliberative bodies have illustrated the potential for 
participants to meaningfully engage in internal over external deliberation. While 
Ancient Athens is often heralded as an early example of deliberative democracy in 
action, recent research casts doubt that citizens did very much talking. In a critical 
semantic analysis, Cammack (2013: 125) concludes that “‘deliberative’ is not an 
appropriate label for Athenian democracy, unless ‘deliberation’ in the exclusively 
‘internal-reflective’ sense is meant.” She challenges the conventional assumption 
that the Greek verb ‘bouleuomai’ connotes external discussion among all decision-
makers. Instead, by cross-referencing the verb’s usage in other texts, including 
instances where it is used alongside words unequivocally associated with speech, 
Cammack finds a division of labour in Athenian decision-making: between speakers 
and listeners (see also Landauer, 2012). A small number of citizens had the role of 
providing oral advice to the ekklēsia (assembly), but the vast majority had the role of 
listening and reflecting on the speeches before individually casting a vote. From a 
practical standpoint, this made sense. With approximately six thousand citizens 
typically present at a single meeting of the assembly (Hansen, 1999), the size of the 
gathering “prohibited public conversation of the kind imagined by many modern 
scholars” (Cammack, 2013: 129). Through the precedent created by these early 
forms of democracy, deliberation can be understood primarily as a process of 
internal reflection. 																																																								
95 Dryzek (2009) cites a shared language as a favourable condition for deliberation. Initiatives like the 
‘EuroPolis’ Deliberative Poll ®, bringing together 348 participants from all (then) 27 member states 
of the European Union, do demonstrate that it is possible to facilitate good deliberation even without 
a common language (see Fishkin et al. 2014). However, such initiatives require intense logistical 
effort: simultaneous interpretation was provided in 22 different languages. 
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 So, in circumstances in which external deliberation among citizens is deemed 
unfeasible or undesirable, how could contemporary mini-publics be designed to 
facilitate a purely internal mode of deliberation instead? Over the last decade, social 
psychologists have been exploring the potential for imagined contact to replicate the 
positive effects of physical contact when favourable conditions do not exist to 
support the latter. In an experimental setting, participants are usually asked to 
imagine having a positive encounter with a member of the out-group. Compared to a 
control group, participants who engage in imagined contact with a member of a 
stigmatised group – including religious groups, sexual minorities, and people with a 
mental illness – consistently show improvement in explicit and implicit attitudes 
towards the out-group (Turner et al. 2007; Crisp and Turner, 2009; Giacobbe et al. 
2013).  
Garry (2016a) took the principles of the imagined contact hypothesis and 
applied them to political decision-making. In the deeply divided context of Northern 
Ireland, he conducted an experiment in which Protestant respondents were asked to 
imagine having a structured conversation with a member of the Catholic community 
about the contentious issue of flag display (and vice versa), after receiving relevant 
background information and perspectives. The main finding was that, with reference 
to a control condition, imagined dialogue had a positive effect on participants’ 
support for a flag policy based on ‘common ground’. While there are significant 
challenges in designing the structure of an extended imagined dialogue with which 
mini-public participants can successfully engage, not least in constructing the 
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‘imagined other’, Garry demonstrates the basic feasibility of the concept that can be 
adapted to meet the demands of particular contexts.96 
 
6.2.1  Hypotheses 
Taking the essential principles of deliberative democracy as the departure point, it 
should be expected that a citizens’ assembly featuring some kind of deliberation – 
however operationalised – will be perceived as more legitimate than one in which no 
deliberation takes place. Despite the theoretical and practical potential for internal 
deliberation to facilitate decision-making in a citizens’ assembly, it remains a 
relatively unconventional approach compared to the well-established practice of 
mini-public participants engaging in face-to-face discussion. The first hypothesis, 
therefore, rests on the further expectation that a prototypical mode of mini-public 
decision-making (based on external deliberation) will ultimately be perceived as 
more legitimate than one in which decision-making relies on imagined dialogue: 
 
H1: The occurrence of deliberation increases the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ 
assembly decision-making, particularly when deliberation is external rather 
than internal. 
 
This effect is likely to be moderated by the extent to which people value deliberation 
as a democratic principle. People who see it as an important element of democratic 
decision-making are expected to be particularly supportive of any form of decision-
making that involves deliberation – operationalised either internally or externally – 																																																								
96  Although not directly interested in decision-making through internal deliberation, Warner and 
Villamil (2017) provide compelling experimental evidence that imagined contact helps to improve 
cross-partisan feelings, reinforcing the potential for imagined contact to be meaningfully applied to 
political contexts. Online simulations also afford opportunities to operationalise internal deliberation 
in a consistent, structured manner among participants (see, for example, Kull et al. 2012). 
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compared to people who see it as an unimportant goal. This is not a tautological 
supposition. Rather, it enables a test of the relationship between two distinct 
variables: the perceived importance of deliberation and the perceived legitimacy of 
decision-making featuring deliberation across different modes of mini-public design. 
 
H2: The positive effect of deliberation, external or internal, on the perceived 
legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making is stronger among 
individuals who value deliberation as a democratic principle. 
 
Since deliberation involves a willingness among decision-makers to openly consider 
evidence and arguments, and to weigh up policy options beyond their initial 
preferences, it is reasonable to expect that the positive effect of deliberation on 
perceived legitimacy will be moderated by the strength of an individual’s ideology; 
in the context of Northern Ireland, ideology is with respect to the relative strength of 
underlying ethno-nationalism: 
 
H3: The positive effect of deliberation, external or internal, on the perceived 
legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making is stronger among 
individuals with a moderate, rather than a strong, ethno-national ideology. 
 
Finally, since deliberation involves the equal consideration of different preferences, 
in a deeply divided place it is likely that individuals from a minority group, who are 
disadvantaged by purely aggregative decision-making, are likely to be particularly 
supportive. In contrast, individuals from the majority group, who benefit from 
decision-making marked by a simple aggregation of individual preferences, may see 
less need for deliberation. In Northern Ireland, Catholics have been traditionally in 
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the minority and Protestants in the majority, thus reflecting the final hypothesis on 
the expected moderating effect of community background: 
 
H4: The positive effect of deliberation, external or internal, on the perceived 
legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making is stronger among 
Catholics and weaker among Protestants. 
 
6.3  Study One 
6.3.1  Data & Method 
In parallel to recruitment for Study One in Chapter Five, participants were drawn 
from an online panel hosted by a major UK survey company between late February 
and early March of 2018.97 The non-random sample of 265 adults living in Northern 
Ireland was largely male (71 percent), but contained a greater deal of diversity on 
community background: 44 percent of respondents were Protestant, 40 percent 
Catholic, and a further 15 percent of respondents identified their community 
background with another or no religion. The average age was 47.2 years (SD = 13.6 
years). Participants completed a 10-minute online questionnaire and received £0.50 
in credit to their panel accounts. They were randomly assigned to one of three 
versions of the survey, each of which presented respondents with a different mode of 
decision-making via a short vignette. In Group [1], decision-making involved only 
the presentation of information before members took a decision. In the other two 
conditions, deliberation was explicitly outlined as a distinct intermediary phase of 
decision-making: in Group [2] deliberation was external (the prototypical condition); 
in Group [3] was internal. The experimental conditions are summarised in Table 6.1. 																																																								
97 This study also took place alongside recruitment for Study One in Chapter Seven. Participants 
could only be randomly assigned to a single condition across all three experiments, meaning they 
could not take part in more than one experiment. 
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Nature of Decision-Making Process 
[1] 
Information +  
decision 
[2] PROTOTYPICAL 
Information +  
external deliberation + 
decision 
[3] 
Information +  
internal deliberation + 
decision 
Table 6.1: Summary of experimental conditions in Study One 
 
 
As with the experiments in Chapter Five, respondents were provided with some 
basic background information to the concept of a citizens’ assembly in a text-based 
vignette. The manipulated text is shown in italics (see Appendix E for the three 
individual vignettes presented in full):  
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in [{two} {three}] phases: 
1. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides of the 
issue. 
[ { 2. Group Discussion 
Participants will then talk about the issue with each other, including with 
members from a different community. These discussions will take place in 
small groups of about ten participants, facilitated by a neutral chairperson. 
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This will allow participants the opportunity to consider other perspectives as 
well as their own. They will be asked to try and think about common ground 
on the issue. } 
{ 2. Imagined Conversation 
Participants will then independently spend time thinking about the issue. 
They will be asked to imagine that they are having a conversation with a 
person from another community about the issue. This will allow participants 
the opportunity to consider other perspectives as well as their own. They will 
be asked to try and think about common ground on the issue. } ] 
 [{2.} {3.}] Taking a Decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would then 
be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in the vote 
would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be implemented.   
 
The composition of the citizens’ assembly (a representative random sample of 
citizens) and the nature of the decision (binding;) were held constant across the three 
conditions. Respondents had to pause for a minimum of 30 seconds on the screen 
containing the vignette before they could proceed to the survey items. A single 
manipulation check was embedded in the questionnaire, asking respondents to recall 
the phases of decision-making mentioned in the vignette.98 
Immediately after reading the text, respondents were asked to evaluate the 
decision-making process described. As with the experiments in the previous chapter, 
the outcome variable of perceived legitimacy was measured using a multi-item 
																																																								
98 After respondents answered questions measuring to the outcome variable, they were asked, “How 
would the citizens’ assembly consider an issue? Tick the [two/three] phases that were mentioned.” 
The response options were ‘receiving information’, ‘group discussion’, ‘imagined conversation’ and 
‘taking a decision’. 
		 177 
scale.99 The ten items capture relevant aspects of legitimacy: the extent to which the 
process was fair, trustworthy, democratic, efficient, even-handed, acceptable, good, 
competent, supportable, and credible.100 The final ten-item scale performed well: 
factor analysis identified a single dimension, and the combined items have a high 
degree of internal consistency (α = .97).101 
Later survey items asked respondents to report their ethno-national ideology 
and community background. The survey also captured support for the principle of 
deliberation, measured on a five-point unipolar scale on which respondents indicated 
the extent to which they think it is important “that decisions are made after extensive 
deliberation (that is, after the careful consideration of evidence and arguments on 
both sides of an issue).” For this item the content in parentheses was carefully 
worded to try and convey the underlying essence of the (perhaps unfamiliar) concept 
without privileging an external or internal version of its application. The full list of 
questions and response categories can be found in Appendix E. 
 
6.3.2  Results 
Across the three experimental conditions, there were no significant differences in the 
mean legitimacy scores of each decision-making process (see Figure 6.1). For Group 
[2], featuring a prototypical citizens’ assembly in which members engage in external 
																																																								
99 The full wording of the question was: “Imagine the way in which a citizens’ assembly would deal 
with a political issue. As a way of making a decision, to what extent do you think this process would 
be … fair or unfair; trustworthy or untrustworthy; democratic or undemocratic; efficient or 
inefficient; even-handed or discriminatory; acceptable or unacceptable; good or bad; competent or 
incompetent; supportable or unsupportable; credible or not credible?” For each of the ten items there 
were seven response options on a bipolar scale, for example: ‘extremely’ (fair), ‘mostly’ (fair), 
‘slightly’ (fair), ‘neither’ (fair nor unfair), ‘slightly’ (unfair), ‘mostly’ (unfair), and ‘extremely’ 
(unfair). See Appendix E for the full questionnaire. 
100 See Chapter Five for a discussion on the construction of the multi-item scale, including an 
explanation of the items included and excluded. 
101 For factor analysis and reliability statistics, refer to Appendix G.  
		 178 
deliberation, the mean legitimacy was 3.17 (SD = 1.54). This was not higher, let 
alone significantly higher, than the mean legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly without 
any deliberative phase in decision-making (M = 3.19, SD = 1.67); similarly, it was 
not significantly higher than the mean legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly in which 
members engage in internal deliberation (M = 3.40, SD = 1.48). Overall, there was 
no direct effect of deliberative mode on the perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ 
assembly (F(2, 262) = .57, p = .57). 
 
 










int. deliberation All groups 
Pass 39.1 71.4 26.4 46.0 
Fail 60.9 28.6 63.6 54.0 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.2: Respondents passing or failing manipulation checks in Study One (%) 
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However, as with the first experiment presented in Chapter Five, a majority of 
respondents (54 percent) failed to correctly answer the manipulation check. Pass 
rates varied significantly across the experimental conditions (χ2 (2, N = 265) = 
38.77, p < .01). While most respondents successfully identified the key parts of the 
manipulation in the second condition, over 60 percent of respondents failed to do so 
in Groups [1] and [3]. Thus, it is not possible to credibly accept the null hypothesis 
on the basis of these results. 
Two elements of the check were largely unproblematic. Figure 6.2 shows that 
the vast majority of respondents successfully recognised that ‘receiving information’ 
was the first stage of decision-making outlined in each vignette. Similarly, as Figure 
6.5 demonstrates, the vast majority of respondents correctly identified ‘taking a 
decision’ as the final stage of the process. These features were, of course, constant 
across the decision-making processes described in each of the three conditions. 
Confusion appeared to arise over the manipulations themselves: the presence and 
nature of deliberation. As Figure 6.3 shows, a majority of respondents in Groups [1] 
and [3] mistakenly identified ‘group discussion’ as one of the phases of decision-
making, perhaps automatically assuming that external deliberation is an inherent 
feature of a citizens’ assembly. The vast majority of respondents recognised that 
‘imagined conversation’ was not part of the decision-making process in Groups [1] 
and [2], but a significant minority (approximately one-third) in Group [3] failed to 
identify internal deliberation as a distinct phase described in this condition (see 
Figure 6.4).  
		 180 
 
Figure 6.2: Responses selecting ‘receiving information’ for the manipulation check: 
“How would the citizens’ assembly consider an issue?” 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Responses selecting ‘group discussion’ for the manipulation check: 






Figure 6.4: Responses selecting ‘imagined conversation’ for the manipulation 
check: “How would the citizens’ assembly consider an issue?” 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Responses selecting ‘taking a decision’ for the manipulation check: 





After dropping respondents failing the manipulation check, the substantive 
conclusion is the same: there are no significant differences in the mean legitimacy 
score across the three conditions when the analysis is restricted only to the 
respondents passing the manipulation check.102 However, accepting the results on 
this basis would be problematic, given both the high proportion of respondents 
failing the manipulation check and the uneven distribution of pass rates across the 
experimental conditions. It is clearly necessary to strengthen the quality of 
manipulations in order to more convincingly test the effect of deliberation on the 
perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making. Echoing the research 
process of Chapter Five, the experiment is repeated and refined. 
 
6.4  Study Two 
6.4.1  Data & Method 
A follow-up study was conducted on a sample of 272 adults living in Northern 
Ireland, recruited from an online panel of over 10,000 members.103 They were 
incentivised to participate by earning reward points that can be redeemed in regular 
prize draws. The profile of the non-random sample was largely male (80 percent). 44 
percent of respondents came from a Protestant community background, 37 percent 
from a Catholic background, and 18 percent did not identify their community 
background with either of the two religious groups. Data collection took place from 
3-6 June 2018.  
																																																								
102 See Tables A15 and A16 in Appendix G for alternative analyses. 
103 The panel is hosted by LucidTalk, a survey company based in Northern Ireland. Participants were 
recruited to this experiment in parallel to Study Two in Chapter Five and Study Two in Chapter 
Seven. Participants could not participate in more than one of the parallel experiments. 
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The design of the experiment mirrors that of Study One, apart from three 
significant amendments. First, respondents were presented with a simple infographic 
underneath the text-based vignette of each experimental condition. These visual 
supplements were intended to summarise and reinforce the manipulations as clearly 
and effectively as possible. As with the structure of the text in each vignette, the 
three infographics (presented in Figure 6.6) contain consistent representations of the 
first and last stages of decision-making, with variation in the representation of the 
intermediate stage (where applicable).  
The first phase of receiving information is summarised with the presentation 
of evidence both for and against a given policy. This emphasises the balanced nature 
of the information provided to members. The positioning of the presenter behind a 
lectern is intended to convey the one-way, top-down flow of information, i.e. that 
members were purely receiving, not discussing, the information. In contrast, the 
second infographic emphasises that citizens’ assembly members would engage in 
face-to-face discussion in small groups. While the physical attributes of the citizens 
were kept deliberately vague, at a minimum the depiction conveys some basic 
diversity around the table; the members are somehow different from one another.  
In the final condition, a combination of hand gestures and thought bubbles 
around two individuals is used to depict the more abstract concept of internal 
deliberation via an imagined conversation. This was a more challenging infographic 
to design, but the thought bubble, together with the hand gestures, are generally 
understood to represent the internal act of ‘thinking’. The depiction of the members 
facing in opposite directions emphasises their mutual independence, but the fact that 
there are two is to convey the dialogical aspect of the process. The last stage of each 










































Second, the manipulation check was placed immediately after respondents were 
presented with the vignette and infographic, and before they completed survey items 
measuring the outcome variable. The wording of the instrument is the same: “How 
would the citizens’ assembly consider an issue? Tick the [two/three] phases that 
were mentioned.” As in Study One, the response options were simply ‘receiving 
information’, ‘group discussion’, ‘imagined conversation’, and ‘taking a decision’. 
In the previous version of the experiment, in which respondents completed the 
manipulation check after responding to ten intermediary survey items, it is possible 
that the clarity of the manipulation faded for a number of respondents during the 
course of completing the questionnaire. The revised placement minimises this risk 
and, in turn, reinforces the manipulation itself before respondents evaluate the 
citizens’ assembly described in each condition. 
Finally, any respondents initially failing the manipulation check had the 
opportunity to review his or her original submission. If their selections did not match 
the correct responses to the manipulation check, they were alerted to the 
discrepancy, invited to return to the previous page containing the relevant 
information on citizens’ assembly decision-making, and asked to revise their initial 
selections. Respondents could technically still proceed to the remainder of the 
questionnaire, but their incorrect responses to the manipulation check would be 
recorded to facilitate post hoc exclusion. These revisions all reflect the same 
approach adopted in Chapter Five to overcome high levels of manipulation check 
failure in the first study. 
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6.4.2  Results 
This time, the vast majority of respondents passed the manipulation check: 94 
percent of individuals completing the online survey correctly identified the phases of 
decision-making mentioned. Almost all respondents recognised that ‘receiving 
information’ was an explicit part of the decision-making process in each condition 
(see Figure 6.7). In Group [2], all respondents correctly identified ‘group discussion’ 
as a further stage of decision-making, with a small number of respondents in Groups 
[1] and [3] incorrectly reporting this to be the case (see Figure 6.8). In marked 
contrast to Study One, nearly all respondents in Group [3] recognised that ‘imagined 
conversation’ was a feature of the citizens’ assembly described in their condition 
(see Figure 6.9). Most respondents correctly selected ‘taking a decision’ as the final 
stage of the process described in each condition (see Figure 7.10). 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Responses selecting ‘receiving information’ for the manipulation check: 




Figure 6.8: Responses selecting ‘group discussion’ for the manipulation check: 




Figure 6.9: Responses selecting ‘imagined conversation’ for the manipulation 






Figure 6.10: Responses selecting ‘taking a decision’ for the manipulation check: 
“How would the citizens’ assembly consider an issue?” 
 
 
In the analysis that follows, the 16 respondents failing to pass the manipulation 
check are excluded, leaving 256 valid cases.104 Consistent with the provisional 
results of Study One, there was no significant direct effect overall (F(2, 253) = .59,  
p = .55). In Group [1], the decision-making process involving simply the 
presentation of information before taking a decision received a mean legitimacy 
score of 3.43 (SD = 1.65). The presence of external deliberation in Group [2] 
produced a similar score (M = 3.20, SD = 1.68), as did the presence of internal 
deliberation in Group [3] (M = 3.46, SD = 1.64). Therefore, neither the formal 
addition of deliberation to the decision-making process, nor the distinction between 
its external and internal forms, had an effect on the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ 
assembly decision-making. 
																																																								
104 The substantive conclusions emanating from the results are similar when all 272 respondents are 




Figure 6.11: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly 
 
 
However, while there is no direct effect of deliberative mode on the extent to which 
respondents perceived a citizens’ assembly’s decision-making process to be 
legitimate – resulting in the rejection of H1 – there are two significant moderating 
effects. First, the relationship is moderated by the extent to which respondents value 
the democratic principle of deliberation itself, providing support for H2.105  Among 
the (vast majority of) respondents who considered deliberation to be an important 
feature of decision-making, the citizens’ assembly in each experimental condition 
was perceived to be equally legitimate.106 In contrast, as Figure 6.12 illustrates, 
among those who considered deliberation to be relatively unimportant in decision-
making, the addition of a formal deliberation phase – either external or internal – 
significantly reduced the mean legitimacy score by over one unit (p < .05). For these 																																																								
105 When asked how important it was “that decisions are made after extensive deliberation (that is, 
after the careful consideration of evidence and arguments on both sides of an issue),” the vast 
majority of respondents (91.0 percent) said it was ‘mostly’ or ‘very’ important. Less than 9 percent of 
respondents said that it was only ‘somewhat’, ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ important. 
106 Among those who considered deliberation to important, the mean for Group [1] was 3.43 (SD = 
1.66), 3.39 for Group [2] (SD = 1.66), and 3.55 for Group [3] (SD = 1.58). 
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individuals, the presence of deliberation may have been perceived to come at the 
expense of other values in decision-making that they generally considered more 
important, such as expediency, partisanship, or deference to ‘common sense’. For the 
others who did value deliberation, the consistency in the mean scores across all three 
conditions may reflect a belief that the provision of a balanced range of information 
to decision-makers is sufficient for establishing the basic legitimacy of the process. 
If deliberation, as narrowly defined in the question, is taken simply to be “careful 
consideration of evidence and arguments on both sides of an issue,” the activities 
channelled by the experimental conditions – face-to-face discussion and imagined 
conversations – do not appear strictly necessary for the enhancement of citizens’ 




Figure 6.12: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly, by 





























(p =.25); n.s. 
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Second, the relationship is moderated by ethno-national ideology. Respondents 
identifying as neither nationalist nor unionist gave a higher legitimacy score, on 
average, to each model of citizens’ assembly compared to respondents identifying as 
either nationalist or unionist, as illustrated in Figure 6.13. The magnitude of the 
differences in effect size was statistically significant between Groups [1] and [2]. A 
citizens’ assembly decision-making process featuring external deliberation had a 
mean legitimacy score of 4.24 (SD = 1.37) among the ‘neither’ group, compared to 
2.71 (SD = 1.59) among individuals identifying with one of the two main ethno-
national ideologies. The differences were less pronounced in the information only 
condition. It might be the case that ethno-national moderates associate talk-based 
deliberation with fair and reasoned dialogue, thus enhancing the legitimacy of 
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positions might envisage face-to-face discussion descending into an acrimonious 
dispute among participants, thus weakening the legitimacy of the process. There was 
some convergence between the two levels of ethno-nationalism on the perceived 
legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly featuring internal deliberation. The differences 
between the two levels were not significantly different to those observed in either 
Groups [1] or [2], painting a rather complicated picture in which individuals with 
different levels of ethno-nationalism do not evaluate a citizens’ assembly featuring 
imagined deliberation in a way that is distinct from the other two conditions. This 
mode of decision-making might not be so clearly associated with the opportunities 
that ethno-national moderates associate with face-to-face discussion, compared to 
the information only condition, but it equally might not be associated with the kind 
of risks that individuals with a stronger ethno-national position perceive external 
deliberation to involve. H3 is, therefore, partly confirmed. 
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Figure 6.14 indicates that community background also has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between the mode of decision-making and perceived legitimacy, but not 
necessarily in the manner expected. Catholic respondents, on average, scored the 
citizens’ assembly featuring imagined deliberation as the least legitimate decision-
making model (M = 3.24, SD = 1.71) while Protestant respondents scored it as the 
most legitimate model (M = 3.37, SD = 1.61). The magnitude of the differences in 
mean legitimacy is similar across the two groups with respect to the first two modes 
of decision-making: Catholics consistently evaluated a citizens’ assembly featuring 
information only and external deliberation more positively than Protestants by 
around one unit or more on the seven-point legitimacy scale. In contrast, H4 
predicted that attitudes of Catholics and Protestants would be similar to one another 
with respect to the citizens’ assembly featuring only the presentation of information 
to members, and that attitudes would diverge in the other two conditions. While it 
was expected that Protestants would score a citizens’ assembly featuring any form of 
deliberation more negatively than Catholics, we instead see that the two groups 
converge in their attitudes towards a citizens’ assembly featuring internal 
deliberation. This moderating effect is statistically significant.107  
As a final stage of the analysis, echoing the approach of the previous chapter, 
Figure 6.15 presents the mean legitimacy scores for the citizens’ assembly described 
in each of the experimental conditions against the mean scores awarded by 
respondents to the Northern Ireland Assembly on the same multi-item scale.108 
Overall, decision-making by each hypothetical citizens’ assembly received a 
significantly higher mean legitimacy score compared to decision-making by the 																																																								107	All moderating effects were formally tested with regression analysis, the results of which are 
reported in Appendix G. 
108 Using the same items evaluating citizens’ assembly decision-making, respondents were asked to 
imagine the way in which the Northern Ireland Assembly makes decisions “when it is functioning.” 
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Northern Ireland Assembly.109 This adds an extra level of robustness to the results of 
Study Two. The lack of significant variation in the mean legitimacy levels with 
respect to the Northern Ireland Assembly shows that respondents across the three 
conditions engaged with the multi-item legitimacy scale in a similar fashion.  
Furthermore, the differences between the scores for the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and each model of citizens’ assembly show that despite the null effect of the 
manipulated variable, respondents still demonstrated the capacity to evaluate the 
legitimacy of different decision-making processes in significantly different ways. 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly compared 






109 Differences in means were tested using paired samples t-tests (two-tailed), with an alpha level of 
.05. 
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6.5 Discussion & Conclusion 
According to deliberative theory, the promotion of deliberation in decision-making is 
crucial for securing the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes. A pollster could 
find out what a representative sample of the population thinks about a particular 
issue, off the top of their heads. Meanwhile, a benevolent dictator could make 
political decisions that people like. In contrast, the purpose of a deliberative mini-
public is to find out the considered preferences of a microcosm of the population in 
order to reach decisions that may not necessarily be widely popular, but that can be 
regarded as legitimate by virtue of the deliberative process through which they have 
been generated. However, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter seems to 
suggest that, in general, deliberation does not make any significant difference to the 
extent to which citizens’ assembly decision-making is perceived to be legitimate, 
irrespective of whether participants engage in a mode of deliberation that is external 
or internal. 
 While deliberative democrats may respond to these overall null effects with a 
mixture of puzzlement and scepticism, it is important that, in true deliberative spirit, 
they are carefully considered in the round. The most perplexing aspect of the results 
is that among those who say they value deliberation as an important democratic 
principle, the addition of deliberation to mini-public decision-making has no positive 
effect on the extent to which they perceive the process to be legitimate. If 
deliberation is particularly important to some individuals, how can its presence not 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of a mini-public compared to one in which 
participants do not formally engage in any active deliberation? The answer likely lies 
in the design of the experiment itself. Recall that in the first condition, respondents 
were told that the members of a citizens’ assembly would engage in two phases of 
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decision-making on a particular issue: first, receiving a comprehensive set of 
information about the issue; and, second, taking a collective decision on the basis of 
that information. Meanwhile, in the other two conditions, respondents were 
presented with a different kind of interactive decision-making process, with 
interaction taking place either physically or in an imagined form. Unlike that of the 
first condition, these two conditions specified a citizens’ assembly in which 
members would engage in a distinct deliberation phase of interactive decision-
making, in between learning about the issue and taking a collective decision. While 
these manipulations were intended to capture the effects of decision-making 
featuring information plus interactive deliberation, relative to decision-making 
featuring only the provision of information to mini-public members (without any 
form of interaction), the effectiveness of the manipulation may have varied across 
different respondents. This is not simply to say that the manipulations had different 
effects on different individuals, which any experiment seeks to establish, but that 
different individuals may have interpreted the manipulations in divergent ways. 
 At the heart of this concern is the extent to which respondents perceived 
interactive deliberation to be entirely absent from the ‘information only’ citizens’ 
assembly described in the first condition. While it made no explicit reference to a 
distinct deliberation phase featuring a form of interaction, it is possible that some 
respondents still imagined that the activity of a citizens’ assembly necessarily 
involves face-to-face group discussion among participants in either the learning or 
decision-taking phases. Given the relative novelty of the concept of a citizens’ 
assembly, this explanation may only be true for a small number of cases. Much more 
likely is the possibility that many respondents took internal deliberation to be an 
inevitable feature of any of the mini-public decision-making processes described, 
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even when the process is reduced to participants simply receiving information and 
subsequently using it to take a decision, without any form of interaction, face-to-face 
or imagined. In other words, it could be hard to imagine that in between receiving a 
comprehensive set of information and taking a decision, decision-makers would not 
be independently weighing up the evidence in their own minds before choosing their 
preferred policy outcome.  
 This interpretation does not appear to have been universal, as demonstrated 
by the significant moderating effect of the perceived importance of deliberation on 
the perceived legitimacy of mini-public decision-making. Individuals for whom 
deliberation is not an important democratic principle were significantly less likely to 
perceive citizens’ assemblies to be legitimate when decision-making included a 
distinct interactive deliberation phase, operationalised through either external or 
internal modes. If these individuals do not care very much about deliberation, 
presumably it would have been easier for these individuals to imagine its relative 
absence from the ‘information only’ condition of the experiment. In contrast, the 
explicit framing of interactive deliberation in the remaining two conditions causes 
these individuals to perceive the deliberative citizens’ assemblies to be significantly 
less legitimate compared to individuals for whom deliberation is an important 
democratic value. 
Further research is, therefore, needed to clarify the overall effect of 
interactive deliberation on the perceived legitimacy of a mini-public decision-
making process. At a minimum, a revised version of the experiments presented in 
this chapter could include a much stricter control condition in which the members of 
a citizens’ assembly do not receive any information before taking a collective 
decision. An ‘information only’ condition could then be understood to facilitate 
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internal deliberation among individual participants, without any interactive element, 
and compared directly against a stripped-back condition in which members do not 
have the opportunity to meaningfully engage in any kind of internal deliberation. A 
different approach could involve the construction of mini-public conditions in which 
key deliberative principles are both promoted and violated. For example, by 
explicitly injecting partisanship, bargaining, or biased information provision, into 
mini-public decision-making, we may obtain a clearer understanding of the extent to 
which high quality deliberation, interactive or otherwise, adds real value to the 
perceived legitimacy of the process. 
 Still, despite the potential inseparability of internal deliberation from 
information provision in an experimental treatment, it is important to recall that the 
former was operationalised in its own right in a rather unconventional fashion: as 
imagined dialogue. Respondents were told that citizens’ assembly members would 
be instructed to “imagine that they are having a conversation with a person from 
another community,” and to use this structured mental simulation to help them each 
reach a decision on the issue in question. The very fact that this process is evaluated 
so similarly to the other conditions is a noteworthy finding. Reflecting solely on its 
effect on legitimacy, it shows that the concept of imagined contact in political 
decision-making is taken seriously by citizens – at least as seriously as decision-
making featuring face-to-face interaction or the mere provision of a balanced range 
of information.  
Beyond academic experiments in social psychology and, more recently, in 
political science, imagined interaction has had limited formal application. And yet, 
in the context of intense political disagreement, previous studies have shown the 
potential for imagined contact to induce opinion shift in the direction of a common 
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ground position, as well as to reduce the attribution of malevolent intentions to 
political opponents (Garry 2016a; Warner and Villamil, 2017). The findings of this 
chapter suggest that if this mode of deliberation were to be formally adopted in mini-
public decision-making, members of the broader public are willing to give it a 
chance. Such flexibility in procedural design may be of great value in contexts where 
direct contact is impractical and/or potentially counter-productive. 
 Indeed, in the deeply divided context of Northern Ireland, we do see a 
significant difference in the way people respond to external versus internal 
deliberation across different levels of ethno-national ideological intensity and 
different community backgrounds. Individuals who are neither unionist nor 
nationalist perceived talk-based discussion to significantly enhance the legitimacy of 
mini-public decision-making, compared to the other modes of decision-making and, 
indeed, compared to respondents who are unionist or nationalist. Among the latter, 
however, talk-based deliberation reduced the extent to which they perceived the 
process to be legitimate. This moderating effect is unsurprising. People with stronger 
ideological views, especially on ethno-nationalism, might imagine that participants 
in a deliberative setting will share similarly strong ideological views. Such a 
gathering, they might envisage, could easily descend into a shouting match, with 
destructive consequences for collective decision-making. On the other hand, if 
people with more moderate ideological views project themselves into such an 
environment, they may envisage participants being open to reason and persuasion, 
fulfilling the underlying goals of deliberative democracy, with constructive 
consequences for collective decision-making.  
Additional research is needed to confirm whether or not this is indeed the 
mechanism explaining the moderating effect of ethno-nationalism on the perceived 
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legitimacy of decision-making featuring external rather than internal deliberation. If 
it is, it is possible that concerns over face-to-face discussion among individuals with 
stronger ideological preferences may be assuaged by practical demonstrations that, 
under carefully designed conditions, deliberation can indeed yield constructive and 
respectful interactions, even when the assembled participants share a diverse range 
of strongly-held views (see Steiner, 2012; Luskin et al. 2014). In the meantime, the 
roughly even level of cross-community support for a citizens’ assembly featuring 
imagined dialogue suggests that such an approach could play a helpful role as a 
rehearsal, in advance of deliberation featuring physical interaction. 
 In sum, this chapter has attempted to answer two questions, both with 
implications for the design of citizens’ assemblies and other forms of deliberative 
mini-public. First, does the presence of deliberation in a mini-public increase the 
perceived legitimacy of decision-making from the maxi-public? The empirical 
evidence suggests that as long as the mini-public members are provided with 
comprehensive and balanced information, a formal, interactive deliberation phase 
makes no significant difference to the perceived legitimacy of decision-making. 
However, the effect of information provision and deliberation requires deeper 
investigation. Second, does the mode of interactive deliberation affect perceived 
legitimacy? Overall, the answer appears to be ‘no’: mini-publics featuring 
deliberation operationalised either externally or internally are perceived as equally 
legitimate at the aggregate level. While this offers considerable flexibility and 
creativity around citizens’ assembly design, variation in attitudes at the individual-
level emphasises the need for a deliberative decision-making process to carefully 






THE PROCESS OF TAKING DECISIONS 
LEGITIMACY AT THE OUTPUT STAGE  




Mission Control: I presume that you’re doing this with the full permission 
and – of the commander. 
Apollo 13: And this – at this moment, who do you think is the commander? 
Radio communication between Mission Control and Apollo 13 Lunar 
Module Pilot Fred Haise, 14 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 381) 
 
 
Once a mini-public produces an output, a decision, where does it go? Should 
statutory authorities declare prior to the taking of the decision that they will be 
bound by it? Or should a mini-public be restricted to producing a recommendation, 
directed elsewhere for a final decision? And, if so, who should take the final 
decision: politicians in a legislature, or voters in a referendum? These are some of 
the most consequential – and sensitive – questions around the design of citizens’ 
assemblies. They address the nature of such a body’s relationship with the broader 
political system: whether it serves to advise other bodies, or whether it has the power 
in its own right to take a policy decision that will be implemented.  
Almost exclusively, citizens’ assemblies are designed to be consultative 
bodies, but is this prototypical practice rooted in public preferences, or is it simply a 
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convention rooted in undue caution? This chapter investigates the degree to which 
the perceived legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly is conditional on its level of power. 
Do citizens themselves see mini-publics as more legitimate when they are 
constrained to make recommendations, rather than binding decisions? If so, why is 
this the case? The chapter begins by setting out the theoretical justification for 
limiting the power of mini-publics to take decisions in their own right. Drawing on 
Fishkin’s principle of non-tyranny, it considers the risk that citizens’ assemblies 
could take ‘bad’ decisions, requiring politicians or the wider electorate to be able to 
step in and help prevent tyrannical outcomes. However, despite the fact that mini-
publics rarely have the power to take binding decisions in practice, the results of an 
experiment presented in this chapter demonstrate that on a salient ethno-national 
issue, overall, a citizens’ assembly with such power is perceived to be just as 
legitimate as one that is limited to making recommendations. Crucially, the 
perceived legitimacy of such an arrangement is particularly high among individuals 
who value the promotion of non-tyranny in democratic decision-making. The chapter 
concludes by considering the implications of these findings for the design of mini-
publics, particularly those in deeply divided settings. 
 
7.1  Promoting Non-Tyranny 
In addition to the promotion of political equality and deliberation in decision-
making, Fishkin insists that the decisions resulting from a democratic process must 
be non-tyrannical. Here, a tyrannical outcome is understood as “the choice of policy 
that imposes severe deprivations when an alternative policy could have been chosen 
that would have imposed no severe deprivations on anyone” (Fishkin, 1991: 34). The 
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basic concern is straightforward: even if decision-makers generate policies in a 
democratic fashion, they are still capable of, as Fishkin (2009: 60) bluntly puts it, 
doing “bad things.” Tyrannical decisions are not simply those that could be regarded 
as unacceptable or undesirable by certain individuals, but ones that violate their 
essential interests, such as their human rights, when an alternative outcome was 
possible. They can arguably be best understood with reference to societal groups, 
possessing either majority or minority status. Majority tyranny occurs when one 
group is able to take decisions that systematically discriminate against the basic 
interests of a minority community, in favour of furthering the interests of the 
majority group. Under the old unionist regime in Northern Ireland, for example, one 
party was able to exercise power for almost half a century. With a perpetual majority 
of votes and legislative seats, historical evidence shows that the Ulster Unionist 
Party government enabled decision-making to benefit the majority Protestant 
community and, over time, neglected basic interests of the minority Catholic 
community (see Whyte, 1983).110 
 Counter-intuitively, Fishkin argues that tyrannical outcomes can also arise 
from the choices of a minority. If a minority group were able to veto a course of 
action favoured by a majority of citizens, and if this non-decision violated people’s 
basic interests when such harm could have been avoided, Fishkin (2009: 62) holds 
that “policy omission as well as commission” (original emphasis) can produce 
tyrannical consequences. For example, under Northern Ireland’s contemporary 
consociational model of government, critics have suggested that low veto thresholds 
allow a minority group to block reasonable policies that have no discriminatory 
effect on the rival group’s interests. When the exercise of such vetoes results in 																																																								
110 Examples of discrimination included the gerrymandering of electoral districts (mainly at the local 
government level), and systematic inequalities in public employment, policing, housing allocation, 
and regional development policies (Whyte, 1983). 
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gridlock, and even the collapse of devolved government, it could be argued that the 
basic interests of all citizens are jeopardised, irrespective of group identity.111 
 Whereas political equality and deliberation are democratic values that can be 
promoted within the procedural design of a decision-making process, the principle of 
non-tyranny differs in that it concerns the substantive outcome(s) of a process. For 
Fishkin, deliberative democracy makes an explicit commitment to political equality 
and deliberation, but is essentially agnostic when it comes to the avoidance of 
tyranny. Leaving open the definition of the severe deprivations that are consequent 
to tyrannical decisions, the challenge for democratic institutional design is to 
minimise the likelihood of such decisions, to the extent that they are perceived as 
fundamentally unjust, from arising in the first place.112 Notably, as expressed by 
Hamilton in the Federalist No. 78, the framers of the US Constitution intended for a 
strong, independent judicial system to guard against “serious oppressions” of 
individuals, particularly those from a minority group (Hamilton, 1788). They also 
intended for multiple institutions to hold each other to account, constituting a process 
of checks and balances seminally articulated by Madison in the Federalist No. 63. In 
the event that the House of Representatives reached a discriminatory decision based 
on the numerical strength of a majority faction, the Senate, designed to be a more 
deliberative body and less prone to factional influence, was to serve as a “defence to 
the people against their own temporary errors and delusions” (Madison, 1788).  
																																																								
111 For example, a report produced by Deloitte highlights “huge challenges” across the public sector 
in Northern Ireland, with political and economic difficulties “exacerbated by the absence of 
(government) Ministers” (Deloitte, 2018: 3). The lack of strategic decision-making is argued to have 
an adverse effect on health, education, justice and housing, as well as the broader economy. 
112 Fishkin generally avoids an attempt to define the severe deprivations that constitute tyranny: “We 
can leave open the exact definition of severe deprivations but specify that the more severe they are, 
and the more clearly avoidable they are, the more compelling is the case of majority (or minority) 
tyranny” (Fishkin, 2009: 64). 
		 205 
When considering the potential role of mini-publics in a political system, and 
the nature of their decisions, a strong argument for them to be given a prominent role 
is precisely that their decisions are the product of deliberation among a 
representative group of the population. 113  In this sense, the very process of 
deliberation may help to reduce the likelihood that the considered judgements of a 
mini-public will impose severe deprivations on any particular group – similar to the 
rationale for the Senate. Significantly, however, when it comes to matters of ordinary 
legislation, the deliberative decisions of the US Senate are not unilateral. Just as its 
decisions feed into a system of checks and balances, the appropriate status of mini-
public decisions must be considered against the requirements and logic of the 
broader system in which they sit. 
 
7.2  Mini-Public Decisions 
In almost all circumstances, deliberative mini-publics are understood to be 
consultative bodies, even when they are explicitly coupled to the state.114 That is, 
when a statutory body commissions a mini-public in which citizens learn about a 
specified issue, the members engage with the relevant evidence and arguments, they 
weigh up the possible options according to a pre-defined remit, and they produce a 
recommendation or set of recommendations for the commissioning body to consider. 
The output of the mini-public, thus, carries an advisory status: it can either be 
accepted or rejected, and so there is no guarantee that (a) mini-public decision(s) will 
ultimately be implemented. The authority to take a legally binding decision lies 																																																								
113 For a dissenting normative argument, see Lafont (2015). 
114 For the purposes of this research, our attention will focus on mini-publics that are commissioned 
by the state. Sometimes it is desirable for mini-publics to be sponsored by (a) civil society 
organisation(s), rather than by the state. See Kuyper and Wolkenstein (2018) for a useful typology. 
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elsewhere in the political system through established procedures. Such an 
arrangement may minimise the risk of tyrannical outcomes, but it may also give 
political elites the opportunity to override any decisions with which they disagree.  
 If a prototypical decision-taking process exists for citizens’ assembly 
recommendations, the modal global experience has been for their advisory decisions 
to be put to a referendum. This way, all voters in the given jurisdiction have the 
opportunity to endorse or reject the considered decision recommended by their 
fellow citizens in a mini-public. When British Columbia’s provincial government 
proposed a citizens’ assembly on electoral reform in 2003 (the BCCA), its terms of 
reference were unanimously passed by the provincial legislature. Under this clear 
mandate, it was agreed that any decision taken by the BCCA “must be made by a 
vote of the majority” of its members, and that its final report should be presented to 
the province’s Attorney General “for tabling in the Legislative Assembly” 
(Government of British Columbia, 2003: 1). On top of its terms of reference, the 
legislation underpinning the BCCA specified that, unless the body decided to 
maintain the status quo, any recommended change to the electoral system must be 
put to all eligible voters in a province-wide referendum. The government would be 
legally bound to introduce legislation giving effect to an affirmative referendum 
result – provided at least 60 percent of voters endorsed the citizens’ assembly 
recommendation, and that it was supported by a majority of voters in at least 60 
percent of the province’s electoral districts. 
In the end, the final report of the BCCA in 2004 did recommend changing 
British Columbia’s electoral system, from a Single Member Plurality System to the 
Single Transferable Vote (Warren and Pearse, 2008). In line with the commissioning 
		 207 
legislation, a referendum was held six months later.115 While 58 percent of voters 
endorsed the BCCA recommendation, on a respectable turnout of 62 percent, the 
level of support fell short of the super-majority threshold that had been set under the 
original legislation. 116  Before and after the referendum, there were plenty of 
criticisms of this super-majority threshold (Ruff, 2004; Pilon, 2010). However, the 
fundamental point remains: had the referendum passed, under the pre-defined 
criteria, the government was legally bound to introduce legislation giving effect to 
the citizens’ assembly recommendation. This leads Warren (2008: 69) to classify the 
BCCA as a formally “empowered” decision-making venue, distinct from a purely 
advisory forum. 
 In the Republic of Ireland, we observe a slightly different process. While the 
government was not legally bound in advance to put mini-public decisions to a 
national referendum, of the recommendations that it chose to put to a popular vote, 
most were endorsed and subsequently implemented. In 2012, the Irish government 
established a Constitutional Convention to consider eight selected issues.117 Three of 
the Convention’s final proposals were put to a national referendum: the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage, the removal of the ban on blasphemy from the Irish 
Constitution, and a reduction in the minimum age for candidacy in presidential 
elections. Two of the proposals were decisively endorsed: 62 percent of voters 
agreed with the Convention’s recommendation to legalise same-sex marriage, while 																																																								
115 After the BCCA presented its report to the Attorney General in December 2004,  “Should British 
Columbia change to the BC-STV electoral system as recommended by the Citizens' Assembly on 
Electoral Reform? [Yes/No].” 
116 British Columbia’s Electoral Reform Referendum Act (2004) also required that, in order for the 
result to be binding on the provincial government, the proposal must be supported by a majority of 
voters in at least 60 percent (or 48) of the province’s 79 electoral districts. This threshold was met in 
the referendum itself: a majority of valid votes supported the citizens’ assembly’s proposed reform in 
77 out of 79 districts. 
117 The agenda of the Convention also included: reducing the voting age to 17, reviewing the electoral 
system, extending the franchise in presidential elections to Irish citizens living abroad, amending the 
Irish Constitution’s clause on the role of women, and increasing women’s participation in politics. 
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65 percent supported removing the constitutional ban on blasphemy. 118  The 
Convention’s recommendation to reduce the minimum age for 35 to 21 for 
candidates standing for Irish presidency was rejected by 75 percent of the 
electorate.119 In 2016, the Irish government commissioned a second deliberative 
mini-public, the Irish Citizens’ Assembly, to consider a further set of five specified 
issues. It subsequently put one of its recommendations – to repeal and replace a 
constitutional ban on abortion – to a national referendum, in which the proposition 
was endorsed by 65 percent of voters.120 Recommendations on the other four topics 
considered by the Citizens’ Assembly were submitted in reports to the Irish 
Parliament, as per the terms under which the body was established, but to date these 
have not been put to a national referendum.  
The Irish case, therefore, highlights the authority of the commissioning body, 
the government, in setting the agenda and ultimately controlling the status of any of 
its outcomes. However, it also highlights the potentially powerful legitimating effect 
of popular referendums. None of the Irish mini-public recommendations have been 
approved without the endorsement of a majority of voters, and the decision of each 
referendum held on a mini-public recommendation has been, or is in the process of 
being, implemented by the Irish government. At the very least, in this sense, mini-
publics have played a consequential co-decision-making role in Ireland, alongside 
politicians and voters. 
 Another model of mini-public design limits participation in the subsequent 
taking of decisions to political elites, without any formal consultation of the wider 
electorate in a referendum. In 2018, two parliamentary committees of the British 																																																								
118 These referendums were held on two separate dates: the former took place on 22 May 2015 (the 
year after the work of the Convention ended); the latter occurred three years later, on 26 October 
2018. 
119 This vote was held concurrently with the referendum on the legalisation of same-sex marriage. 
120 See Field (2018) for an overview of the referendum. 
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House of Commons co-commissioned a citizens’ assembly to consider the politically 
sensitive topic of social care.121 The chairpersons of the committees, Dr Sarah 
Wollaston MP and Clive Betts MP, jointly explained their decision to initiate a mini-
public of this kind: “We strongly believe that the public needs to be involved in 
answering these questions and decisions about a sustainable way of funding social 
care” (Involve, 2018a: 4). It was the first time in the UK that a citizens’ assembly 
had been formally established by Parliament, and MPs seemed impressed with both 
the process and its outcomes: the committees’ joint 80-page report on the future of 
social care funding made 48 references to the mini-public’s recommendations 
(House of Commons, 2018a). 122   Under British parliamentary procedure, the 
government normally issues a formal response to a committee report. In this 
instance, a formal response has not yet been released. While the government is under 
no statutory obligation to endorse the recommendations of parliamentary 
committees, recent systematic analysis has found that approximately half go on to be 
implemented (Benton and Russell, 2013). Under this model, it is therefore unclear as 
to whether or not citizens’ assembly decisions are ultimately adopted; it is clear that, 
no matter how compelling they may be in their own right, their outputs are purely 
advisory. 
 In contrast, certain decisions of a mini-public in Gdańsk have been binding 
on the municipal government. After severe flooding repeatedly caused damage to the 
city, a citizens’ assembly was established to consider potential changes to local 
planning policies that could help prevent any recurrence of the problem. The Mayor 																																																								
121 The Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee and the Health and Social Care 
Committee jointly commissioned the mini-public. 
122 A number of academic-led initiatives have been held previously in the UK. Citizens’ assemblies 
were held in the North and South of England respectively on democratic reform in 2015, organised by 
a team of researchers and civil society organisations (see Flinders et al. 2016). A further citizens’ 
assembly was held in 2017 to consider the issues arising from the UK’s planned departure from the 
European Union (see Renwick et al. 2018). 
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of Gdańsk agreed in advance of the establishment of the citizens’ assembly that its 
decisions would be implemented, provided they received the support of at least 80 
percent of members (Gerwin, 2018). Any decisions that received support below this 
super-majority threshold were treated as suggestions for consideration, but with no 
prior commitment from the municipal government that they would be adopted. 
However, even when the 80 percent threshold was met, there was no legal basis 
compelling the municipal government to adopt the proposals. Implementation relied 
on a political commitment from a sympathetic mayor and his personal endorsement 
of the process. He retained the authority to ignore the body’s decisions, even those 
commanding an 80 percent super-majority, if he was in strong enough disagreement 
with any of its substantive outcomes. Still, even without de jure authority, the 
Gdańsk case illustrates the potential for citizens’ assemblies to take decisions that 
are de facto binding. 
 
7.2.1  Hypotheses 
Consistent with the studies in Chapters Five and Six, we take as our departure point 
the expectation that a prototypical model of citizens’ assembly decision-making will 
be regarded as more legitimate than models that deviate from established processes. 
Accordingly, a citizens’ assembly with the power to make a recommendation should 
be seen as more legitimate than one possessing the power to take a binding decision 
in its own right. More specifically, a process in which the recommendation is put to 
all voters in a referendum – the most common arrangement – is likely to be seen as 
more legitimate than one in which politicians accept or reject the recommendation. 
The first hypothesis, therefore, has two related elements: 
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H1a: The perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making is highest 
when it has the power to make a recommendation, rather than to take a 
binding decision. 
 
H1b: Perceived legitimacy will be higher when the recommendation is put to a 
referendum, rather than to political representatives. 
 
To move beyond conventional practice and deeper into democratic theory, we must 
consider the normative justification for a co-decision-making process, at least 
according to Fishkin’s logic: to help avoid tyrannical outcomes. If a mini-public 
were established with the authority to take binding decisions of its own, there would 
be no other body to serve as a check on its decisions. Among those who think it is 
particularly important that democratic decisions that do not unfairly discriminate 
against certain groups, it is reasonable to expect that they would prefer an additional 
level of decision-making to help minimise the risk of that a simple majority of 
citizens’ assembly members would take a decision with tyrannical consequences for 
a minority. Moreover, given the majoritarian nature of referendums, it is likely that 
these individuals would prefer this sanctioning role to be performed by professional 
politicians, operating within institutional constraints, rather than the mass public: 
 
H2a: Among individuals who value non-tyranny as a democratic principle, the 
perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making will be 
particularly low when it has the power to take a binding decision. 
 
H2b: For these individuals, perceived legitimacy will be particularly high when it 
has the power to make a recommendation, especially a recommendation to 
political representatives over a referendum. 
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However, Fishkin points out that tyranny can be the consequence of policy non-
decisions, as well as substantive decisions. If the existing political system already 
contains too many veto points, allowing one ideological perspective to block 
reasonable decisions, tyrannical outcomes may arise precisely because there are too 
many layers through which decisions must pass. In Chapter Three we observed that 
Northern Ireland’s consociational system allows unionist or nationalist political 
parties to effectively block decisions, whereas those lacking a strong ethno-national 
position are left without such veto power. Therefore, individuals with a more 
moderate ethno-national outlook are more likely to feel threatened by non-decision-
making caused by ethno-national vetoes, and less likely to feel threatened by a more 
expedient decision-making process that denies a veto based on ideological 
designation: 
 
H3a: Among individuals with a moderate, rather than a strong, ethno-national 
ideology, the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-making will 
be particularly high when it has the power either to take a binding decision 
or to make a recommendation to be put to a referendum. 
 
H3b: For these individuals, legitimacy will be particularly low when it has the 
power to make a recommendation to political representatives. 
 
Still, when it comes to societal groups in a deeply divided place, the group 
traditionally in the minority is likely to prefer an additional check on decisions made 
by the majority – even if it is a majority decision based on the considered 
preferences of a deliberative mini-public. In Northern Ireland, this leads us to expect 
that Catholic citizens will be more wary of a citizens’ assembly with the power to 
take binding decisions, or with the ability to make a recommendation subject to the 
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endorsement of a simple majority of voters in a referendum. In contrast, Protestant 
citizens are expected to be less fearful of majority tyranny, and so should be 
generally more supportive of processes that enable a final decision to be taken by a 
simple majority of fellow citizens, either in the context of a mini-public or in a 
referendum:  
 
H4a: Among Catholics, the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-
making will be particularly high when it has the power to make a 
recommendation, especially a recommendation to political representatives 
over a referendum.  
 
H4b: Among Protestants, the perceived legitimacy of citizens’ assembly decision-
making will be particularly high when it has the power either to take a 
binding decision or to make a recommendation to be put to a referendum. 
 
7.3 Study One 
7.3.1  Data & Method 
A non-random sample of 254 adults was recruited from an online panel of 40,000 
members across the UK. A series of screening questions ensured that only residents 
of Northern Ireland were directed to a 10-minute online survey hosted by Opinium; 
non-residents were filtered out or directed to other surveys for which they were 
eligible. The study was conducted in late February and early March of 2018, in 
parallel to the process of recruitment and data collection for the initial studies 
reported in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. Respondents could only participate in a 
single study. Each participant received £0.50 in credit to their account as members of 
the survey panel.  
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Nature of Citizens’ Assembly Decision 
[1] 
Binding decision by the 
citizens’ assembly itself 
[2]  
Recommendation to be 
put to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly 
[3] PROTOTYPICAL 
Recommendation to be put 
to all voters in a referendum 
Table 7.1: Summary of experimental conditions in Study One 
 
 
The final sample was largely male (71 percent), but sufficiently diverse on the key 
variable of community background: 42 percent of respondents were Protestant, 33 
percent Catholic, and 21 percent of respondents identified their community 
background with another or no religion. The average age was 47.1 years (SD = 14.6 
years). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups, each of which 
received a different version of the survey. An opening vignette described how a 
citizens’ assembly might hypothetically operate in the context of Northern Ireland, 
with the nature of the body’s decision power manipulated for each group. Table 7.1 
summarises the three conditions of the survey experiment. 
In the first condition, presented to Group [1], respondents were told that the 
decision of the citizens’ assembly would be binding. In other words, although the 
citizens’ assembly would not formally have the legal authority to take decisions in 
the way that the Northern Ireland Assembly does, its statutory commissioning body 
would accept in advance to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly.123 
Respondents assigned to the other two conditions were told that the citizens’ 
assembly would only be able to make a recommendation, either to be put to 
politicians in the Northern Ireland Assembly (for respondents in Group [2]) or to all 																																																								
123 In this condition the word ‘final’ is used to describe the decision. While no policy decision in a 
democratic political system can technically be protected from being overturned at a later point in 
time, the word ‘final’ is used simply to convey to respondents that no other body would subsequently 
reject the decision of the citizens’ assembly in this context; that the decision amounts to more than a 
recommendation. 
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voters in a referendum (for respondents in Group [3]). In the present experiment, the 
third citizens’ assembly condition is taken as the prototypical process of taking 
decisions. The manipulated text is shown in italics (see Appendix E for the three 
individual vignettes):  
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
On the specific issue of an Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
[ { The decision would be final. In other words, politicians would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it. } 
{ The decision would be a recommendation that would be put to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly. In other words, politicians would have the final 
say on whether or not to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly. } 
{ The decision would be a recommendation that would be put to all voters 
in a referendum. In other words, all citizens would have the final say on 
whether or not to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly. 
Politicians would agree in advance to implement this result. } ] 
 
Note that while respondents were not presented with a specific decision, each 
condition did narrowly define the issue at stake: Irish language policy. By 
controlling for the type of issue being considered by the citizens’ assembly, the 
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degree of issue salience was consistent across the three conditions.124 By selecting 
the particular issue of Irish language policy, the study also maintains consistency 
with the survey experiment on decision acceptance in Chapter Four. 
 Respondents could only proceed to the survey items after spending at least 30 
seconds on the screen containing the vignette. They were then asked to indicate their 
reaction to the hypothetical citizens’ assembly based on what they had read about it. 
Replicating the measurement of the outcome variable in the studies presented in 
Chapters Five and Six, respondents evaluated the citizens’ assembly on a series of 
ten items, each with the same seven-point scale.125 A mean score from the multi-item 
scale provided an overall measure of perceived legitimacy. Respondents’ perceptions 
on the extent to which the process was fair, trustworthy, democratic, efficient, even-
handed, acceptable, good, competent, supportable, and credible were equally 
weighted.126 The final ten-item scale was unidimensional with a high degree of 
internal consistency (α = .97).127 In the analysis that follows, the scale is calibrated to 
run from 0 to 6 to facilitate interpretation. One question was embedded in the survey 
as a manipulation check, asking respondents to recall the nature of the decision 
mentioned in the vignette.128 
																																																								
124 Other elements of citizens’ assembly design are held constant across the three conditions, 
including the selection of members and the (narrowly specified) process of deliberation. 
125 The full wording of the question was: “Imagine the way in which a citizens’ assembly would deal 
with a political issue. As a way of making a decision, to what extent do you think this process would 
be … fair or unfair; trustworthy or untrustworthy; democratic or undemocratic; efficient or 
inefficient; even-handed or discriminatory; acceptable or unacceptable; good or bad; competent or 
incompetent; supportable or unsupportable; credible or not credible?” For each of the ten items there 
were seven response options on a bipolar scale, for example: ‘extremely’ (fair), ‘mostly’ (fair), 
‘slightly’ (fair), ‘neither’ (fair nor unfair), ‘slightly’ (unfair), ‘mostly’ (unfair), and ‘extremely’ 
(unfair). See Appendix E for the full questionnaire. 
126 See Chapter Five for a more detailed discussion on the construction of the multi-item scale 
measuring perceived legitimacy, including an explanation of the items included and excluded. 
127 For factor analysis and reliability statistics, refer to Appendix H.  
128 After respondents answered questions measuring to the outcome variable, they were asked, “How 
is the decision of the citizens’ assembly described?” The response options were ‘the decision would 
be final’, ‘the decision would be a recommendation that would be put to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly’ and ‘the decision would be a recommendation that would be put to all voters in a 
referendum’. 
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Potential moderators of the relationship between the nature of citizens’ 
assembly decisions and perceived legitimacy were measured with single survey 
items. Ethno-national ideology was recorded on a standard five-point bipolar scale; 
respondents indicated their community background from a familiar set of nominal 
categories. The survey also captured support for the democratic value of non-
tyranny, measured on a five-point unipolar scale on which respondents indicated the 
extent to which they think it is important “that decisions do not discriminate against 
a particular group.” In the context of taking decisions, the simple wording of the 
question captures the essence of non-tyranny without introducing the relatively 
abstract (and, therefore, potentially unclear) term itself. The full list of questions and 
response categories can be found in Appendix E. 
 
7.3.2  Results 
As Figure 7.1 illustrates, a prototypical citizens’ assembly making a 
recommendation on Irish language policy, to be put to voters in a referendum, 
received the highest mean legitimacy score (M =3.50, SD = 1.50). A citizens’ 
assembly making a recommendation to the Northern Ireland Assembly received a 
similar score (M = 3.45, SD = 1.56). A citizens’ assembly taking a binding decision 
on Irish language policy was evaluated slightly less positively, with a mean 
legitimacy score of 3.13 (SD = 1.84). However, the overall effect of decision-taking 
process on the outcome variable across the experimental conditions is not 








So far, this analysis constitutes an inadequate test of the main hypotheses, H1a and 
H1b. Unlike the initial studies presented in Chapters Five and Six, Table 7.2 shows 
that a majority of respondents passed the manipulation check in each condition. 
However, the overall pass rate of 63 percent cannot be described as resounding, and 
the distribution of pass rates varied across the experimental groups; χ2 (2, N = 254) = 
5.26, p < .10. In Group [1], most respondents correctly reported that the citizens’ 
assembly decision would be final but a significant minority (46 percent) responded 
that it would be a recommendation. In Groups [2] and [3] the pass rate was much 
higher: nearly 70 percent of respondents recognised the decision to be a 
recommendation to be put either to the Northern Ireland Assembly or to a 
referendum, as appropriate. However, even in these groups, nearly one in four 
















Pass 53.6 69.0 67.4 63.4 
Fail 46.4 31.0 32.6 36.6 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 7.2: Respondents passing or failing manipulation checks in Study One (%) 		
	
Figure 7.2: Responses to the manipulation check: “How is the decision of the 
citizens’ assembly described?” 
 
 
The substantive conclusion holds when respondents failing the manipulation check 
are dropped from the analysis, leaving 161 valid cases.129 However, excluding 93 
respondents from the analysis reduces statistical power, increasing the probability of 
making a Type II error. Moreover, the uneven distribution of pass rates across the 
experimental conditions is problematic. Therefore, before accepting the null 																																																								
129 See Tables A24 and A25 in Appendix H for alternative analyses. 
û		 û		 û		 û		û		 û		ü		 ü		 ü		
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hypothesis, it would be preferable to repeat the experiment with discernible 
modifications to the manipulations. Above all, a more effective experiment would 
need to better emphasise the binding nature of the citizens’ assembly decision in the 
first condition. The remaining manipulations should be as clear as possible on the 
destination of the recommendations of a citizens’ assembly, avoiding confusion 
among respondents as to whether the decision proceeds to either the Northern 
Ireland Assembly or to all voters in a referendum. Replicating the iterative approach 
adopted in Chapters Five and Six, this initial study is repeated and refined. 
 
7.4 Study Two 
7.4.1  Data & Method 
In a follow-up study, 291 participants were recruited from an online panel hosted by 
LucidTalk – in parallel to the follow-up experiments presented in Chapters Six and 
Seven.130 Data collection took place in the first week of June 2018; as a standard 
incentive, all panel members who took part in the study earned reward points that 
they could subsequently redeem in regular prize draws. The non-random sample 
contained a healthy distribution across categories of community background: 46 
percent of respondents came from a Catholic background, 33 percent from a 
Protestant background, and 19 percent did not identify their background with either 
of the two communities. While Catholic respondents were over-represented in the 
sample, as were male respondents (at 78 percent), such a demographic skew is 
relatively unproblematic given the experimental design of the study.  
																																																								
130 The panel is hosted by LucidTalk, a survey company based in Northern Ireland. Participants were 
recruited to this experiment in parallel to Study Two in Chapter Five and Study Two in Chapter Six. 
Participants were randomly assigned to only one condition across all three experiments, meaning that 
it was not possible to participate in more than one of the parallel experiments. 
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The experiment is designed such that it broadly replicates Study One. The same 
vignettes are used in the three respective conditions, to which respondents were 
randomly assigned; the outcome variable was measured using the same multi-item 
scale of legitimacy; 131 the hypothesised moderating variables of the perceived 
importance of non-tyranny, ethno-national identity, and community background 
were measured using the same survey instruments; and respondents were still asked 
to evaluate the decision-making process of the Northern Ireland Assembly on the 
same items on which they evaluated the decision-making process of the respective 
citizens’ assembly presented.132  
Where the second experiment differs is with respect to the presentation of 
each manipulation and the placement of the manipulation check associated with it. 
Echoing the follow-up experiments in Chapters Six and Seven, an infographic was 
created for each condition, taking the form of a simple flow-chart. Unlike the 
infographics used in experiments of the previous chapters, the infographics of this 
study rely heavily on text (see Figure 7.3). However, the visualisation of the 
decision-taking steps helps to reinforce the key elements of their sequential nature. 
Immediately after being presented with the vignette and accompanying infographic, 
respondents were asked to recall the nature of the citizens’ assembly decision: would 
it be final, would it be a recommendation to be put to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, or would it be a recommendation to be put to all voters in a referendum? 
If a respondent gave an incorrect response, he or she was informed and prompted to 
return to the page containing the vignette and infographic. 																																																								
131 There was a slight change of wording for one of the items: instead of being asked the extent to 
which respondents thought the process described would be ‘credible’ or ‘not credible’, they were 
asked the extent to which they thought it would be ‘credible’ or ‘uncredible’. The latter is not a 
commonly used word, but it is easily comprehendible. 
132 In both studies, respondents were asked to, “Think about the Northern Ireland Assembly at 
Stormont.” For Study Two the words, “when it is functioning,” were added to emphasise the 








































7.4.2  Results 
A high proportion of respondents passed the manipulation check in each of the 
experimental conditions (see Figure 7.4). In Group [1], 91 percent of respondents 
correctly reported that the citizens’ assembly decision was described as final; in 
Group [2], 92 percent reported that it would be a recommendation put to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly; and in Group [3], 91 percent reported that it would be a 
recommendation to be put to a referendum. The overall pass rate of 91 percent was 
uniform across all three groups, indicating no significant differences in the ability of 
respondents to identify the manipulated feature of each decision-taking process 
described (χ2 (2, N = 291) = .15, p = .93). In the analysis that follows, only those 
passing the manipulation check are included.133 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Responses to the manipulation check: “How is the decision of the 
citizens’ assembly described?” 																																																								
133 This leaves 265 valid cases in total. An alternative analysis was conducted on the full sample of 
291 participants and is presented in Appendix H. The two analyses yield the same overall conclusions. 
û	 û	 û	 û	û	 û	ü		 ü	 ü	
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Figure 7.5: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly 
 
 
Overall, the nature of citizens’ assembly decision-taking has no direct effect on the 
perceived legitimacy of the process, at least under the specific conditions of this 
experiment (F(2, 262) = 2.00, p = 1.38). Respondents perceived a process in which a 
citizens’ assembly took a binding decision on an Irish language policy (M = 3.34, SD 
= 1.74) to be just as legitimate as a prototypical process featuring a recommendation 
to be put to voters in a referendum (M = 3.69, SD = 1.68). However, as Figure 7.5 
illustrates, a process in which a citizens’ assembly makes a recommendation to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly was regarded as the least legitimate model (M = 3.18, SD 
= 1.72). Compared to the prototypical model, the mean legitimacy score for this 
model is significantly lower (albeit at the p < .10 level). The first hypothesis is, 
therefore, only partially rejected. 
 Alongside this aggregate result, the experiment yielded a significant 
moderating effect at the individual level. Respondents were asked on the extent to 
which they thought it was important that decisions should be taken in accordance  
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Figure 7.6: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly, by 
perceived importance of non-tyranny 
 
 
with the democratic principle of non-tyranny.134 Among the large proportion of 
respondents who considered it to be mostly or very important that decisions do not 
discriminate against a particular group, the prototypical decision-taking process 
received the highest mean legitimacy score (M = 3.84, SD = 1.68), providing some 
evidence in support of H2b. However, the mean score is not significantly lower 
when the citizens’ assembly has the power to take a binding decision (M = 3.41; SD 
= 1.67), causing us to reject H2a. In contrast, as Figure 8.6 shows, the perceived 
legitimacy of a citizens’ assembly was significantly lower among these individuals 
when it produced a recommendation for the Northern Ireland Assembly (M = 3.17, 
SD = 1.76). Among individuals who placed less importance on the democratic  
																																																								
134 When asked how important it was “that decisions do not discriminate against a particular group,” 
the vast majority of respondents (90 percent) said it was ‘mostly’ or ‘very’ important. The remaining 
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principle of non-tyranny, it was precisely this decision-taking process that was 
perceived to be most legitimate (M = 3.24, SD = 1.40). A process involving a 
citizens’ assembly producing a recommendation to be put to a referendum – the 
prototypical model – received a lower mean legitimacy score by one unit compared 
to those who value non-tyranny as an important decision-taking principle (M = 2.83, 
SD = 1.73). This difference in the magnitude of the effect across these two levels is 
significant (at the p < .10 level).135  
 A moderating effect was also tested for different levels of ethno-national 
ideology. Those identifying as neither unionist nor nationalist consistently perceived 
each model of citizens’ assembly to be more legitimate than individuals identifying 
as unionist or nationalist. (see Figure 7.7). The former group of individuals scored  
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each model on the upper end of the 7-point legitimacy scale, on average; the latter 
group of individuals converged around the midpoint (recalling that 0 represents the 
lowest possible score, 6 the highest). However, the magnitude of these individual-
level differences does not vary significantly across the experimental conditions, thus 
disconfirming H3a and H3b.  
Perhaps even more strikingly, the mean legitimacy scores for Protestant and 
Catholic respondents did not vary between or within the experimental groups; the 
two groups are indistinguishable in Figure 7.8.136 It had been hypothesised that 
members of a traditional minority community would perceive decision-taking 
processes differently to members of a traditional majority community, with the  																																																								
136 Among Catholic respondents, the mean legitimacy scores were 3.31 (SD = 1.78) in Group [1], 3.17 
(SD = 1.82) in Group [2], and 3.50 (SD = 1.88) in Group [3]. Among Protestant respondents, 
perceived legitimacy averaged 3.30 (SD = 1.75) in Group [1], 3.11 (SD = 1.79) in Group [2], and 3.51 
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Figure 7.9: Mean legitimacy scores of each model of citizens’ assembly compared 
to mean legitimacy scores for the Northern Ireland Assembly 
 
 
former (Catholic respondents) perceiving a recommendation for the Northern Ireland 
Assembly to be most legitimate process and the latter (Protestant respondents) to 
perceive a recommendation for a referendum to be a particularly legitimate mode of 
taking decisions. This is clearly not the case, and so H4a and H4b are rejected. 
With only a modest direct effect at the aggregate level, and with only one 
significant moderating effect at the individual level, a further test of the robustness 
of the experiment is necessary – beyond an initial check to establish whether or not 
respondents successfully identified the key manipulation of each experimental 
condition. As a point of reference, respondents were asked to consider the way in 
which the Northern Ireland Assembly makes decisions (when it is functioning), and 
to evaluate its process of reaching decisions on the same multi-item scale on which 
respondents had evaluated the model of citizens’ assembly described in each 
condition. Figure 7.9 presents the mean scores for the citizens’ assembly and 
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Northern Ireland Assembly alongside each other. Consistent with the lack of any 
theoretical basis for a relationship between this second outcome variable and the 
manipulated variable, it shows the absence of variation in the mean legitimacy scores 
for the Northern Ireland Assembly across each group. Crucially, however, we do see 
significant and consistent variation in the mean legitimacy scores for the Northern 
Ireland Assembly against each model of citizens’ assembly. This mirrors the 
findings of Chapters Six and Seven, and adds a considerable weight of reassurance 
that respondents meaningfully engaged with the task of evaluation. Once again, we 
have good reason to expect that citizens’ assemblies can add value to the perceived 
legitimacy of the democratic process in Northern Ireland. 	
7.5 Discussion & Conclusion 
The central goal of this thesis is to investigate the potential for deliberative mini-
publics to strengthen the democratic quality of a political system – not by replacing 
existing institutions, but by complementing them. This chapter has addressed a 
simple, yet fundamental, question: if a citizens’ assembly were to be established 
alongside existing institutions, how much authority should it have, in its own right, 
for it to be considered a legitimate element of the democratic process? Based purely 
on real-world practice to date, the resounding answer would appear to be ‘not very 
much’ – providing some reassurance to critics of mini-publics (see Lafont, 2015). 
Beyond Ancient Greece, modern citizens’ assemblies have generally only had the 
power to produce recommendations, albeit with the qualified exception of the 
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Gdańsk Citizens’ Assembly.137 Instead, their generally non-binding outputs have 
been used to inform those with the authority to take decisions – either elected 
representatives in a legislature or voters in a referendum. From the perspective of 
citizens themselves, however, this caution around the decision power of citizens’ 
assemblies appears to be excessive. The evidence presented in this chapter shows 
that a process in which a citizens’ assembly has the power to take a binding decision 
on a contested issue is perceived to be just as legitimate as one in which it has the 
(limited) power to make a recommendation. 
 This finding is particularly significant in the context of a deeply divided 
polity, where part of the rationale for establishing a citizens’ assembly in the first 
place may be precisely to help unlock gridlock – non-decision-making – in other 
parts of the political system. In Northern Ireland, contestation over Irish language 
legislation has contributed to the collapse of the devolved legislature and power-
sharing government, as well as the protracted difficulty in restoring them. If political 
parties continue to be unable to reach a substantive agreement on the issue, after a 
repeated series of negotiations, they may eventually reach a collective conclusion 
that another decision-making vehicle, such as a citizens’ assembly, is needed to 
settle the issue and break the impasse. In such a scenario, it would be logical for the 
parties to agree in advance to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly, 
irrespective of the decision itself. If there were no such binding commitment to begin 
with, there would be a significant risk that the political parties would simply ignore 
any proposal emerging from the citizens’ assembly, at least those parties ending up 
in substantive disagreement with its considered recommendation.  
																																																								
137 Recall that the decisions of the Gdańsk Citizens’ Assembly were only considered binding if they 
were supported by at least 80 percent of its members, and that this decision rule was based on a 
political commitment by the city’s mayor as opposed to any formal legal requirement. 
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Similarly, if the mini-public recommendation were put to all voters in a 
referendum, there is a risk that political parties would still ignore the decision. 
Taking this avenue, perhaps a greater danger lies in the potential for a referendum 
campaign on such a contentious issue to have an intensely polarising effect on an 
already deeply divided polity. Even if a representative sample of citizens were able 
to successfully and respectfully consider a conflict-ridden issue in a non-partisan, 
deliberative setting, there is no guarantee that high-quality mini-public deliberation 
would be replicated at the level of the maxi-public. However, even in a deeply 
divided polity, it is notable that referendums are still associated with powerful 
democratic qualities. In Chapter Four we saw clear evidence that an unfavourable 
decision on Irish language policy was significantly more likely to be accepted than 
one taken either by a more conventional mode of decision-making or by a citizens’ 
assembly. This was mainly attributable to differences at the individual-level: an 
unfavourable decision taken by voters in a referendum was significantly more likely 
to be accepted by those holding the strongest ethno-national ideological views, 
compared to decisions taken in other ways.  
Historically, a majoritarian instrument like a referendum may have been 
regarded as a largely inappropriate device for decision-making in Northern Ireland, 
given the systematic advantage likely to be enjoyed by one group at the expense of 
another. More recently, however, the demographic profile of Northern Ireland has 
been changing. Catholics and Protestants are both minority groups, and recent 
Assembly election results have perhaps reinforced this reality on the dimension of 
ethno-national ideology. In 2017, unionists were without a majority of seats in a 
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devolved Northern Ireland legislature for the first time since the polity’s inception.138 
This may help to explain why, contrary to our initial hypotheses, a process involving 
a popular vote on a citizens’ assembly recommendation is seen as particularly 
legitimate among those who value the democratic principle of non-tyranny, and that 
such a process is seen as equally legitimate by each of the two traditional 
communities. 
 In practice, perhaps the bluntest effects of a referendum campaign could be 
mitigated if the popular vote is informed by the output of a robust citizens’ assembly 
decision-making process (Gastil and Richards, 2013). Fournier et al. (2011) show 
that among citizens who were aware of the activity of the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly were significantly more likely to vote in favour of its recommendation in 
the subsequent referendum. Suiter (2018) found a similar effect in the Republic of 
Ireland, illustrating the constructive potential for mini-public deliberation to help 
inform voters in the maxi-public as they weigh up competing options ahead of a 
referendum. Indeed, in the Irish referendum on the constitutionality of abortion, a 
particularly emotive issue, the campaign itself was marked by a relative degree of 
civility – attributed in part to the deliberation undertaken by the 99 members of the 
Irish Citizens’ Assembly two years beforehand (ibid).  
Still, it is notable that in both British Columbia and the Republic of Ireland, 
political parties either played a muted role during the referendum campaign, or else 
displayed little opposition to the substantive mini-public recommendations (Warren 
and Pearse, 2008; Field, 2018). It may be harder to imagine that political parties 
would display such deference to the output of a mini-public in a more polarised 																																																								
138 After the 2017 Northern Ireland Assembly election, 44 percent of members designated as unionist, 
down from 52 percent in the previous mandate. Similarly, 43 percent of members designated as 
nationalist, up from 37 percent. The proportion of ‘others’ was virtually unchanged, rising to 12 
percent from 11 percent. 
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political climate on a more intensely contested issue. However, if political parties at 
least collectively express their support for the process in advance of it being 
established, taking an oppositional position on the substantive outcome may have a 
limited effect on the overall perceived legitimacy of the process, while at the same 
time laying the conditions for the broader political system to function more 
smoothly. Moreover, political parties may also be more likely to lend their a priori 
support to such a process if they knew that a referendum would serve as a check on 
any ‘bad’ mini-public decision. 
 Alternatively, a more cautiously designed process could give political 
representatives explicit control over the outcome itself. Under this design, the 
Northern Ireland Assembly could formally accept or reject the recommendation of a 
citizens’ assembly. Leaving aside political calculations, such a process may be 
justified on the grounds that the decisions reached by either a mini-public or a 
referendum could have tyrannical consequences, especially if they rest on the 
support of a simple majority. In other words, Northern Ireland’s consociational 
institutions would be able to disregard a mini-public decision that threatened the 
essential interests of a certain group, reflecting the anti-majoritarian logic of a 
system seeking to protect group interests.  
And yet, it is striking that among those who value non-tyranny as a 
democratic principle, the perceived legitimacy of mini-public decision-making is 
significantly lower when the Northern Ireland Assembly serves as a check on the 
mini-public decision. On the contrary, it is higher among those who consider non-
tyranny to be a relatively unimportant democratic principle. This finding casts doubt 
on the rationale underpinning Northern Ireland’s consociational system of 
government: if it is designed to enhance the legitimacy of decision-making through 
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an explicit commitment to non-tyranny, its unique ability to perform this role does 
not appear to be recognised by citizens themselves. Indeed, compared to the way 
respondents evaluated the way the Northern Ireland Assembly usually takes 
decisions, each of the three models of citizens’ assembly described in this chapter 
were perceived to be more legitimate. 
 Overall, these findings suggest that citizens’ assemblies could enhance, rather 
than weaken, the legitimacy of decision-making in a political system weighed down 
by crisis and popular dissatisfaction. To follow conventional wisdom, such a mini-
public would have the power to make a recommendation, serving as a check on its 
authority and helping to prevent it from delivering tyrannical decisions. But if we 
take seriously Fishkin’s contention that tyrannical outcomes can arise from policy 
omission as well as policy commission, we need to consider how political paralysis 
can be legitimately overcome. The results of this chapter suggest that a citizens’ 
assembly with the power to take a binding decision on a contested political issue 
would be perceived to be just as legitimate as one with the power only to make a 
recommendation. There may be good reasons for limiting the power of a citizens’ 
assembly, but concern that an authoritative mini-public would be perceived to be 
illegitimate by the maxi-public should not be one of them. Similarly, there may be 
good reasons for designing a multi-level decision-making procedure to help guard 
against harmful decisions, but such considerations must be weighed against the 
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Mission Control: Odyssey, Houston. I have your final entry pad when you 
are ready. 
Apollo 13: Okay, Houston. Ready to copy. 
Radio communication between Mission Control and Apollo 13 
Commander Jim Lovell, 17 April 1970 (NASA, 1970: 751) 
 
 
This thesis has addressed the potential for citizens’ assemblies, as an application of 
deliberative democracy, to address democratic deficits. In a political system 
diagnosed with this problem, can citizens’ assemblies serve as a control mechanism 
to help improve its democratic performance? Taking the deeply divided polity of 
Northern Ireland as a case study, the cumulative weight of evidence from a series of 
empirical studies suggests that, from the perspective of the maxi-public, citizens’ 
assemblies can indeed play a constructive role.  
Starting with a cross-sectional analysis, this thesis finds that there is deep and 
widespread support for the idea of citizens’ assemblies supplementing the existing 
political system in the event of a crisis. There are largely favourable attitudes on the 
capacity of ordinary people to be selected to serve as members, on the likelihood of 
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members making decisions for the benefit of everyone, and on citizens’ assemblies 
playing some sort of formal role ahead of political decisions being taken. Compared 
to a more conventional response to crisis involving political elites (through cross-
party talks), support for a citizens’ assembly is particularly high among individuals 
with low levels of trust in political parties. Compared to an alternative way of 
involving citizens directly in decision-making (through a referendum), support for a 
more deliberative approach is particularly high among non-voters. These findings 
suggest that citizens’ assemblies have a unique potential to target some of the main 
weaknesses of consociational systems, especially the intensely partisan process of 
decision-making and the institutional obstacles that undermine substantive inclusion. 
Crucially, a follow-up survey experiment finds that aggregate support for citizens’ 
assemblies is robust. Even when they are presented with an unfavourable decision on 
an ethno-nationally sensitive policy issue, respondents are just as likely to accept the 
decision of a citizens’ assembly compared to a decision taken in a more conventional 
way, with the exception of a referendum. In other words, losers’ consent, a crucial 
requirement in any democracy, extends to decisions produced by this relatively 
novel type of democratic innovation (Anderson et al. 2005).  
 A further series of online experiments found that different ways of designing 
citizens’ assemblies – in their processes of selecting members, decision-making, and 
taking decisions – had generally no effect on overall perceptions of their legitimacy. 
Aggregate levels of perceived legitimacy were high irrespective of whether the 
selection mechanism was by random lottery (sortition) or election, whether members 
were exclusively citizens or a mixture of lay citizens and elected politicians, whether 
deliberation was external or internal, or whether the citizens’ assembly produced a 
recommendation or a binding decision. There were, however, some important 
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differences at the individual-level, suggesting some trade-offs in design features for 
those who value particular democratic principles, and those who hold stronger versus 
more moderate ethno-national views. As a further design consideration for deeply 
divided contexts, there are also some models of citizens’ assembly that have the 
potential to attract similarly high levels of perceived legitimacy on a cross-
community basis, helping to reduce the risk of asymmetrical evaluations of the 
process from different groups. The findings of this research have implications for the 
governance of post-conflict Northern Ireland, for constitutional engineering in other 
deeply divided places, and for future research in the broad field of deliberative 
democracy. 
 
8.1 A Citizens’ Assembly for Northern Ireland? 
At the time of writing, Northern Ireland has been without a devolved government for 
over two years. Arguably the time has passed when the problem was simply a 
democratic deficit, serious as it was; instead, the challenge has escalated into a 
deeper political vacuum – with no obvious or straightforward way out. After an 
Assembly election in March 2017 and five rounds of cross-party talks, political 
leaders have been unable, or unwilling, to form a new power-sharing government. 
The looming prospect of the UK’s departure from the European Union – widely 
expected to cause particular challenges for Northern Ireland – has reduced the 
incentives for political parties to re-enter an administration that looks set to confront 
a fresh crisis. 139  Meanwhile, the UK’s minority government has been visibly 
reluctant to introduce direct rule from Westminster – constrained by a confidence 																																																								
139 Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK to share a land border with the EU once it leaves; 
given Northern Ireland’s recent history, there are particular sensitivities over the possible erection of 
any physical infrastructure along the Irish border.  
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and supply agreement with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party, as well as 
the likely disapproval of the Irish government in Dublin.140 In the protracted absence 
of political leadership, public services are continuing to operate under the interim 
management of civil servants, whose scope of action is legally limited. Such an 
arrangement is as unsustainable as it is undemocratic.  
 Against such an intolerable backdrop, citizens might be expected to vent their 
collective dismay by taking direct action en masse: signing petitions, organising 
social media campaigns, and participating in peaceful protests. And yet, the voices of 
civil society have been conspicuous for their overwhelming silence. On 28 August 
2018, when Northern Ireland surpassed Belgium’s 589-day record for the longest 
period without a government, thousands of people attended ‘We Deserve Better’ 
rallies across 14 towns and cities (Halliday, 2018).141 These rallies witnessed vocal 
yet dignified displays of frustration, but they failed to generate enough momentum to 
convert popular grievances into a more enduring, formidable movement. This raises 
a crucial, and uncomfortable, question: even if people widely think they ‘deserve 
better’, do they ultimately perceive the restoration of Northern Ireland’s democratic 
institutions to be ‘better’ than a power vacuum? Have their negative evaluations of 
the performance of the political system undermined people’s underlying 
commitment to the system itself? Here we recall Easton’s (1965) distinction between 
specific and diffuse support, noting an important qualification: the “frustration of 
expectations can so jolt the deeper loyalties of the members of a system that their 
diffuse support falls into a precipitous decline” (Easton, 1975: 445). Northern Ireland 
is edging very close to confirming the hypothesis. 																																																								
140 In the June 2017 general election, the Conservatives lost their majority in the House of Commons. 
They rely on the DUP’s ten MPs to stay in power. 
141 Since Northern Ireland is a devolved region, not a sovereign territory, the two cases are not 
directly comparable. That said, the UK government has so far refused to introduce direct rule. 
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 Political leaders were aware of citizens’ mounting disapproval before 
Northern Ireland’s democratic institutions collapsed. In 2014, the then First Minister, 
Peter Robinson, himself said the institutions were “no longer fit for purpose,” 
adding: 
 
We urgently need to take steps towards improving the operation of the 
democratic institutions and maintaining the respect and support of the 
electorate. We all need to reimagine the way forward (Robinson, 2014). 
 
What does a re-imagined way forward look like? Does it rely on political elites 
simply engaging with existing institutions in a different way, or does it involve a 
bolder approach that creates new types of decision-makers in a new type of 
institution? In the subsequent Fresh Start Agreement (NIO, 2015: 67), the main 
parties acknowledged the need to “proactively engage with civic society” in a 
reformed political process. With faint echoes of the abandoned Civic Forum, the 
Agreement proposed a new ‘Compact Civic Advisory Panel’ to ensure that “civic 
voices are heard and civic views are considered in relation to key social, cultural and 
economic issues” (ibid: 38; emphasis added). However, its terms of reference 
strikingly preclude any political purpose, while the number and nature of 
appointments to the new body – six representatives chosen by the First and deputy 
First Minister – indicate a missed opportunity to display ambition and imagination. 
If the goal is to help bridge the gap between citizens and their political system, a 
more ambitious vehicle must go far beyond cosmetic gesturing. 
 The time has come for political representatives to consider the potential for a 
citizens’ assembly to help re-invigorate, and subsequently complement, Northern 
Ireland’s dormant democratic institutions. This proposal involves two related stages. 
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First, in the short-term, a citizens’ assembly could help overcome the immediate 
issues that are causing gridlock among elites. A draft agreement between the main 
political parties in February 2018, which was abandoned but widely reported in the 
media, suggests the main points of contention fall under three categories: improving 
the operation of the Assembly and Executive; respecting languages and culture; and 
rights and respect (Mallie, 2018). 
 These issues range from technical aspects of government procedure to 
broader questions of principle. Given their centrality to the re-establishment of 
devolved governance, and given the structural orientation of some of the issues, an 
ensuing citizens’ assembly could effectively serve as a constitutional convention, or 
at least form part of such a process of democratic renewal. The pioneering British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform demonstrated the capacity for this 
kind of mini-public to constructively engage with complex, technical matters in a 
comprehensive manner (Warren and Pearse, 2008), while subsequent citizens’ 
assemblies have broadly confirmed their suitability to the constitutional domain 
(Reuchamps and Suiter, 2016). All of the main political parties have indicated that 
some kind of reform is needed to the way Northern Ireland’s democratic institutions 
operate. A citizens’ assembly may be the most appropriate way of addressing what 
these reforms should be. 
 Second, in the longer-term, citizens’ assemblies could further enhance the 
day-to-day democratic performance of Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions 
once they are restored. Or, more appropriately, they could be used on a more regular 
basis alongside representative institutions if such an idea were endorsed by an initial 
citizens’ assembly tasked with considering possible reforms to governance in 
Northern Ireland. Other procedural changes to the system may be enough to inject 
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some improvement to the democratic performance of the Assembly and Executive. 
However, the present juncture affords an opportunity to go beyond minimal 
patchwork reforms and instead tackle the deeper question of citizens’ expectations 
for a democratic system. Drawing on the empirical research of this thesis, Figure 8.1 
reminds us that there are many possible configurations of citizens’ assembly design 
that could receive a healthy degree of legitimacy from the perspective of the maxi-
public. Crucially, each model considered was perceived to be more legitimate than 
the Northern Ireland Assembly when it is normally functioning. Moving beyond 
Northern Ireland’s immediate crisis is one thing, but addressing chronic issues of 
democratic under-performance must be a related priority. The evidence suggests that 
citizens’ assemblies can help to reduce this underlying democratic deficit. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Mean legitimacy scores for the Northern Ireland Assembly and each of 










The capacity for citizens’ assemblies to control Northern Ireland’s democratic deficit 
should not be overstated. This thesis has tested the potential for citizens’ assemblies 
to do so via hypothetical, yet realistic, scenarios. Outside the control of a research 
environment, the precise way(s) in which mini-publics interact with the broader 
political system and, indeed, the maxi-public, will only become fully clear with a 
shift from theory to practice. 
 This shift is already beginning to take place. In 2018, civil society groups 
funded and organised a pilot Citizens’ Assembly for Northern Ireland.142 It was held 
over the course of two weekends in the autumn on the topic of social care for the 
elderly; a preliminary report featuring its recommendations has been submitted to 
Northern Ireland’s Department of Health (Involve, 2018b). The reception for the 
initiative has been broadly positive, offering tentative answers to some basic, 
practical questions. Is there really an appetite for a citizens’ assembly? Can people in 
a deeply divided place deliberate in a respectful manner? Can they navigate a 
complex issue to come up with concrete measures that policy-makers can be 
expected to implement? The answer to each appears to be ‘yes’.  
 Of the 80 participants recruited to take part in the Citizens’ Assembly via an 
online panel, 77 attended, closely resembling the profile of the Northern Ireland 
population according to age, gender, geographical residence and community 
background. The atmosphere was mostly serious, but consistently friendly and 
respectful, even during intense discussions. The members produced three high-level 
resolutions and 27 narrower resolutions on the future of social care for the elderly, 
suggesting a strong degree of engagement on a challenging topic. There were no 																																																								
142 The author was an unpaid member of the advisory group of the initiative. The citizens’ assembly 
was organised and delivered by Involve, a leading UK public participation charity. It received funding 
from the Building Change Trust, the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, the Paul Hamlyn 
Foundation, and Open Society Foundations. 
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obvious ethno-national features to the issue, but this pilot initiative broadly confirms 
the positive experience of citizens’ assemblies previously observed in less polarised 
settings. 
 Ahead of the pilot, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in the House of 
Commons published a report on the state of democracy in Northern Ireland and 
pledged to follow the progress of the Citizens’ Assembly: 
 
The Committee agrees that increasing civic participation could enhance 
Northern Ireland’s governance in both the current impasse and the future. 
Citizens’ Assemblies remain one option to increase civic engagement at a 
time where citizens are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Northern 
Ireland’s politics. We look forward to the publication of the pilot study to see 
whether it would be a suitable forum for Northern Ireland (House of 
Commons, 2018b: 46). 
 
In the official response to the committee’s report, the UK government officially 
noted the initiative, adding that it looks “forward to the outcome of the pilot study” 
(House of Commons, 2018c: 7). If citizens’ assemblies are to be formally 
commissioned in decision-making in Northern Ireland, the early results of the pilot 
neatly complement the main results of this thesis: they can serve a valuable, 
democratic role. 
 
8.2 Designing Democracy in Deeply Divided Places 
Beyond the case of Northern Ireland, all deeply divided polities are challenging 
places to govern, regardless of how their institutions may be designed. Democratic 
arrangements that are intended to help manage divisions between two or more ethnic 
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groups may, in practice, give rise to a new set of problems. A consociational political 
system selects decision-makers through a proportional electoral system, gives all 
groups access to decision-making in an inclusive power-sharing administration, and 
gives groups a veto over potentially discriminatory decisions. As we see from the 
case of Northern Ireland, however, these carefully designed arrangements may be 
insufficient to establish stable governance that citizens broadly value. Taken 
together, the disproportionate exclusion of moderate voices from the electoral 
process, the emphasis on negotiation over deliberation in decision-making, and the 
low veto threshold, can help bring the system to a grinding halt, making it harder for 
the system to adequately deal with political crises – and making them more likely to 
begin with. 
 When such a crisis occurs at the elite-level, this thesis demonstrates that a 
consociational system may be legitimately supplemented with deliberative decision-
making involving ordinary citizens. This broad finding is significant in two main 
respects. First, citizens’ assemblies have been established around the world as a 
response to particular circumstances in which elected politicians are unable or 
unwilling to reach a contentious decision alone. These cases have been well 
documented (Pearse and Warren, 2008; Smith, 2009; Reuchamps and Suiter, 2016). 
However, their applicability to deeply divided contexts has been less convincingly 
established. In these contexts it may be assumed that political elites, not ordinary 
citizens, are in the best position to reach decisions that can be broadly accepted as 
legitimate (see Nordlinger, 1972). The present research challenges this elite-centric 
assumption, and shows that democratic innovations such as mini-publics could be 
reasonably applied to a deeply divided political setting. Given the propensity of 
consociational systems to encounter gridlock, potentially threatening the survival of 
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the system itself, this thesis provides observational and experimental evidence to 
justify the consideration of deliberative mini-publics as a legitimate response. 
Second, beyond the capacity of mini-publics to constructively react to 
political crises in deeply divided polities, they could also serve a pre-emptive 
purpose. Consociational theory provides a powerful intellectual foundation from 
which democratic institutions may be designed to meet the needs of deeply divided 
places. However, these arrangements can be far from perfect in practice. Given the 
temptation to prescribe the Northern Ireland ‘model’ of consociational governance to 
other polarised environments (Wilson, 2010), future applications of consociational 
theory may be able to anticipate some of the potential problems associated with this 
kind of system and to, therefore, plan accordingly. This could be achieved by 
incorporating some form of supplementary citizen-based decision-making into 
institutional arrangements from the outset, perhaps formally outlining a role for a 
citizens’ assembly on an ad hoc or permanent basis.  
While the nature of a polity’s deep divisions may help to define the realistic 
scope and purpose of mini-publics, these deep divisions should not be used as a 
pretext for avoiding the direct empowerment of ordinary citizens in decision-making. 
If a polity is in the midst of ethnic conflict, the immediate challenge lies in bringing 
an end to violence. This goal understandably places a focus on directly involving 
actors with the power to call and maintain a ceasefire. However, even at this 
particularly delicate stage conflict transformation, the broader representation of civil 
society should not be an afterthought. On the contrary, the formal inclusion of civil 
society groups can help to consolidate peace-building efforts (Kew and Wanis-St. 
John, 2008). While citizens’ assemblies and other types of mini-public may be 
inappropriate vehicles for directly bringing about an end to physical conflict, their 
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adoption should be considered as early as possible to lay the foundations for a 
sustainable peace. For example, the use of mini-publics could help to democratise 
the process of institutional design, rather than leaving it purely up to elites to 
determine the principles and procedures that should shape a post-conflict political 
system. Assuming that a citizen-led process did produce a consociational system, 
though not guaranteed, such a system may enjoy greater popular endorsement from 
the outset by rebutting any suspicions that it was designed to serve elite interests. 
Thereafter, given the broadly favourable attitudes towards citizens’ assemblies found 
in this thesis, even in a post-conflict context, the supplementation of a consociational 
system with mini-public decision-making could help to strengthen its performance 
and help prevent democratic deficits from taking hold from the outset. 
 
8.3 The Empirical Turn of Deliberative Democracy 
The results of this research have broader implications for democratic theory and 
practice. Achen and Bartels (2016: 301) criticise deliberative democrats for being 
too idealistic, “uninterested in pressing questions of institutional design and 
legitimacy” (emphasis added). By directly engaging with the interaction of both of 
these issues, this thesis provides a direct response, demonstrating the potential for 
deliberative mini-publics to offer perfectly realistic and effective remedies to some 
of the main deficiencies of contemporary representative democracies. It shows that 
citizens’ assemblies are perceived by the maxi-public to be broadly legitimate 
institutional innovations, even in a deeply divided place, with a wide range of design 
configurations that can help promote the democratic values of political equality, 
deliberation and non-tyranny. These findings contribute to the “flourishing field” of 
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deliberative democracy (Bächtiger et al. 2018: 1), providing an equally inviting 
home for both normative and empirical scholarship, and with growing synergy 
between academic theory and real-world practice. From this rich base, deliberative 
democrats must continue to theorise, test and refine the precise conditions in which 
mini-publics may be utilised most effectively. Key areas for further research include 
broadening opportunities for participation from other citizens, the coupling of mini-
publics to other institutions and processes, and the evaluation of mini-publics in a 
more comparative perspective. Before these three final thoughts are developed 
further, we first consider a methodological reflection on conducting such research. 
 
8.3.1  Mini-Publics and Experimental Methods 
To date, relatively few studies have analysed popular attitudes towards deliberative 
initiatives (but see Neblo et al. 2010; Gastil et al. 2016; Jäske, 2018). As with most 
empirical research on mini-publics, experimental studies have focused almost 
exclusively on the dynamics within deliberative settings (Esterling, 2018), largely 
leaving aside questions of their interaction with the outside world. This pattern is 
perhaps understandable when we consider a key obstacle to conducting macro-
attitudinal research on mini-publics: many people are unlikely to know very much 
about these democratic innovations to begin with, let alone the subtle differences in 
the ways in which they may be designed. This thesis relied heavily on the use of 
vignettes to concisely explain some of the key features of citizens’ assemblies, 
recognising their relative novelty, before measuring respondents’ attitudes towards 
them. This approach was not without its challenges, and yet this in itself offers an 
important insight for future research.  
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Recall that in the first set of experiments presented in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven respectively, a high proportion of participants provided incorrect responses to 
basic manipulation checks. Having been presented with a short vignette of a citizens’ 
assembly, configured in a particular way, many respondents failed to recognise the 
key element of process design that had been manipulated in the experimental 
treatment to which they had been randomly assigned. This highlights the importance 
of including basic manipulation checks in an experiment, particularly when 
participants are completing the study online. More importantly, it highlights the need 
to design treatments that are sufficiently clear to participants in the first place 
(Aronow et al. 2016). The follow-up studies in Chapters Five, Six and Seven show 
how simple infographics can be deployed to strengthen the effectiveness of text-
based vignettes in an experimental (or even a non-experimental) survey setting. 
Along with some other minor refinements, these visual accompaniments helped to 
ensure that the vast majority of respondents provided correct responses to the 
manipulation checks across all conditions. 
It appears that some concepts had initially posed particular problems from the 
perspective of participants. For example, the idea of electing ordinary citizens to 
serve in a mini-public, the idea of deliberation taking place through imagined 
dialogue, and the idea of a citizens’ assembly taking a binding decision, all seemed 
unfamiliar to respondents to the extent that they were less likely to successfully 
recognise these elements of a citizens’ assembly compared to citizens’ assemblies 
with other design features. These problems appeared to disappear after each of the 
experiments had been redesigned accordingly. Therefore, while researchers should 
not be afraid to maximise the opportunities afforded by online survey experiments, 
especially to investigate attitudes towards democratic innovations that have not been 
		 249 
widely implemented in the real world, these methods require significant effort to 
ensure that respondents can meaningfully engage with the stimulus material. 
 
8.3.2  Mini-Publics and Maxi-Public Participation 
A potential weakness of mini-publics is their necessary exclusion of the wider public 
from their membership. This is a crucial requirement for the promotion of political 
equality, giving all members of the population a virtually equal chance of being 
included in the formal body. However, just as mini-publics are intended to 
complement the existing institutions of a political system, they should not be seen as 
an alternative to mass participation from the maxi-public. Participation and 
deliberation can indeed go together (Curato et al. 2017). This thesis has narrowly 
focused on the capacity of citizens’ assemblies to promote three of the democratic 
values specified by Fishkin (1991) – political equality, deliberation and non-tyranny 
– since these are most directly relevant to the way they are selected, the way they 
make decisions, and the way they take decisions. Taking a broader perspective, there 
are opportunities to explore how mini-publics can promote Fishkin’s (2009: 45) 
fourth democratic value of mass participation, defined as “behaviour on the part of 
members of the mass public directed at influencing, directly or indirectly, the 
formulation, adoption, or implementation of governmental or policy choices.” 
 Some of these opportunities lie in the institutional design of citizens’ 
assemblies and other types of mini-public. For example, even before members of 
such a body are recruited, all citizens may be consulted on its agenda (Jacquet et al. 
2016). Once the topic has been selected and members recruited, it is also possible for 
the mini-public to hold an external consultation phase, giving all citizens the 
		 250 
opportunity to provide an input to the internal deliberation phase (Fournier et al. 
2011). Finally, all citizens may be involved in endorsing – or rejecting – the decision 
of the mini-public in a popular referendum, as has been the case following citizens’ 
assemblies in British Columbia, Ontario and the Republic of Ireland. Arguably each 
of these potential forms of mass participation rely on citizens being aware of a mini-
public’s activities to begin with, which, in turn, depends on the media covering the 
initiatives with the level of attention they deserve. 
 
8.3.3  Mini-Publics and Existing Institutions 
From the perspective of elected politicians, mini-publics may be seen as an explicit 
challenge to their authority and the institutional territory they inhabit. This is an 
understandable reaction. And yet, on the contrary, mini-publics can help to secure 
the positions of elected politicians and existing institutions by strengthening citizens’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the political system overall. While this thesis has 
explored the democratising potential of mini-publics from the perspective of the 
maxi-public, more research is required on the attitudes of political elites. Many high-
profile initiatives appear to have emerged on the basis of good will or a fortuitous 
succession of events. For example, the idea for the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly was personally championed by the then Premier of the province, Gordon 
Campbell (Warren and Pearse, 2008). When he was asked why a citizens’ assembly 
should be held, he simply responded, “because it’s the right thing to do” (Fournier et 
al. 2011: 23). It is questionable whether such a body would have emerged without 
his leadership.  
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In Ireland, the ‘We the Citizens’ civil society initiative helped drive elite 
interest in a Constitutional Convention comprising randomly selected citizens, which 
itself helped pave the way for the Irish Citizens’ Assembly (Farrell et al. 2019). 
Without the initial pilot, political parties may never have taken the concept seriously. 
Process tracing could be used to provide a systematic account of how and why mini-
publics have become embedded in national decision-making in Ireland, while formal 
modelling could help specify the conditions under which political elites would 
rationally support the delegation of political authority to such bodies. Elite 
interviews with both serving and former political representatives could also yield 
valuable insights into their attitudes towards mini-public decision-making. 
 Furthermore, as the concept of citizens’ assemblies and other forms of mini-
public gains traction, scholars must also pay attention to their possible exploitation 
by sectional interests – and how this may adversely affect public opinion towards 
such bodies. In the UK, for example, while the Independent Commission on 
Referendums (2018) recommended that a citizens’ assembly should be held before 
any future referendum, the inherently contested nature of holding a second 
referendum on the UK’s departure from the EU could risk entangling the process 
with the substantive issue. In other words, by apparently ignoring the first 
referendum outcome (to leave the EU), the very establishment of a citizens’ 
assembly could be interpreted as a way of engineering a different result (to remain in 
the EU).  
If a mini-public is established to serve a particular agenda, or if it is 
perceived to serve a particular agenda, its democratic value may be significantly 
damaged. While there are many opportunities to strengthen democratic governance 
by formally coupling mini-publics to existing institutions and processes, deliberative 
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democrats must be vigilant of the potential for these democratic innovations to be 
manipulated by interest groups and political parties (Setälä and Smith, 2018). This 
also raises the question of the conditions in which it is desirable for mini-publics to 
be formally coupled to the state, or whether their democratic contribution may be 
more effective when they are organised by civil society (Kuyper and Wolkenstein, 
2018). It would not be wise to couple mini-publics alongside existing institutions, or 
to even use them at all, if the contextual backdrop serves to undermine maxi-public 
perceptions of their legitimacy.  
 
8.3.4  Mini-Publics in Comparative Perspective 
Rather than asking only what mini-publics can do to strengthen the quality of 
democracy, it would also be fruitful to consider what mini-publics can do more 
effectively compared to other modes of decision-making. Research on the internal 
dynamics of mini-public deliberation will continue to enhance our theoretical and 
practical understanding of their optimal design. However, there is a growing need for 
such research to be matched with externally facing studies. This thesis has 
contributed to this effort by investigating people’s evaluations of mini-publics 
compared to more conventional modes of decision-making. The robustness of these 
findings could be tested in different settings with different political contexts. 
 The present research has focused on the potential for one type of mini-public 
– citizens’ assemblies’ – to enhance the democratic quality of decision-making. 
There are, of course, many others, ranging from citizens’ juries to consensus 
conferences. Each may make different kinds of contributions to citizens’ overall 
evaluations of democratic performance, perhaps by meeting their expectations in 
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different ways and at different levels of decision-making. Cross-sectional and 
experimental approaches will be important in weighing up the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of different types of mini-public, including their capacity to 
deliver particular democratic principles that people expect and value.  
Taking a comparative perspective also requires engagement with the 
dimension of time. For example, what are the durable effects of mini-public 
decision-making on maxi-public satisfaction with democracy? Can one-off mini-
publics make a tangible difference, or do they need to be embedded as regular 
fixtures of a political system for them to help control a democratic deficit? A 
combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches will help to empirically 
address the extent to which mini-publics can add deliberative capacity to the broader 
political system over time and across a range of existing institutions (see Curato and 
Böker, 2016). Taking a long view, if mini-publics can positively influence the 
deliberative capacity of other parts of the system, and serve as an effective corrective 
to other shortcomings of democratic performance, they “would ideally facilitate their 
own obsolescence” (Niemeyer and Jennstål, 2018: 330). That moment is unlikely to 
be soon. 
The democratising value of mini-publics is significant, but their application 
should directly target the problems they can realistically address (Warren, 2017). 
These democratic innovations are not ends in themselves, but rather offer the means 
towards the goal of strengthening the quality of democracy from the perspective of 
citizens. While the democratic principles underpinning deliberative mini-publics 
have endured for millennia, they remain relatively novel modes of decision-making 
to most people, and so they deserve particular attention against a stark backdrop of 
democracy in crisis. This does not mean that they will always offer the best 
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prescription. At the same time, however, while representative democracies have 
suffered from chronic weaknesses for some time, the growing magnitude of these 
weaknesses is now testing political systems to their limits. The results of this thesis 
point to the encouraging possibilities of deliberative solutions. To discern their full 
potential and to maximise their effectiveness will require a step-change in the 
willingness of practitioners to consider the use of democratic innovations in 
decision-making, together with a renewed effort on the part of scholars to critically 
evaluate these processes. The views of citizens themselves should be a central focus 
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APPENDIX A  
Cross-Sectional Survey Questionnaire (Chapters Three & Four) 
Face-to-face Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI) were conducted by 
Ipsos-MORI in October 2015. This module of questions was embedded in an 
omnibus survey, covering a range of other apolitical topics. Interviewers used show 
cards as indicated, a standard practice in survey research to minimise the pressure 
on respondents to select certain responses. Respondents gave their informed consent 
prior to participating, in line with Ipsos-MORI procedures. 
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions related to politics in Northern Ireland. 
 
SHOW CARD BQ1 
 
BQ1.  On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
Northern Ireland?  SINGLE CODE 
 
1 Very satisfied 
2 Fairly satisfied 
3 Not very satisfied 
4 Not at all satisfied 
8 Don’t know 
 
SHOW CARD BQ2 
 
BQ2. Some people feel close to a particular political party while other people feel 
distant from it.  Taking each party in turn, do you feel very close to the party, 
fairly close, neither close nor distant, fairly distant from the party or very 




















Unionist Party (DUP) 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
the SDLP 1 2 3 4 5 8 
Sinn Féin 1 2 3 4 5 8 
the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
the Alliance party 1 2 3 4 5 8 
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SHOW CARD BQ3 
 






- - - Trust a lot 
DK / 
Refused 
a political parties 1 2 3 4 5 8 
b religious leaders 1 2 3 4 5 8 
c business leaders 1 2 3 4 5 8 
d 
people from a 
Catholic/nationalist 
community background 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
e 
people from a 
Protestant/unionist 
community background 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
 
 
SHOW CARD BQ4 
 
BQ4. Would you say that you are…?   
 ASK PARTICIPANT TO READ OUT NUMBER ON SHOW CARD 
 
1 … very strongly unionist 
2 … fairly strongly unionist 
3 … neither unionist nor nationalist 
4 … fairly strongly nationalist 
5 … very strongly nationalist 
8 (Don’t know) 
 
 
SHOW CARD BQ5 
 
BQ5. On some important issues – such as flag display and the issue of welfare 
reform – the political parties in Northern Ireland find it very hard to agree 
with each other, and this leads to political crises. When such a crisis happens, 
there may be a number of ways to try and resolve it. Please tell me to what 
extent you think each of the following approaches is a good idea or a bad 
idea. 
 






















Get the British 
government to 
come up with a 
solution. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
b 
Get the British and 
Irish governments 
working together to 
come up with a 
solution. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
c 
Get the British 
government and the 
Northern Ireland 
parties to come up 
with a solution. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
d 
Get the British and 
Irish governments 
and the Northern 
Ireland parties to 
come with a 
solution. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
e 
Get someone from 
outside Britain and 
Ireland, such as a 
politician or 
diplomat from the 
United States, to 
chair talks between 
the Northern 
Ireland parties and 
come up with a 
solution. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
g 
Hold a referendum 
on the issue so that 
the people can 
directly decide. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
h 
Have an immediate 
election to try and 
resolve the issue. 





SHOW CARD BQ5 (AGAIN) 
 
BQ6. Another possible way of resolving a difficult issue – such as flag display or 
the issue of welfare reform – would be to get a group of ordinary people to 
make a decision on it after they have had a chance to consider the evidence 
and arguments. Here's how it would work... A representative sample of 500 
ordinary citizens in Northern Ireland is selected to consider the issue. These 
people would be selected in the same way that people are selected to serve on 
a jury: they are randomly selected.  And they would be a cross-section of all 
of the people in Northern Ireland in terms of age, gender, social class and 
religious and community background. The people on this ‘citizens’ 
assembly’ would be provided with background information about the issue 
and would be given a presentation of all the main arguments on both sides of 
the issue. They would be asked to think carefully about the evidence and the 
different views and would then be asked to vote on the issue.  What a 
majority of these people decided in the vote would be seen as the decision on 
the issue and would be implemented.  What do you think of this possible way 



















Getting a cross section 
of ordinary citizens on 
a citizens’ assembly to 
learn about the issue, 
listen to a presentation 
of all the main 
arguments and then 
reach a decision on the 
issue is a… 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
 
 
BQ7. If a citizens’ assembly of this kind was introduced do you think it should… 
 
1 Make the final decision 
2 Make a recommendation to be considered by politicians 
3 Not be given any role at all in policy-making 
8 (Don’t know) 
 
 






BQ8. In general, how good or bad do you think ordinary people would be at 
making decisions if they were selected to serve on a citizens’ assembly? 
 
1 Very bad 
2 Fairly bad 
3 Neither good nor bad 
4 Fairly good 
5 Very good 
8 (Don’t know) 
 
 
BQ9. In a citizens’ assembly, do you think ordinary people would try to come to a 
decision that is good for everyone in Northern Ireland, or would they just try 
to look after the interests of their own community, or just try to look after 
their own personal interests? 
 
1 … good for everyone in Northern Ireland 
2 … just try to look after the interests of their own community 
3 … just look after their own personal interests 
8 (Don’t know) 
 
 
SHOW CARD BQ10 
 
BQ10.  Elections, referendums and citizens’ assemblies are all possible ways of 
making democratic decisions, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Taking each one in turn, to what extent are you in favour or 
opposed to each way of making a democratic decision? 
 
  Strongly 
opposed 





a Elections 1 2 3 4 5 8 
b Referendums 1 2 3 4 5 8 
c Citizens’ assemblies 1 2 3 4 5 8 
 
 
(Demographic questions are continued overleaf)  
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C1a. What was your age last birthday? 
 
State exact, and code: ________  
 
1 16-17 7 45-49 
2 18-24 8 50-54 
3 25-29 9 55-59 
4 30-34 10 60-64 






1 Male 2 Female 
 
 
C2. How many people are there in your household aged 16+ including yourself? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+ 
 
 
C3a. How many children under the age of 16 are there in your household? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
 
 
C1. Which of these best describes you? 
 
1 Single 





C4. Is your home owned or rented? PROBE 
 
1 Owned outright 
2 Being bought on mortgage 
3 Rented NIHE 
4 Rented privately 




C7a. Which of these best describes you? MULTI CODE NOT ALLOWED 
 
1 In paid job Working full-time 30 hrs+/week 
2 Working 8-29 hrs/week 
3 Working less than 8 hrs/week 
4 No paid job Retired from full-time job 
5 Unemployed 
6 Housewife 
9 Student at third level education college or university 
10 Student at technical college or higher education institution 
11 Student at secondary or grammar school 
8 Other (specify) 
 
 
C13. Which member of your household would you say is the CHIEF INCOME 
EARNER, that is the person with the largest income, whether from 
employment, pensions, state benefits, investments or any other sources?  (If 
equal income is claimed for two people, classify the elder as the C.I.E.) 
 
1 Self  Ask C15. 
2 Other Go to C13a. 
 
 
C13a. Name of Chief Income Earner (C.I.E.). 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C14. Is … related to you? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No; respondent is C.I.E. 
 
 
C15. Does the C.I.E. have a paid job full-time or part-time? ASK ALL 
 
1 Yes  Ask occupational details at C17. 







SHOW CARD C16 
 
C16.  Looking at this card, please tell me the statement that best describes the 
C.I.E. Just read out the letter. 
 
1 A – Retired, gets pension from previous job Ask occupational 
details of previous 
job – C.17 
2 B – Unemployed, less than 2 months 
3 C – Sick, still receiving pay or statutory pay from job 
4 D – Widow, receiving pension from husband’s 
previous job Ask occupational 
details of husband’s 
previous job 5 E – Divorced/separated, receiving maintenance from 
ex-spouse 
6 F – Full-time student Code Social Class 
C1 at C.18 
7 G – Not working, private means Assess Social Class 
at C.18 
8 H – Unemployed longer than 2 months 
Code Social Class E 
at C.18 
9 I – Sick - only receiving Income Support or Invalidity 
Benefit 
10 J – Receiving State Pension only 
 
 
C17a1. What is the C.I.E.’s job title? 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C17a2. What type of firm/organisation does/did (C.I.E.) work for? 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C17b. Does/did (C.I.E.) have any position/rank/grade in the organisation  
(i.e. responsible for the work of other people)? 
 
1 Yes  Ask C17c. 
2 No Go to C17e. 
 
 
C17c. What is the title of the position / rank / grade? PROMPT AS 
APPROPRIATE (Foreman, Sergeant, Office Manager, Executive, Officer 
etc.) 
 
WRITE IN:  
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C17c. How many people is … responsible for? 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C17e. Does … have any qualifications? 
 
1 Yes  Ask C17f. 
2 No Go to C18. 
 
 
C17f. What type of qualification is that? PROMPT AS APPROPRIATE: 
Apprenticeship, professional qualifications, University degree) 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C18. Social grade: 
 
1 A 4 C2 
2 B 5 D 
3 C1 6 E 
 
 
SHOW CARD C19 
 
C19.  Please tell me your estimation of the household’s annual income before tax.  
If you prefer tell me the letter beside the income band. 
 
1 G Under £5,000 8 N £35,000-£39,999 
2 H £5,000-£9,999 9 O £40,000-£49,999 
3 I £10,000-£14,999 10 P £50,000+ 
4 J £15,000-£19,999 11 Not applicable 
5 K £20,000-£24,999 12 Refused 
6 L £25,000-£29,999 00 DK 
7 M £30,000-£34,999 
 
 
SHOW CARD C23. 
 
C23. From this card, what is your community background? (i.e. the community in 
which the respondent was predominantly brought up) 
 
1 G – Protestant 
2 T – Catholic  
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3 N – Other (specify) 
4 E – None 
5 P – Refused 
 
 
SHOW CARD C27 
 











SHOW CARD C7 
 
C7. To which political party are you most likely to give your first preference vote 
to in a future election? SINGLE CODE ONLY 
 
 
1 W – Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
Thank and 
close 
2 M – Sinn Féin 
3 T – Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
4 J – SDLP 
5 F – Alliance Party 
6 H – Conservative Party 
7 R – Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 
8 E – Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 
9 S – Green Party 
10 B – NI21 
11 Other (specify)   
12 Unlikely to vote 







C8. Which political party are you inclined to support? 
 
1 W – Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
2 M – Sinn Féin 
3 T – Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
4 J – SDLP 
5 F – Alliance Party 
6 H – Conservative Party 
7 R – Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 
8 E – Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 
9 S – Green Party 
10 B – NI21 
11 Other (specify)   
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Satisfaction with democracy 877 1.94 0.83 1 4 13.6 
Support for cross-party talks 
chaired by British government 
969 3.59 1.11 1 5 6.5 
Support for cross-party talks 
chaired by international diplomat 
944 3.39 1.36 1 5 7.0 
Support for election 913 2.57 1.23 1 5 10.0 
Support for direct rule 939 2.95 1.34 1 5 7.5 
Support for referendum 932 3.51 1.20 1 5 8.2 
Support for citizens’ assembly 963 3.63 1.28 1 5 5.2 
Non-voter (ref: voter) 896 0.26 0.44 0 1 11.7 
Ethno-national moderation 962 2.41 0.68 0 2 5.2 
Distant from all political parties  
(ref: close to at least one) 
776 0.24 0.43 0 1 23.5 
Trust in political parties 919 2.01 1.07 1 5 9.5 
Protestant (ref: Catholic) 895 0.52 0.50 0 1 11.8 
Trust out-group (ref: do not trust 
out-group) 
812 0.50 0.50 0 1 20.0 
Age 1001 45.15 18.37 16 97 1.38 
Female (ref: Male) 1015 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.0 
ABC1 (ref: C2DE) 1009 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.6 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables included in regression analyses in 
Chapters Three and Four 
 
Missing observations include refusals and ‘don’t know’ responses. Three variables analysed in 
Chapter Four are not described in Table A1: ordinary citizens’ perceived competence at making 
decisions, perceived motivation of decision-makers and the desired role for citizens’ assemblies in 
taking political decisions. Descriptive statistics for these variables were presented in the substantive 





Survey Questionnaire from Decision Acceptance Experiment 
(Chapter Four) 	
Face-to-face interviews were conducted by Ipsos-MORI in two waves (2nd-19th 
February and 1st-15th April 2017). This module of questions was embedded in an 
omnibus survey, covering a range of other apolitical topics. Respondents were 
randomly assigned to receive one of the six vignette-based treatments, each 
containing an objection precondition. Respondents gave their informed consent 
prior to participating, in line with Ipsos-MORI procedures. 
 
L1.  There has been discussion in recent years about whether or not to introduce 
special rights for people in Northern Ireland who speak Irish. Some people 
have called for an Irish Language Act, which would be a new law to protect 
the rights of Irish language speakers and to promote the use of the Irish 
language in Northern Ireland. Others disagree and are opposed to any special 
rights for Irish language speakers. 
 
Would you support or oppose a new law of this kind? 
 
1 Strongly support special rights for Irish language speakers 
2 Somewhat support special rights for Irish language speakers 
3 Somewhat oppose special rights for Irish language speakers 
4 Strongly oppose special rights for Irish language speakers 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted); Go to L2 
 
 
L2.  If you had to choose, would you be slightly more inclined to support special 
rights for Irish language speakers, or slightly more inclined to oppose special 
rights for Irish language speakers? 
 
1 Support special rights for Irish language speakers 
2 Oppose special rights for Irish language speakers 
8 Really don’t know 
 
 
Based on response to L1, the respondent will be assigned to one of two blocks 
corresponding with his/her stated preference: 
 
[1] SUPPORT Irish Language Act. 
[2] OPPOSE Irish Language Act. 
 
Those responding (unprompted) ‘Don’t know’ to L1 and who subsequently respond 
‘Really don’t know’ to L2 should be randomly assigned to Block [1] or [2].  
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Respondents within each block are then randomly assigned to one of six groups: 
 
[A] Cross-party-talks, chaired by an international politician/diplomat 
[B] Cross-party talks, chaired by the British government 
[C] Direct rule 
[D] Election 
[E] Referendum 
[F] Citizens’ Assembly 
 
Within groups [A]-[F], subjects in Block [1] will receive Treatment [1]; subjects in 
Block [2] will receive Treatment [2]; treatments are therefore contrary to their 
preferred outcome. 
 
All respondents receive the same basic vignette and are then assigned to a 





Suppose that at some point in the near future the issue of Irish language 
rights was brought before the Northern Ireland Assembly. After debating it, a 
majority of MLAs supported a new law protecting Irish language rights, but 
it was blocked by the largest unionist party using its power of veto. This led 
to a worsening of relations among the political parties, creating gridlock in 
the Assembly and a new political crisis. 
 
 
(Treatments begin overleaf)  
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GROUP [A]: 
Cross-party talks, chaired by an international politician/diplomat 
 
To try and deal with the crisis, emergency talks were held between all the 
main political parties. They were chaired by someone from outside Britain 
and Ireland, such as a politician or diplomat from the United States. 
 
Treatment 1 
After extensive negotiations, the parties reached a deal to overcome the 
crisis. The deal did not include any agreement on the issue of Irish language 




After extensive negotiations, the parties reached a deal to overcome the 
crisis. The deal included an agreement on the issue of Irish language rights, 
and so an Irish Language Act would now be passed in the Assembly. 
 
 
A1. Would you accept this decision taken by the parties [{to introduce}/{not 




1 I would find this almost impossible to accept 
2 I would not like it, but could live with it if I had to 
3 I would happily accept the decision 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted) 
 
 
A2. In the event of a future political crisis, would you be happy for the parties to 




1 Yes, I would be happy 
2 No, I would not be happy 






Cross-party talks, chaired by the British government 
 
To try and deal with the crisis, emergency talks were held between all the 




After extensive negotiations, the parties reached a deal to overcome the 
crisis. The deal did not include any agreement on the issue of Irish language 




After extensive negotiations, the parties reached a deal to overcome the 
crisis. The deal included an agreement on the issue of Irish language rights, 
and so an Irish Language Act would now be passed in the Assembly. 
 
 
B1. Would you accept this decision taken by the parties [{to introduce}/{not 




1 I would find this almost impossible to accept 
2 I would not like it, but could live with it if I had to 
3 I would happily accept the decision 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted) 
 
 
B2. In the event of a future political crisis, would you be happy for the parties to 




1 Yes, I would be happy 
2 No, I would not be happy 







To try and deal with the crisis, the British government intervened and 
introduced direct rule for a period of time. 
 
Treatment 1 
During this time, the British government decided against introducing an Irish 
Language Act from Westminster. 
 
Treatment 2 
During this time, the British government decided in favour of introducing an 
Irish Language Act from Westminster. 
 
 
C1. Would you accept this decision [{to introduce}/{not introduce}] an Irish 
Language Act by direct rule? 
 
 
1 I would find this almost impossible to accept 
2 I would not like it, but could live with it if I had to 
3 I would happily accept the decision 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted) 
 
 
C2. In the event of a future political crisis, would you be happy for the British 
government to temporarily introduce direct rule to try and overcome it? 
 
 
1 Yes, I would be happy 
2 No, I would not be happy 







To try and deal with the crisis, an immediate election was called. The issue of 
Irish language rights dominated the campaign. 
 
Treatment 1 
After the election, the Assembly returned to the issue. The number of MLAs 
elected for each party stayed about the same, and the largest unionist party 
again used its veto to block an Irish Language Act, meaning it did not pass. 
 
Treatment 2 
After the election, the Assembly returned to the issue. The number of MLAs 
elected for each party changes, and the largest unionist party could no 
longer use its veto to block an Irish Language Act, meaning it passed. 
 
 
D1. Would you accept this decision [{to introduce}/{not introduce}] an Irish 
Language Act after an election focusing on the issue? 
 
 
1 I would find this almost impossible to accept 
2 I would not like it, but could live with it if I had to 
3 I would happily accept the decision 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted) 
 
 
D2. In the event of a future political crisis, would you be happy for an immediate 
election to be called to try and overcome it? 
 
 
1 Yes, I would be happy 
2 No, I would not be happy 







To try and deal with the crisis, the parties agreed to hold an immediate 
referendum on the issue of Irish language rights. Voters themselves could 
consider both sides of the argument. 
 
Treatment 1 
In the referendum, a majority of voters supported the proposal to introduce 
an Irish Language Act. 
 
Treatment 2 
In the referendum, a majority of voters rejected the proposal to introduce an 
Irish Language Act. 
 
 
E1. Would you accept this decision taken by voters in the referendum [{to 
introduce}/{not introduce}] an Irish Language Act? 
 
 
1 I would find this almost impossible to accept 
2 I would not like it, but could live with it if I had to 
3 I would happily accept the decision 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted) 
 
 
E2. In the event of a future political crisis, would you be happy for a referendum 
to be called to try and overcome it? 
 
 
1 Yes, I would be happy 
2 No, I would not be happy 








To try and deal with the crisis, the parties agreed to set up a citizens’ 
assembly of ordinary people on the issue. The several hundred members of 
the citizens’ assembly were chosen at random, in the same way that legal 
juries are chosen, in order to produce a representative cross-section of the 
population in terms of age, gender, social class and religious and community 
background. They spent time receiving information on both sides of the 
argument and considering the evidence. 
 
Treatment 1 
The citizens’ assembly considered the issue of Irish language rights and 
decided against introducing an Irish Language Act. 
 
Treatment 2 
The citizens’ assembly considered the issue of Irish language rights and 
decided in favour of introducing an Irish Language Act. 
 
 
F1. Would you accept this decision taken a citizens’ assembly of ordinary people 
[{to introduce}/{not introduce}] an Irish Language Act? 
 
 
1 I would find this almost impossible to accept 
2 I would not like it, but could live with it if I had to 
3 I would happily accept the decision 
8 (Don’t know; unprompted) 
 
 
F2. In the event of a future political crisis, would you be happy for a citizens’ 
assembly to try and overcome it? 
 
 
1 Yes, I would be happy 
2 No, I would not be happy 






ALL RESPONDENTS RECEIVE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS 
 
P1. Would you say that you are…?   
 SHOW CARD 
 
1 … very strongly unionist 
2 … fairly strongly unionist 
3 … neither unionist nor nationalist 
4 … fairly strongly nationalist 
5 … very strongly nationalist 
8 Don’t know 
 
 
P2. In general, how much do you trust…? 
 







… members of the 
public in Northern 
Ireland? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
b 
… people from a 
Protestant/unionist 
community background? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
c 
… people from a 
Catholic/nationalist 
community background? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
d … political parties in Northern Ireland? 1 2 3 4 5 8 
e … the British government? 1 2 3 4 5 8 
 
 
C1a. What was your age last birthday? 
 
State exact, and code: ________  
 
1 16-17 7 45-49 
2 18-24 8 50-54 
3 25-29 9 55-59 
4 30-34 10 60-64 






1 Male 2 Female 
 
 
C2. How many people are there in your household aged 16+ including yourself? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+ 
 
 
C3a. How many children under the age of 16 are there in your household? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
 
 
C1. Which of these best describes you? 
 
1 Single 





C4a. Is your home owned or rented? PROBE 
 
1 Owned outright 
2 Being bought on mortgage 
3 Rented NIHE 
4 Rented privately 
5 Other (specify) 
 
 
C7a. Which of these best describes you? MULTI CODE NOT ALLOWED 
 
1 In paid job Working full-time 30 hrs+/week 
2 Working 8-29 hrs/week 
3 Working less than 8 hrs/week 
4 No paid job Retired from full-time job 
5 Unemployed 
6 Housewife 
7 Student at third level education college or university 
8 Student at technical college or higher education institution 
9 Student at secondary or grammar school 
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10 Other (specify) 
 
 
C13. Which member of your household would you say is the CHIEF INCOME 
EARNER, that is the person with the largest income, whether from 
employment, pensions, state benefits, investments or any other sources?  (If 
equal income is claimed for two people, classify the elder as the C.I.E.) 
 
1 Self  Ask C15. 
2 Other Go to C13a. 
 
 
C13a. Name of Chief Income Earner (C.I.E.). 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C14. Is … related to you? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No; respondent is C.I.E. 
 
 
C15. Does the C.I.E. have a paid job full-time or part-time? ASK ALL 
 
1 Yes  Ask occupational details at C17. 
2 No Go to C16. 
 
 
SHOW CARD C16 
 
C16.  Looking at this card, please tell me the statement that best describes the 
C.I.E. Just read out the letter. 
 
1 A – Retired, gets pension from previous job Ask occupational 
details of previous 
job – C.17 
2 B – Unemployed, less than 2 months 
3 C – Sick, still receiving pay or statutory pay from job 
4 D – Widow, receiving pension from husband’s 
previous job Ask occupational 
details of husband’s 
previous job 5 E – Divorced/separated, receiving maintenance from 
ex-spouse 
6 F – Full-time student Code Social Class 
C1 at C.18 
7 G – Not working, private means Assess Social Class 
at C.18 
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8 H – Unemployed longer than 2 months 
Code Social Class E 
at C.18 
9 I – Sick - only receiving Income Support or Invalidity 
Benefit 
10 J – Receiving State Pension only 
 
 
C17a1. What is the C.I.E.’s job title? 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C17a2. What type of firm/organisation does/did (C.I.E.) work for? 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C17b. Does/did (C.I.E.) have any position/rank/grade in the organisation  
(i.e. responsible for the work of other people)? 
 
1 Yes  Ask C17c. 
2 No Go to C17e. 
 
 
C17c. What is the title of the position / rank / grade? PROMPT AS 
APPROPRIATE (Foreman, Sergeant, Office Manager, Executive, Officer 
etc.) 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
C17c. How many people is … responsible for? 
 
WRITE IN:  
 
 
C17e. Does … have any qualifications? 
 
1 Yes  Ask C17f. 
2 No Go to C18. 
 
 
C17f. What type of qualification is that? PROMPT AS APPROPRIATE: 
Apprenticeship, professional qualifications, University degree) 
 




C18. Social grade: 
 
1 A 4 C2 
2 B 5 D 
3 C1 6 E 
 
 
SHOW CARD C19 
 
C19.  Please tell me your estimation of the household’s annual income before tax.  
If you prefer tell me the letter beside the income band. 
 
1 G Under £5,000 8 N £35,000-£39,999 
2 H £5,000-£9,999 9 O £40,000-£49,999 
3 I £10,000-£14,999 10 P £50,000+ 
4 J £15,000-£19,999 11 Not applicable 
5 K £20,000-£24,999 12 Refused 
6 L £25,000-£29,999 00 DK 
7 M £30,000-£34,999 
 
 
SHOW CARD C23. 
 
C23. From this card, what is your community background? (i.e. the community in 
which the respondent was predominantly brought up) 
 
1 G – Protestant 
2 T – Catholic  
3 N – Other (specify) 
4 E – None 
5 P – Refused 
 
 
SHOW CARD C27 
 












SHOW CARD C7 
 
C7. Thinking about GENERAL ELECTIONS, to which political party are you 
most likely to give your first preference vote to in a future general election? 
SINGLE CODE ONLY 
 
 
1 W – Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
Thank and 
close 
2 M – Sinn Féin 
3 T – Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
4 J – SDLP 
5 F – Alliance Party 
6 H – Conservative Party 
7 R – Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 
8 E – Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 
9 S – Green Party 
10 B – NI21 
11 Q – United Kingdom Independence Party 
12 Other (specify)   
13 Unlikely to vote 




C8. Which political party are you inclined to support? 
 
1 W – Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
2 M – Sinn Féin 
3 T – Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
4 J – SDLP 
5 F – Alliance Party 
6 H – Conservative Party 
7 R – Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 
8 E – Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 
9 S – Green Party 
10 B – NI21 
11 Q – United Kingdom Independence Party 
12 Other (specify)   
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Supplementary Analysis (Chapter Four) 
 
 1 2 3 
 Decision Acceptance 
(Ref: Citizens’ Assembly)    

























ILA moderation - 6.250 (.138)*** 
5.907 
(.313)*** 
ILA moderation x  
Party Talks (British Govt) 
- - .815 
(.432) 
ILA moderation x  
Party Talks (Intl Diplomat) 
- - 2.291 
(.529) 
ILA moderation x  
Election 
- - .841 
(.434) 
ILA moderation x  
Direct Rule 
- - 1.091 
(.436) 
ILA moderation x  
Referendum 
- - 1.164 
(.741) 





N 1734 1734 1734 
-2 Log Likelihood 1740.50 1533.61 1528.41 
Nagelkerke R2 .06 .22 .23 
χ2 (d.f.)  62.72 (5)*** 269.60 (6)*** 274.80 (11)*** 
Entries are odds ratios from logistic regressions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is decision acceptance (accept/not accept). “ILA moderation” refers to the intensity of the 
respondent’s preference on an Irish Language Act (1 = moderate intensity; 0 = strong intensity). Odds 
ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive association; odds ratios less than 1 indicate a negative association. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A2: Moderating effects of ethno-nationalism (strength of position on the Irish 
Language Act) on decision acceptance across different modes of decision-making 
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 1 2 3 
 Decision Acceptance 
(Ref: Citizens’ Assembly)    

























Ethno-national moderation - 4.077 (.138)*** 
6.188 
(.330)*** 
Ethno-national moderation x 
Party Talks (British Govt) 
- - .638 
(.462) 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Party Talks (Intl Diplomat) 
- - .526 
(.480) 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Election 
- - .519 
(.450) 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Direct Rule 
- - 1.125 
(.463) 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Referendum 
- - .210 
(.641)** 





N 1734 1708 1708 
Log Likelihood 1740.50 1614.14 1603.81 
Nagelkerke R2 .06 .14 .15 
χ2 (d.f.)  62.72 (5)*** 161.17 (6)*** 171.50 (11)*** 
Entries are odds ratios from logistic regressions; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is decision acceptance (accept/not accept). “Ethno-national moderation” refers to the intensity of 
the respondent’s self-identified ethno-national identity (1 = moderate unionist/nationalist, or neither; 0 = 
strongly unionist/nationalist). Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a positive association; odds ratios less 
than 1 indicate a negative association. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A3: Moderating effects of ethno-nationalism (strength of self-identified 





Questionnaire from Online Experiments on Mini-Public Design 
(Study One in Chapters Five, Six & Seven) 
 
Participants on Opinium’s online panel were recruited to complete an online survey 
in between 19th February and 19th March 2018. Respondents were randomly 




 This study is about attitudes towards decision-making in Northern Ireland. 
The study has received approval from the Ethics Committee in the History, 
Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast.  
 
Your participation would involve reading a short passage and answering a 
series of questions on your attitudes about decision-making. It should take 
approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
 
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose not to participate, 
you do not need to provide any reason. Your decision will have no personal 
or academic consequences. If you choose to participate, you may withdraw at 
any time during the survey.  
 
Your responses will be confidential and anonymous.  
 
Results from the study will be used in academic research. If you have any 
questions about this study, or if you would like to stay informed about these 
results, please contact the Principal Investigator, James Pow: 
jpow01@qub.ac.uk  
 










B2. Please state your age. 
 




B3. Which of these applies to you? 
 
1 Working full time (30 or more hours per week) 
2 Working part time (8-29 hours per week) 
3 Working part time (less than 8 hours per week) 
4 Full time student 
5 Retired 
6 Unemployed 
7 Other not working 
 
 
B4. Where do you currently live? 
(Screening question; respondent must live in Northern Ireland to proceed) 
 
1 North East 
2 North West 
3 Yorkshire & Humberside 
4 East Midlands 
5 West Midlands 
6 East of England 
7 London 
8 South East 
9 South West 
10 Wales 
11 Scotland 
12 Northern Ireland 
13 Do not live in the UK 
 
 
B5. We would now like you to think about the chief income earner in your 
household, that is the person with the highest income. This may be you or it 
might be someone else.  
 
Which of the following groups does the chief income earner in your 
household belong to?  
 
(If the chief income earner is retired with an occupational pension, please 
enter their former occupation. Please only enter ‘retired’ if the chief income 
earner is only receiving the state pension. If the chief income earner has been 





1 Higher managerial/ professional/ administrative (e.g. established doctor, 
solicitor, board director in large organisation (200+ employees), top level 
civil servant/ public service employee, head teacher etc.) 
2 Intermediate managerial/ professional/ administrative (e.g. newly 
qualified (under 3 years) doctor, solicitor, board director of small 
organisation, middle manager in large organization, principal officer in 
civil service/ local government etc. 
3 Supervisory or clerical/ junior managerial/ professional/ administrator 
(e.g. office worker, student doctor, foreman with 25+ employees, sales 
person, student teacher etc.) 
4 Skilled manual worker (e.g. skilled bricklayer, carpenter, plumber, 
painter, bus/ ambulance driver, HGV driver, unqualified teaching 
assistant, pub/ bar worker etc.) 
5 Semi-skilled or unskilled manual worker (e.g. manual jobs that require 
no special training or qualifications, apprentices to be skilled trades, 
caretaker, cleaner, nursery school assistant, park keeper, non-HGV 
driver, shop assistant etc.) 
6 Student 
7 Retired and living on state pension only 
8 Unemployed for over 6 months or not working due to sickness 
 
 
B6. Which of the following cities do you live in or nearest to? Please select one 
response.  
(Screening question; respondents must live nearest to ‘Belfast’ to proceed) 
 
1 Belfast 10 London 
2 Birmingham 11 Manchester 
3 Brighton 12 Newcastle 
4 Bristol 13 Norwich 
5 Cardiff 14 Nottingham 
6 Edinburgh 15 Plymouth 
7 Glasgow 16 Sheffield 




RESPONDENTS ARE RANDOMLY ASSIGNED TO: 
 
è  GROUP 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D [= EXPERIMENT 1] 
è  GROUP 2A, 2B, 2C [= EXPERIMENT 2] 





Selection process: Citizens; sortition 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a citizens’ 
assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 100 ordinary members of the public. 
Members would be randomly chosen in the same way that legal juries are 
selected.  
 
A random sample of 100 citizens would be a cross-section of the Northern 
Ireland population in terms of age, gender, social class and religious and 
community background. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 




Selection process: Citizens + politicians; sortition 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a version of 
a citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 50 ordinary members of the public 
and 50 elected politicians.  
 
The ordinary members of the public would be randomly chosen in the same 
way that legal juries are selected. A random sample of 50 citizens would be a 
cross-section of the Northern Ireland population in terms of age, gender, 
social class and religious and community background. 
 
The political parties would appoint the remaining 50 members – in 
proportion to their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 





Selection process: Citizens; election 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a citizens’ 
assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 100 ordinary members of the public. 
Anyone would be able to put themselves forward to be a member, apart from 
politicians who currently hold elected office. 
 
They would then face an election. Out of all people who put themselves 
forward, the 100 people with the most votes would be selected to sit on the 
citizens’ assembly. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 






Selection process: Citizens + politicians; election 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a version of 
a citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 50 ordinary members of the public 
and 50 elected politicians.  
 
Any member of the public would be able to put themselves forward to be a 
member. They would face an election. Out of all members of the public who 
put themselves forward, the 50 people with the most votes would be selected 
to sit on the citizens’ assembly. 
 
The political parties would appoint the remaining 50 members – in 
proportion to their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 




Decision-making: Information + taking a decision 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in two phases: 
 
1. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides 
of the issue. 
 
2. Taking a Decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would 
then be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in 
the vote would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be 





Decision-making: Information + group discussion + taking a decision 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in three phases: 
 
1. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides of 
the issue. 
 
2. Group discussion 
Participants will then talk about the issue with each other, including with 
members from a different community. These discussions will take place in 
small groups of about ten participants, facilitated by a neutral 
chairperson. This will allow participants the opportunity to consider 
other perspectives as well as their own. They will be asked to try and 
think about common ground on the issue. 
 
3. Taking a decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would 
then be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in the 
vote would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be 





Decision-making: Information + imagined conversation + taking a decision 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in three phases: 
 
4. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides of 
the issue. 
 
5. Imagined conversation 
Participants will then independently spend time thinking about the issue. 
They will be asked to imagine that they are having a conversation with a 
person from another community about the issue. This will allow 
participants the opportunity to consider other perspectives as well as 
their own. They will be asked to try and think about common ground on 
the issue. 
 
6. Taking a decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would 
then be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in the 
vote would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be 





Decision-taking: Final decision by citizens’ assembly 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
 
On the specific issue of an Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, politicians would accept in 





Decision-taking: Recommendation by citizens’ assembly for politicians 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
 
On the specific issue of an Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
 
The decision would be a recommendation that would be put to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. In other words, politicians would have the final say on 





Decision-taking: Recommendation by citizens’ assembly for referendum 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
 
On the specific issue of Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
 
The decision would be a recommendation that would be put to all voters in a 
referendum. In other words, all citizens would have the final say on whether 
or not to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly. Politicians would 
agree in advance to implement this result. 
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PRESENTED TO ALL RESPONDENTS: 
 
  
Imagine the way in which a citizens’ assembly would deal with a political 
issue. As a way of making a decision, to what extent do you think this 
process would be…  
 
CA1. … fair or unfair? 
 
1 Extremely fair 
2 Mostly fair 
3 Slightly fair 
4 Neither fair nor unfair 
5 Slightly unfair 
6 Mostly unfair 
7 Extremely unfair 
 
 
CA2. … trustworthy or untrustworthy? 
 
1 Extremely trustworthy 
2 Mostly trustworthy 
3 Slightly trustworthy 
4 Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy 
5 Slightly untrustworthy 
6 Mostly untrustworthy 
7 Extremely untrustworthy 
 
 
CA3. … democratic or undemocratic? 
 
1 Extremely democratic 
2 Mostly democratic 
3 Slightly democratic 
4 Neither democratic nor undemocratic 
5 Slightly undemocratic 
6 Mostly undemocratic 
7 Extremely undemocratic 
 
 
CA4. … efficient or inefficient? 
 
1 Extremely efficient 
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2 Mostly efficient 
3 Slightly efficient 
4 Neither efficient nor inefficient 
5 Slightly inefficient 
6 Mostly inefficient 
7 Extremely inefficient 
 
 
CA5. … even-handed or discriminatory? 
 
1 Extremely even-handed 
2 Mostly even-handed 
3 Slightly even-handed 
4 Neither even-handed nor discriminatory 
5 Slightly discriminatory 
6 Mostly discriminatory 
7 Extremely discriminatory 
 
 
CA6. … acceptable or unacceptable? 
 
1 Extremely acceptable 
2 Mostly acceptable 
3 Slightly acceptable 
4 Neither acceptable nor unacceptable 
5 Slightly unacceptable 
6 Mostly unacceptable 
7 Extremely unacceptable 
 
 
CA7. … good or bad? 
 
1 Extremely good 
2 Mostly good 
3 Slightly good 
4 Neither good nor bad 
5 Slightly bad 
6 Mostly bad 




CA8. … competent or incompetent? 
 
1 Extremely competent 
2 Mostly competent 
3 Slightly competent 
4 Neither competent nor incompetent 
5 Slightly incompetent 
6 Mostly incompetent 
7 Extremely incompetent 
 
 
CA9. … supportable or unsupportable? 
 
1 Extremely supportable 
2 Mostly supportable 
3 Slightly supportable 
4 Neither supportable nor unsupportable 
5 Slightly unsupportable 
6 Mostly unsupportable 
7 Extremely unsupportable 
 
 
CA10. … credible or not credible? 
 
1 Extremely credible 
2 Mostly credible 
3 Slightly credible 
4 Neither credible nor not credible 
5 Slightly not credible 
6 Mostly not credible 





PRESENTED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS IN GROUPS 1A, 1B, 1C & 1D: 
 
PE1. Think about how people are represented in Northern Ireland’s political 
system. How important is it to you that representation promotes political 
equality for everyone? 
 
1 Very important 
2 Mostly important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 
5 Not at all important 
 
 
PRESENTED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS IN GROUPS 2A, 2B & 2C: 
 
DL1. Think about how decisions are made in Northern Ireland’s political system. 
How important is it to you that decisions are made after extensive 
deliberation (that is, after the careful consideration of evidence and 
arguments on both sides of an issue)? 
 
1 Very important 
2 Mostly important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 
5 Not at all important 
 
 
PRESENTED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS IN GROUPS 3A, 3B & 3C: 
 
DE1. Think about how decisions are taken in Northern Ireland’s political system. 
How important is it to you that decisions do not discriminate against a 
particular group? 
 
1 Very important 
2 Mostly important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 





PRESENTED TO ALL RESPONDENTS: 
 
  
Now think about the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont. 
 
When it comes to the way in which the Northern Ireland Assembly makes 
decisions, to what extent do you think its decision-making process is…  
 
 
NIA1. … fair or unfair? 
 
1 Extremely fair 
2 Mostly fair 
3 Slightly fair 
4 Neither fair nor unfair 
5 Slightly unfair 
6 Mostly unfair 
7 Extremely unfair 
 
 
NIA2. … trustworthy or untrustworthy? 
 
1 Extremely trustworthy 
2 Mostly trustworthy 
3 Slightly trustworthy 
4 Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy 
5 Slightly untrustworthy 
6 Mostly untrustworthy 
7 Extremely untrustworthy 
 
 
NIA3. … democratic or undemocratic? 
 
1 Extremely democratic 
2 Mostly democratic 
3 Slightly democratic 
4 Neither democratic nor undemocratic 
5 Slightly undemocratic 
6 Mostly undemocratic 





NIA4. … efficient or inefficient? 
 
1 Extremely efficient 
2 Mostly efficient 
3 Slightly efficient 
4 Neither efficient nor inefficient 
5 Slightly inefficient 
6 Mostly inefficient 
7 Extremely inefficient 
 
 
NIA5. … even-handed or discriminatory? 
 
1 Extremely even-handed 
2 Mostly even-handed 
3 Slightly even-handed 
4 Neither even-handed nor discriminatory 
5 Slightly discriminatory 
6 Mostly discriminatory 
7 Extremely discriminatory 
 
 
NIA6. … acceptable or unacceptable? 
 
1 Extremely acceptable 
2 Mostly acceptable 
3 Slightly acceptable 
4 Neither acceptable nor unacceptable 
5 Slightly unacceptable 
6 Mostly unacceptable 
7 Extremely unacceptable 
 
 
NIA7. … good or bad? 
 
1 Extremely good 
2 Mostly good 
3 Slightly good 
4 Neither good nor bad 
5 Slightly bad 
6 Mostly bad 
		 338 
7 Extremely bad 
 
 
NIA8. … competent or incompetent? 
 
1 Extremely competent 
2 Mostly competent 
3 Slightly competent 
4 Neither competent nor incompetent 
5 Slightly incompetent 
6 Mostly incompetent 
7 Extremely incompetent 
 
 
NIA9. … supportable or unsupportable? 
 
1 Extremely supportable 
2 Mostly supportable 
3 Slightly supportable 
4 Neither supportable nor unsupportable 
5 Slightly unsupportable 
6 Mostly unsupportable 
7 Extremely unsupportable 
 
 
NIA10. … credible or not credible? 
 
1 Extremely credible 
2 Mostly credible 
3 Slightly credible 
4 Neither credible nor not credible 
5 Slightly not credible 
6 Mostly not credible 




PA1. If there were an election for the Northern Ireland Assembly tomorrow, which 
political party would you vote for? 
 
1 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
2 Sinn Féin 
3 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
4 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
5 Alliance 
6 Other (specify) 
7 Would not vote 
8 Don’t know 
 
 
PA2. Would you say that you are… 
 
1 … very strongly unionist? 
2 … fairly strongly unionist? 
3 … neither unionist nor nationalist? 
4 … fairly strongly nationalist? 
5 … very strongly nationalist? 
8 Don’t know 
 
 




3 Other religion 
4 No religion 
5 Prefer not to say 
 
 
PA4. In general, how much do you trust…? 
 
  Trust 
a lot 






… members of the 
public in Northern 
Ireland? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
b 
… people from a 
Protestant/unionist 
community background? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
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c 
… people from a 
Catholic/nationalist 
community background? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
d … political parties in Northern Ireland? 1 2 3 4 5 8 






Supplementary Analysis (Chapter Five) 	
Tables A4 and A5 present factor analysis for each of the ten-item legitimacy scales 
used in Studies One and Two of Chapter Five. 
 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 1 




Fair/unfair .864 .797 
Trustworthy/untrustworthy .920 .833 
Democratic/undemocratic .859 .792 
Efficient/inefficient .797 .775 
Even-handed/discriminatory .881 .812 
Acceptable/unacceptable .947 .854 
Good/bad .940 .906 
Competent/incompetent .908 .844 
Supportable/unsupportable .942 .873 
Credible/not credible .939 .868 
Table A4: Factor matrix for citizens’ assembly legitimacy scale and Northern 
Ireland Assembly legitimacy scale (Study One) 
 
Factor loadings are unrotated: since only one factor was extracted for each scale, the solutions could 
not be rotated. All items had a loading greater than .5, and so all items were retained in each scale. 





 Factor 1 Factor 1 




Fair/unfair .909 .567 
Trustworthy/untrustworthy .921 .837 
Democratic/undemocratic .864 .807 
Efficient/inefficient .876 .757 
Even-handed/discriminatory .903 .765 
Acceptable/unacceptable .940 .897 
Good/bad .945 .917 
Competent/incompetent .913 .874 
Supportable/unsupportable .939 .915 
Credible/not credible .944 .918 
Table A5: Factor matrix for citizens’ assembly legitimacy scale and Northern 
Ireland Assembly legitimacy scale (Study Two) 
 
Factor loadings are unrotated: since only one factor was extracted for each scale, the solutions could 
not be rotated. All items had a loading greater than .5, and so all items were retained in each scale. 




Tables A6 and A7 present alternative analyses for the experiment in Study One of 
Chapter Five. Table A6 presents ANOVA with all respondents; Table A7 presents 
ANOVA for only those respondents who passed the manipulation checks. Dropping 















Regression 16.496 3 5.499 1.922 .126 
Residual 938.313 328 2.861   
Total 954.810 331    
Table A6: ANOVA for Study One experiment (all respondents) 
 
 










Regression 27.665 3 9.222 3.707 0.13 
Residual 333.361 134 2.488   
Total 361.026 137    





Tables A8 and A9 present alternative analyses for the experiment in Study Two of 
Chapter Five. Table A8 presents ANOVA with all respondents; Table A9 presents 
ANOVA for only those respondents who passed the manipulation checks. Dropping 















Regression 4.695 3 1.565 .560 .642 
Residual 906.190 324 2.797   
Total 910.885 327    
Table A8: ANOVA for Study Two experiment (all respondents) 
 
 










Regression 8.743 3 2.914 1.047 .372 
Residual 773.466 278 2.782   
Total 782.209 281    





Tables A10 to A12 present multiple regression analyses to test for moderating effects 




 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: Citizens only; sortition)    















Political equality - .519 (.108)*** 
.839 
(.166)*** 
Political equality x  
Mixed members; sortition 
- - -.964 
(.373)** 
Political equality x  
Citizens only; election 
- - -.362 
(.279) 
Political equality x 
Mixed members; election 
- - -.552 
(.270)** 





N 281 280 280 
Adjusted R2 .00 .07 .09 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). The perceived 
importance of political equality is measured on a five-point scale (1= not at all important; 5 = extremely 
important). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A10: The moderating effect of perceived importance of political equality on 
the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly 
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 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: Citizens only; sortition)    















Ethno-national moderation - .425*** (.118) 
.607 
(.225)*** 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Mixed members; sortition 
- - -.649 
(.349)* 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Citizens only; election 
- - -.230 
(.323) 
Ethno-national moderation x 
Mixed members; election 
- - .010 
(.318) 





N 281 278 278 
Adjusted R2 .00 .04 .05 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). Ethno-national 
moderation is measured on a three-point scale (1 = very strongly unionist/nationalist; 1 = fairly strongly 
unionist/nationalist; 2 = neither unionist/nationalist). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A11: The moderating effect of ethno-national ideology on the perceived 




 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: Citizens only; sortition)    















Catholic (ref: Protestant) - .816 (.241)*** 
1.425 
(.479)*** 
Catholic x  
Mixed members; sortition 
- - -.337 
(.712) 
Catholic x  
Citizens only; election 
- - -.938 
(.703) 
Catholic x 
Mixed members; election 
- - -1.045 
(.641) 





N 281 221 221 
Adjusted R2 .00 .04 .04 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). Community 
background is operationalised as a dummy variable (1 = Catholic; 0 = Protestant). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A12: The moderating effect of community background on the perceived 







Supplementary Analysis (Chapter Six) 	
Tables A13 and A14 present factor analysis for each of the ten-item legitimacy 
scales used in Studies One and Two of Chapter Six. 
 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 1 




Fair/unfair .849 .783 
Trustworthy/untrustworthy .885 .847 
Democratic/undemocratic .865 .809 
Efficient/inefficient .805 .679 
Even-handed/discriminatory .838 .814 
Acceptable/unacceptable .937 .906 
Good/bad .943 .912 
Competent/incompetent .889 .852 
Supportable/unsupportable .942 .921 
Credible/not credible .936 .888 
Table A13: Factor matrix for citizens’ assembly legitimacy scale and Northern 
Ireland Assembly legitimacy scale (Study One) 
 
Factor loadings are unrotated: since only one factor was extracted for each scale, the solutions could 
not be rotated. All items had a loading greater than .5, and so all items were retained in each scale. 





 Factor 1 Factor 1 




Fair/unfair .887 .439 
Trustworthy/untrustworthy .906 .808 
Democratic/undemocratic .851 .799 
Efficient/inefficient .836 .760 
Even-handed/discriminatory .876 .719 
Acceptable/unacceptable .939 .884 
Good/bad .944 .906 
Competent/incompetent .896 .869 
Supportable/unsupportable .938 .894 
Credible/not credible .937 .882 
Table A14: Factor matrix for citizens’ assembly legitimacy scale and Northern 
Ireland Assembly legitimacy scale (Study Two) 
 
Factor loadings are unrotated: since only one factor was extracted for each scale, the solutions could 
not be rotated. All items had a loading greater than .5 apart from the fairness item on the Northern 
Ireland Assembly scale. However, all ten items are included in the final sets of scales since its factor 
loading is reasonably borderline (.44) and since the fairness item has loaded highly on identical multi-
item legitimacy scales. In other words, this lower factor loading for the fairness item appears to be 
anomalous. Cronbach’s α= .974 (citizens’ assembly ten-item scale); .939 (Northern Ireland 
Assembly ten-item scale). 
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Tables A15 and A16 present alternative analyses for the experiment in Study One of 
Chapter Six. Table A15 presents ANOVA with all respondents; Table A16 presents 
ANOVA for only those respondents who passed the manipulation checks. Dropping 















Regression 2.780 2 1.390 .567 .568 
Residual 642.940 262 2.454   
Total 645.720 264    
Table A15: ANOVA for Study One experiment (all respondents) 
 
 










Regression .967 2 .484 .197 .821 
Residual 291.734 119 2.452   
Total 292.702 121    




Tables A17 and A18 present alternative analyses for the experiment in Study Two of 
Chapter Six. Table A17 presents ANOVA with all respondents; Table A18 presents 
ANOVA for only those respondents who passed the manipulation checks. Dropping 















Regression 3.478 2 1.739 .640 .528 
Residual 731.550 269 2.720   
Total 735.029 271    
Table A17: ANOVA for Study Two experiment (all respondents) 
 
 










Regression 3.252 2 1.626 .594 .553 
Residual 692.230 253 2.736   
Total 695.482 255    





Tables A19 to A21 present multiple regression analyses to test for moderating effects 




 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: External deliberation)    










Deliberation  - .378 (.138)*** 
.785 
(.216)*** 
Deliberation x  
Information only 
- - -1.007 
(.334)*** 
Deliberation x  
Internal deliberation 
- - -.378 
(.324) 





N 255 254 254 
Adjusted R2 -.00 .02 .05 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). The perceived 
importance of deliberation is measured on a five-point scale (1= not at all important; 5 = extremely 
important). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A19: The moderating effect of perceived importance of deliberation on the 




 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: External deliberation)    










Ethno-national moderation  - .448 (.127)*** 
.721 
(.225)*** 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Information only 
- - -.638 
(.308)** 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Internal deliberation 
- - -.141 
(.314) 





N 255 250 250 
Adjusted R2 -.00 .04 .05 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). Ethno-national 
moderation is measured on a three-point scale (1 = very strongly unionist/nationalist; 1 = fairly strongly 
unionist/nationalist; 2 = neither unionist/nationalist). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A20: The moderating effect of ethno-national ideology on the perceived 
legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly 
  
		 354 
 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: External deliberation)    










Catholic (ref: Protestant) - .633 (.213)*** 
1.400 
(.440)*** 
Catholic x  
Information only 
- - -.608 
(.575) 
Catholic x  
Internal deliberation 
- - -1.534 
(.586)*** 





N 255 205 205 
Adjusted R2 -.00 .04 .06 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). Community 
background is operationalised as a dummy variable (1 = Catholic; 0 = Protestant). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A21: The moderating effect of community background on the perceived 







Supplementary Analysis (Chapter Seven) 		
Tables A22 and A23 present factor analysis for each of the ten-item legitimacy 
scales used in Studies One and Two of Chapter Seven. 
 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 1 




Fair/unfair .872 .811 
Trustworthy/untrustworthy .908 .852 
Democratic/undemocratic .853 .860 
Efficient/inefficient .735 .757 
Even-handed/discriminatory .868 .824 
Acceptable/unacceptable .937 .879 
Good/bad .951 .887 
Competent/incompetent .896 .855 
Supportable/unsupportable .948 .866 
Credible/not credible .941 .873 
Table A22: Factor matrix for citizens’ assembly legitimacy scale and Northern 
Ireland Assembly legitimacy scale (Study One) 
 
Factor loadings are unrotated: since only one factor was extracted for each scale, the solutions could 
not be rotated. All items had a loading greater than .5, and so all items were retained in each scale. 





 Factor 1 Factor 1 




Fair/unfair .910 .406 
Trustworthy/untrustworthy .915 .834 
Democratic/undemocratic .898 .852 
Efficient/inefficient .783 .776 
Even-handed/discriminatory .912 .676 
Acceptable/unacceptable .941 .890 
Good/bad .947 .905 
Competent/incompetent .896 .875 
Supportable/unsupportable .937 .917 
Credible/not credible .949 .892 
Table A23: Factor matrix for citizens’ assembly legitimacy scale and Northern 
Ireland Assembly legitimacy scale (Study Two) 
 
Factor loadings are unrotated: since only one factor was extracted for each scale, the solutions could 
not be rotated. All items had a loading greater than .5 apart from the fairness item on the Northern 
Ireland Assembly scale. However, all ten items are included in the final sets of scales since its factor 
loading is reasonably borderline (.41) and since the fairness item has loaded highly on identical multi-
item legitimacy scales. In other words, this lower factor loading for the fairness item appears to be 
anomalous. Cronbach’s α= .976 (citizens’ assembly ten-item scale); .943 (Northern Ireland 
Assembly ten-item scale). 
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Tables A24 and A25 present alternative analyses for the experiment in Study One of 
Chapter Seven. Table A24 presents ANOVA with all respondents; Table A25 
presents ANOVA for only those respondents who passed the manipulation checks. 















Regression 7.083 2 3.541 1.318 .270 
Residual 674.579 251 2.688   
Total 681.662 253    
Table A24: ANOVA for Study One experiment (all respondents) 
 
 










Regression 11.021 2 5.511 2.032 .134 
Residual 428.501 158 2.712   
Total 439.522 160    




Tables A26 and A27 present alternative analyses for the experiment in Study Two of 
Chapter Seven. Table A26 presents ANOVA with all respondents; Table A27 
presents ANOVA for only those respondents who passed the manipulation checks. 















Regression 13.100 2 6.550 2.222 .110 
Residual 848.919 288 2.948   
Total 862.019 290    
Table A26: ANOVA for Study Two experiment (all respondents) 
 
 










Regression 11.751 2 5.875 1.995 .138 
Residual 771.551 262 2.945   
Total 783.302 264    





Tables A28 to A30 present multiple regression analyses to test for moderating effects 




 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: Referendum 
recommendation) 
   










Non-tyranny  - .353 (.131)*** 
.446 
(.188)** 
Non-tyranny x  
Binding decision 
- - .209 
(.309) 
Non-tyranny x  
NI Assembly recommendation 
- - -.621 
(.323)* 





N 264 264 264 
Adjusted R2 .01 .03 .05 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). The perceived 
importance of non-tyranny is measured on a five-point scale (1= not at all important; 5 = extremely 
important). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A28: The moderating effect of perceived importance of non-tyranny on the 




 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: Referendum 
recommendation) 
   










Ethno-national moderation - .611 (.124)*** 
.761 
(.208)*** 
Ethno-national moderation x  
Binding decision 
- - -.247 
(.299) 
Ethno-national moderation x  
NI Assembly recommendation 
- - -.219 
(.306) 





N 264 262 262 
Adjusted R2 .01 .09 .08 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). Ethno-national 
moderation is measured on a three-point scale (1 = very strongly unionist/nationalist; 1 = fairly strongly 
unionist/nationalist; 2 = neither unionist/nationalist). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A29: The moderating effect of ethno-national ideology on the perceived 
legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly 
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 1 2 3 
 Perceived Legitimacy of Citizens’ Assembly 
(Ref: Referendum 
recommendation) 
   










Catholic (ref: Protestant)  - .021 (.253) 
-.004 
(.427) 
Catholic x  
Binding decision 
- - .012 
(.622) 
Catholic x  
NI Assembly recommendation 
- - 0.64 
(.614) 





N 264 208 208 
Adjusted R2 .01 -.01 -.02 
Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is the perceived legitimacy of each model of citizens’ assembly (mean of ten-item scale). Community 
background is operationalised as a dummy variable (1 = Catholic; 0 = Protestant). 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table A30: The moderating effect of community background on the perceived 





Questionnaire from Online Experiments on Mini-Public Design 
(Study Two in Chapters Five, Six & Seven) 
 
Participants on LucidTalk’s online panel were recruited to complete an online 
survey between 3rd and 5th June 2018. Respondents were randomly assigned to 
receive one of ten vignette-based treatments, constituting three distinct experiments.  
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
 This study is about attitudes towards decision-making in Northern Ireland. 
The study has received approval from the Ethics Committee in the History, 
Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast.  
 
Your participation would involve reading a short passage and answering a 
series of questions on your attitudes about decision-making. It should take 
approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
 
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose not to participate, 
you do not need to provide any reason. Your decision will have no personal 
or academic consequences. If you choose to participate, you may withdraw at 
any time during the survey.  
 
Your responses will be confidential and anonymous.  
 
Results from the study will be used in academic research. If you have any 
questions about this study, or if you would like to stay informed about these 
results, please contact the Principal Investigator, James Pow: 
jpow01@qub.ac.uk  
 

















B2. Please select your age group. 
 
1 18-24 years 3 45-64 years 
2 25-44 years 4 65+ years 
 
 
B3. Which of these applies to you? 
 
1 Working full time (30 or more hours per week) 
2 Working part time (8-29 hours per week) 
3 Working part time (less than 8 hours per week) 
4 Full time student 
5 Retired 
6 Unemployed 
7 Other not working 
 
B4. We would now like you to think about the chief income earner in your 
household, that is the person with the highest income. This may be you or it 
might be someone else.  
 
Which of the following groups does the chief income earner in your 
household belong to?  
 
(If the chief income earner is retired with an occupational pension, please 
enter their former occupation. Please only enter ‘retired’ if the chief income 
earner is only receiving the state pension. If the chief income earner has been 




1 Senior or middle manager/company director/doctor/lawyer etc. 
2 Junior manager/small business owner/skilled 
trade/engineer/teacher/farmer etc. 
3 Clerk/tradesman/driver/labourer etc. 
4 Unemployed/on benefits/temporarily not working etc. 
5 Retired/housewife/househusband 
6 Student/full-time education/training 
 
 
RESPONDENTS ARE RANDOMLY ASSIGNED TO: 
 
è  GROUP 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D [= EXPERIMENT 1] 
è  GROUP 2A, 2B, 2C [= EXPERIMENT 2] 




Selection process: Citizens; sortition 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a citizens’ 
assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 100 ordinary members of the public. 
Members would be randomly chosen in the same way that legal juries are 
selected.  
 
A random sample of 100 citizens would be a cross-section of the Northern 
Ireland population in terms of age, gender, social class and religious and 
community background. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it. 
 
 The graphic below summarises the membership of the citizens’ 
assembly: 
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GROUP [1B]: 
Selection process: Citizens + politicians; sortition 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a version of 
a citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 50 ordinary members of the public 
and 50 elected politicians.  
 
The ordinary members of the public would be randomly chosen in the same 
way that legal juries are selected. A random sample of 50 citizens would be a 
cross-section of the Northern Ireland population in terms of age, gender, 
social class and religious and community background. 
 
The political parties would appoint the remaining 50 members – in 
proportion to their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it. 
 
 The graphic below summarises the membership of the citizens’ 
assembly: 
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GROUP [1C]: 
Selection process: Citizens; election 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a citizens’ 
assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 100 ordinary members of the public. 
Anyone would be able to put themselves forward to be a member, apart from 
politicians who currently hold elected office. 
 
They would then face an election. Out of all people who put themselves 
forward, the 100 people with the most votes would be selected to sit on the 
citizens’ assembly. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it. 
 







Selection process: Citizens + politicians; election 
 
 
 Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which politicians are divided 
over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a version of 
a citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of 50 ordinary members of the public 
and 50 elected politicians.  
 
Any member of the public would be able to put themselves forward to be a 
member. They would face an election. Out of all members of the public who 
put themselves forward, the 50 people with the most votes would be selected 
to sit on the citizens’ assembly. 
 
The political parties would appoint the remaining 50 members – in 
proportion to their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the contentious issue, consider the 
evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and then decide 
on the best way forward. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, the government would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it. 
 
 The graphic below summarises the membership of the citizens’ 
assembly: 
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GROUP [2A]: 
Decision-making: Information + taking a decision 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in two phases: 
 
1. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides 
of the issue. 
 
2. Taking a Decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would 
then be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in 
the vote would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be 
implemented.   
 








Decision-making: Information + group discussion + taking a decision 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in three phases: 
 
1. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides of 
the issue. 
 
2. Group discussion 
Participants will then talk about the issue with each other, including with 
members from a different community. These discussions will take place in 
small groups of about ten participants, facilitated by a neutral 
chairperson. This will allow participants the opportunity to consider 
other perspectives as well as their own. They will be asked to try and 
think about common ground on the issue. 
 
3. Taking a decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would 
then be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in the 
vote would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be 
implemented.   
 






Decision-making: Information + imagined conversation + taking a decision 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward. On these issues, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead.  
 
The citizens’ assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is 
representative of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would 
be randomly chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider an issue in three phases: 
 
4. Receiving Information 
Participants in the citizens’ assembly will be assumed to have no prior 
knowledge of the issue in question. They will all be provided with 
background information and presented with arguments from both sides of 
the issue. 
 
5. Imagined conversation 
Participants will then independently spend time thinking about the issue. 
They will be asked to imagine that they are having a conversation with a 
person from another community about the issue. This will allow 
participants the opportunity to consider other perspectives as well as 
their own. They will be asked to try and think about common ground on 
the issue. 
 
6. Taking a decision 
After learning about the issue, members of the citizens’ assembly would 
then be asked to vote on it. What a majority of these people decided in the 
vote would be seen as the decision on the issue and would be 
implemented.   
 






Decision-taking: Final decision by citizens’ assembly 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
 
On the specific issue of an Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
 
The decision would be final. In other words, politicians would accept in 
advance the decision of the citizens’ assembly and agree to implement it.	
 








Decision-taking: Recommendation by citizens’ assembly for politicians 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
 
On the specific issue of an Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
 
The decision would be a recommendation that would be put to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. In other words, politicians would have the final say on 
whether or not to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly. 
	









Decision-taking: Recommendation by citizens’ assembly for referendum 
 
 
Please read the following proposal. 
 
In Northern Ireland, there are some issues on which elected politicians are 
divided over the way forward, notably on Irish language legislation. 
 
On the specific issue of Irish language policy, it has been proposed that a 
citizens’ assembly could decide on the way forward instead. The citizens’ 
assembly would consist of a group of ordinary citizens that is representative 
of the whole population of Northern Ireland. Members would be randomly 
chosen, in the same way that legal juries are selected. 
 
The citizens’ assembly would consider the existing policy disagreement, 
consider the evidence on different perspectives and different arguments, and 
then reach a decision on Irish language policy. 
 
The decision would be a recommendation that would be put to all voters in a 
referendum. In other words, all citizens would have the final say on whether 
or not to implement the decision of the citizens’ assembly. Politicians would 
agree in advance to implement this result. 
	








PRESENTED TO ALL RESPONDENTS: 
 
  
Imagine the way in which a citizens’ assembly would deal with a political 
issue. As a way of making a decision, to what extent do you think this 
process would be…  
 
CA1. … fair or unfair? 
 
1 Extremely fair 
2 Mostly fair 
3 Slightly fair 
4 Neither fair nor unfair 
5 Slightly unfair 
6 Mostly unfair 
7 Extremely unfair 
 
 
CA2. … trustworthy or untrustworthy? 
 
1 Extremely trustworthy 
2 Mostly trustworthy 
3 Slightly trustworthy 
4 Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy 
5 Slightly untrustworthy 
6 Mostly untrustworthy 
7 Extremely untrustworthy 
 
 
CA3. … democratic or undemocratic? 
 
1 Extremely democratic 
2 Mostly democratic 
3 Slightly democratic 
4 Neither democratic nor undemocratic 
5 Slightly undemocratic 
6 Mostly undemocratic 
7 Extremely undemocratic 
 
 
CA4. … efficient or inefficient? 
 
1 Extremely efficient 
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2 Mostly efficient 
3 Slightly efficient 
4 Neither efficient nor inefficient 
5 Slightly inefficient 
6 Mostly inefficient 
7 Extremely inefficient 
 
 
CA5. … even-handed or discriminatory? 
 
1 Extremely even-handed 
2 Mostly even-handed 
3 Slightly even-handed 
4 Neither even-handed nor discriminatory 
5 Slightly discriminatory 
6 Mostly discriminatory 
7 Extremely discriminatory 
 
 
CA6. … acceptable or unacceptable? 
 
1 Extremely acceptable 
2 Mostly acceptable 
3 Slightly acceptable 
4 Neither acceptable nor unacceptable 
5 Slightly unacceptable 
6 Mostly unacceptable 
7 Extremely unacceptable 
 
 
CA7. … good or bad? 
 
1 Extremely good 
2 Mostly good 
3 Slightly good 
4 Neither good nor bad 
5 Slightly bad 
6 Mostly bad 




CA8. … competent or incompetent? 
 
1 Extremely competent 
2 Mostly competent 
3 Slightly competent 
4 Neither competent nor incompetent 
5 Slightly incompetent 
6 Mostly incompetent 
7 Extremely incompetent 
 
 
CA9. … supportable or unsupportable? 
 
1 Extremely supportable 
2 Mostly supportable 
3 Slightly supportable 
4 Neither supportable nor unsupportable 
5 Slightly unsupportable 
6 Mostly unsupportable 
7 Extremely unsupportable 
 
 
CA10. … credible or not credible? 
 
1 Extremely credible 
2 Mostly credible 
3 Slightly credible 
4 Neither credible nor uncredible 
5 Slightly uncredible 
6 Mostly uncredible 





PRESENTED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS IN GROUPS 1A, 1B, 1C & 1D: 
 
PE1. Think about how people are represented in Northern Ireland’s political 
system. How important is it to you that representation promotes political 
equality for everyone? 
 
1 Very important 
2 Mostly important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 
5 Not at all important 
 
 
PRESENTED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS IN GROUPS 2A, 2B & 2C: 
 
DL1. Think about how decisions are made in Northern Ireland’s political system. 
How important is it to you that decisions are made after extensive 
deliberation (that is, after the careful consideration of evidence and 
arguments on both sides of an issue)? 
 
1 Very important 
2 Mostly important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 
5 Not at all important 
 
 
PRESENTED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS IN GROUPS 3A, 3B & 3C: 
 
DE1. Think about how decisions are taken in Northern Ireland’s political system. 
How important is it to you that decisions do not discriminate against a 
particular group? 
 
1 Very important 
2 Mostly important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 





PRESENTED TO ALL RESPONDENTS: 
 
  
Now think about the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont when it is 
functioning. 
 
When it comes to the way in which the Northern Ireland Assembly makes 
decisions, to what extent do you think its decision-making process is…  
 
 
NIA1. … fair or unfair? 
 
1 Extremely fair 
2 Mostly fair 
3 Slightly fair 
4 Neither fair nor unfair 
5 Slightly unfair 
6 Mostly unfair 
7 Extremely unfair 
 
 
NIA2. … trustworthy or untrustworthy? 
 
1 Extremely trustworthy 
2 Mostly trustworthy 
3 Slightly trustworthy 
4 Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy 
5 Slightly untrustworthy 
6 Mostly untrustworthy 
7 Extremely untrustworthy 
 
 
NIA3. … democratic or undemocratic? 
 
1 Extremely democratic 
2 Mostly democratic 
3 Slightly democratic 
4 Neither democratic nor undemocratic 
5 Slightly undemocratic 
6 Mostly undemocratic 
7 Extremely undemocratic 
 
NIA4. … efficient or inefficient? 
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1 Extremely efficient 
2 Mostly efficient 
3 Slightly efficient 
4 Neither efficient nor inefficient 
5 Slightly inefficient 
6 Mostly inefficient 
7 Extremely inefficient 
 
 
NIA5. … even-handed or discriminatory? 
 
1 Extremely even-handed 
2 Mostly even-handed 
3 Slightly even-handed 
4 Neither even-handed nor discriminatory 
5 Slightly discriminatory 
6 Mostly discriminatory 
7 Extremely discriminatory 
 
 
NIA6. … acceptable or unacceptable? 
 
1 Extremely acceptable 
2 Mostly acceptable 
3 Slightly acceptable 
4 Neither acceptable nor unacceptable 
5 Slightly unacceptable 
6 Mostly unacceptable 
7 Extremely unacceptable 
 
 
NIA7. … good or bad? 
 
1 Extremely good 
2 Mostly good 
3 Slightly good 
4 Neither good nor bad 
5 Slightly bad 
6 Mostly bad 




NIA8. … competent or incompetent? 
 
1 Extremely competent 
2 Mostly competent 
3 Slightly competent 
4 Neither competent nor incompetent 
5 Slightly incompetent 
6 Mostly incompetent 
7 Extremely incompetent 
 
 
NIA9. … supportable or unsupportable? 
 
1 Extremely supportable 
2 Mostly supportable 
3 Slightly supportable 
4 Neither supportable nor unsupportable 
5 Slightly unsupportable 
6 Mostly unsupportable 
7 Extremely unsupportable 
 
 
NIA10. … credible or not credible? 
 
1 Extremely credible 
2 Mostly credible 
3 Slightly credible 
4 Neither credible nor uncredible 
5 Slightly uncredible 
6 Mostly uncredible 




PA1. If there were an election for the Northern Ireland Assembly tomorrow, which 
political party would you vote for? 
 
1 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
2 Sinn Féin 
3 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
4 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
5 Alliance 
6 Other (specify) 
7 Would not vote 
8 Don’t know 
 
 
PA2. In general, how much do you trust…? 
 







… members of the 
public in Northern 
Ireland? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
b 
… people from a 
Protestant/unionist 
community background? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
c 
… people from a 
Catholic/nationalist 
community background? 
1 2 3 4 5 8 
d … political parties in Northern Ireland? 1 2 3 4 5 8 
e … the British government? 1 2 3 4 5 8 
 
 
PA3. Would you say that you are… 
 
1 … very strongly unionist? 
2 … fairly strongly unionist? 
3 … neither unionist nor nationalist? 
4 … fairly strongly nationalist? 
5 … very strongly nationalist? 
8 Don’t know 
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PA4. What is your community background? NB: It's your choice how you 
determine your community, i.e. whether it's what you are now, or how you 




3 Other religion 
4 No religion 
5 Prefer not to say 
 
 
PA5. Your constituency: 
 
1 Belfast East 10 Mid Ulster 
2 Belfast North 11 Newry & Armagh 
3 Belfast South 12 North Antrim 
4 Belfast West 13 North Down 
5 East Antrim 14 South Antrim 
6 East Londonderry 15 South Antrim 
7 Fermanagh/S. Tyrone 16 Strangford 
8 Foyle 17 Upper Bann 
9 Lagan Valley 18 West Tyrone 
 
 
